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ABSTRACT 
WOMEN BECOMING LAWYERS: 
A PROCESS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES 
(May 1984) 
Jacqueline Smethurst, B.A., University of Oxford 
M.A., University of Oxford 
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor David Schuman 
This study examines the significance of the great increase of women 
entering law school and practice since 1970: 
In an historical context, examining the nature of law education 
from colonial times to the present, and placing the law education 
of women within that context. 
Second, within a theoretical framework, examining relevant 
theories of social and political organization which consider the 
nature of public and private life. This provides a context within 
which to consider the meaning of the great movement of women from a 
private world to a public world by means of law education. 
Third, by interviews with women law students and lawyers, to 
attempt to understand at an immediate level what it is like to be a 
woman in the field of law. 
The study raises the question of the meaning of women becoming law 
students and lawyers. Does it make a difference that women go to law 
school? To these women; to other women; to men; to male/female 
relationships; to the family; to the nature and practice of law? 
Entering the field of law has meaning for the individual lives of 
the women interviewed and affords opportunities for professional 
satisfaction previously unavailable to women. Major differences in 
women's experience are noted between high-pressure and low-pressure law 
practice. Women appear to make little difference to the way law is 
practiced. Impact on the family, however, is significant. New models 
of marriage and child-rearing are emerging to accommodate the 
professional involvement of women lawyers. 
Further research is suggested in three areas: 
Additional studies such as this in the areas of medicine and 
business, to create a broader foundation for hypotheses about the 
impact of women in the professions. 
Research which will incorporate the findings of this study with 
those of Carol Gilligan's studies. 
Studies to examine the components and impact on members of newly 
emerging structures of families in which the woman is a 
professional. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more 
than to think what we are doing. 
Hannah Arendt 
The Human Condition 
The ideas of law and a system of laws have held a central place in 
the development of American society. While the status of lawyers has 
varied, their political, economic and social influence has been 
consistent and extensive. Until the 1970's, this meant that the 
influence was almost entirely in the hands of men. The admission of two 
women to St. Louis Law School (now Washington University) in 1869 did 
not set significant precedent for other women: it would be a hundred 
years before women comprised more than 6% of the law school population. 
At this point, however, a dramatic rise in women's admissions to law 
schools began, until by 1980 women were 33% of all law students in the 
United States. 
The exclusionary mystique of the legal profession has been 
developed and maintained until the last decade by and for men. Some of 
the reasons for this are similar to those that obtain in most 
professions and significant social and political bodies and institutions 
in America; others are specific to the law profession. Mitchell makes a 
strong argument against succumbing to an analysis of sex discrimination 
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in only one sphere of society [1]; certainly a consideration of law 
education has to look beyond "equal education" for women. 
The issues of women in law education and practice may be 
conceptualized in three layers. The question of equal right to 
admission to law school, the history of women's efforts to assert this 
right, the gradual change in attitudes in educational institutions at 
the undergraduate and law school levels which have furthered this 
movement, all this is clearly in focus. Progress has been immense, from 
total exclusion before 1869 to the large numbers of women successfully 
competing for places at all law schools today. The second layer reveals 
that equality in the practice of the law is a more complex area than 
equality in education for the law. It is here to a greater extent that 
other structures compete and constrain, so that although there has been 
progress in the numbers of women practicing law, their numbers and role 
in the professions have not been as significant as law school enrollment 
of women would appear to predict. In the third layer, there are no 
statistics or objective signs of progress to be cited. This is the 
layer of the theoretical issues, which ideally would be the subject of 
investigation and discussion in college, in law school, and in women's 
law organizations. The results of such discussion would then inform 
women's approach to legal education and practice. Theoretical issues 
cluster around the questions of ultimate aims in women's entrance to the 
legal profession. Do women simply want equal access to a fair share of 
law school places, law jobs with government, corporations and private 
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firms? Do they want other societal structures changed sufficiently to 
support this design in realistic ways? What are and will be the effects 
on their political and personal relations with the neighboring sex? Do 
women aim to change the role of women and the role of law in society? 
Will this require or imply "an entire subversion of the present order of 
society?" These issues are usually addressed in this order, so that the 
more difficult ones are constantly postponed in favor of the easier 
ones. It is my view that all layers are important and attached to each 
other. Revolutionary theory and affirmative action statistics may be 
equally barren. A productive theory addresses the real history, needs 
and aspirations of women, and the most fruitful and rewarding action on 
the part of women is taken with an informing vision of the future. 
Purpose of the Study 
Thus, it is the purpose of this study to look at the significance 
of the second wave of law school admissions in three major ways: 
1. In an historical context, examining the nature of American law 
education from colonial times to the present, and placing the law 
education of women within that context. 
A. Law Education 
The notion of law education as men's education is 
apparent in the literature. Histories of law education and of 
individual law schools make little reference to women. 
Nevertheless, it is important to review the historical 
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development of law education in order to comprehend its force 
and direction, the context within which women have attempted 
to emerge as law students and practitioners. The growth of 
American law and the corresponding training and education of 
lawyers will be charted from Colonial America to the present. 
The issue of the extent to which the law is impartial or 
"instrumental" is raised (Hurst [2]; Horowitz [3]; Friedman 
[4]). This ambiguity has had an important effect on women 
attempting to gain access to the profession. In general, the 
resolution has been to maintain the professional and 
procedural image of impartiality while implementing a form of 
law tightly interwoven with specific interests in American 
social, political and economic development. This duality 
serves to confound analysts of the legal system, particularly 
those groups and individuals experiencing exclusion from power 
and privilege. 
1870, the year Dean Langdell began his twenty-five year 
appointment as dean of the Harvard Law School, heralds the 
beginning of the extended and powerful drive for "standards" 
in education for the legal profession. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, some states had ruled that any man "of good moral 
character" could be eligible for admission to the bar. After 
1870, the profession began its swing to the furthest distance 
from such a conception. Auerbach analyzes the impact on 
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ethnic groups of the elitism and exclusion inherent in the 
standards movement.!5] An organized bar and institutionalized 
system of law education also proved to be specific barriers to 
women's study and practice of the law. 
The development of law curriculum also reveals a movement 
towards homogenization and an avoidance of the great debate 
between the law's objectivity and its social involvement. The 
strength the law schools derive by this limitation is in their 
power to educate future practitioners according to legal and 
social status quo. This, together with the legal mystique 
maintained by lawyers as a body, little changed from 1831 when 
de Tocqueville noted their attachment to legality over 
freedom, strengthens the position of the law profession and 
its schools in restricting the access of women. 
B. Women's Law Education 
The literature available on the law education of women is 
slim. The first summary of women's gains in the field of law 
placed them within the history of women's education from 
ancient times and held that, "women's entrance into the 
highest professions, demanding the best powers, physical and 
mental, as well as the best educational facilities, is a more 
certain mark of her emancipation from the dominion of man and 
her freedom from the drudgery of life than her recent 
political privileges."[6] This optimistic view of social 
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progress has an encouraging quality, but ignores the reality 
of how very few women had entered the law profession between 
1869 and 1929. It is predicated on a notion that a series of 
individuals who are of the same sex, by taking similar 
actions, will become a force, inevitably gathering numbers and 
momentum. This was to a large extent the view of most women 
involved in confronting impeding institutions and laws until 
the beginning of the twentieth century women's movements in 
the 1960's and 1970's. I shall look at some of the 
differences between the nineteenth and twentieth century 
women's movements to demonstrate their impact on women's 
admission to the study and profession of law. 
Some of the individual achievements of women who entered 
law schools, studied law in other settings, and were admitted 
to the bar will be reviewed, with particular reference to 
articles by Barnes[7], Wallach[8], and Weisberg[9]. These 
stories will afford some understanding of the kinds of women 
who were attracted to the study of law and the central 
elements of opposition to them. 
2. Within a theoretical framework, examining relevant theories in 
three areas: concepts of achievement and oppression; feminist 
theories of patriarchy; and analyses of social and political 
organization which consider the nature of public and private life. 
This will provide an opportunity to consider in some detail the 
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meaning of the great movement of women from a private world to a 
public world by means of law education. I shall look at the 
following: 
(1) The historiographical question of whether the history of women 
should be viewed primarily as a history of their oppression 
and struggle; or whether it should be seen more strongly as 
one of achievement and the exercise of power, even though 
women have been excluded from the main institutions and 
organizations of power. This debate will lead to some of the 
questions around what constitutes significant achievement for 
the second wave of women lawyers. 
(2) Feminist theories of patriarchy. Much of the focus of the 
nineteenth century women leaders was on the symptoms of male 
domination; there was considerable faith in linear progress to 
be achieved through argument and legislation. Twentieth 
century analysts have more insistently examined the nature and 
structure of their situation. This section affords an 
evaluative review of twentieth century efforts to understand 
the status of women by defining and understanding the forces 
that affect them in a society comprehended as a patriarchy. 
(3) Views of public and private spheres. Arendt's exploration of 
the nature and meaning of life in the public and private 
realms in the ancient Greek world develops the notion that 
excellence can only be achieved in the public world, where one 
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is seen by one's peers rather than by one's familiars. Women 
were thus automatically excluded from aspiring to or achieving 
excellence, dwelling as they did within the household, 
devoting their time to the "maintenance of life."[10] I shall 
consider the ways in which such a vision of the public realm 
has informed women's drive to become students, makers and 
interpreters of laws. I shall also consider countering views 
offered by Rich[ll] and Elshtain[12]. Rich calls for "a 
steady, passionate attention to all female experience" as a 
prerequisite to "a more complex way of thinking about, thus 
more responsibly acting upon, the conditions of human 
life."[13] Elshtain directly challenges Arendt's claim to 
primacy for the political, asserting the force of Christianity 
in challenging that primacy by its elevation out of the 
household of virtues previously held to be domestic. 
3. By interviews with women law students and lawyers in practice. 
Since the rise in law school admissions is so recent, there is no 
generally agreed upon view even of its initial impact on the 
profession, on law education, on women, on men. It is therefore 
critical to pay attention to the thoughts and feelings of 
individual women who have been and are engaged in law education, as 
a way to ground theory in experience. As their particular stories 
emerge, I shall place them within the historical and theoretical 
frameworks of earlier chapters, and make judgments and predictions 
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for the future - both in the private and the public spheres - which 
extend the historical and theoretical perspective and enlarge the 
meaning of the women's individual experiences. 
The central concern of this study is with the meaning of law 
education for women. Does it make a difference that women go to law 
school? Does it make a difference to these women; to other women; to 
men; to relationships between men and women; to the nature and practice 
of law; to the quality of American public life? David Schuman notes 
that "it is not at all easy to think about and study meaning. But... 
meaning does not disappear simply because it is not studied."[14] It is 
not expected that this study will result in the discovery of the one 
meaning of women's law education and practice. Meaning will be 
different from one group to another, from one individual to another. 
"If there are many right answers to a question, and if I can live with 
most of them, it seems silly to limit anyone's choice to one 
answer. "[15] However, my; answer, my sense of the meaning will develop 
in the remaining chapters, from a process that gives due weight to the 
complexities of women's historical situation, to the value of feminist 
theory, and to the intricacies of individual women's experience and 
perception. 
The final chapter will return to the questions raised in the first 
chapter, the questions clustering around the issue of, "does it make a 
difference that women go to law school?" At this point I shall 
of the words and insights of Janet Rifkin, a lawyer, incorporate some 
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teacher, friend and adviser whom I interviewed, but whose relation to 
this study is too complex for her thoughts to be presented in Chapter V. 
Epstein in a four-hundred page book, the only book published on the 
topic of women and the law, addresses the questions of meaning in two 
paragraphs in the Introduction: 
Does it matter that women become lawyers? 1 think it does. Not 
only is the entry of women into the legal profession an important 
indicator of their general equality in American life, but it 
constitutes a broadening of the profession's responsiveness to the 
needs of all sectors of society... this is one of the most 
traditional and exclusive professions in the United States. It 
also provides access to important positions in business, 
government, and politics.[16] 
This is a fair summary of the generally acknowledged reasons for 
women to enter the field of law. I shall question these assumptions - 
does the influx of women make the profession more broadly responsive (or 
does the profession tend more to influence the values of the women); if 
law provides access to "important positions," what is their importance, 
and on what terms may women acquire access? I shall construct an 
account of the meaning of women's entrance to law school and practice 
which looks beyond "general equality." The conclusion will define, 
within an historical and theoretical framework, and taking into account 
the individual stories of the interviews, what is happening in this 
second wave of women lawyers. This careful description will point 
towards an understanding of the meaning of its consequent implications 
for change - for women, for men, and society. Is it possible for women 
lawyers to effect change in public life? And what have been and are 
likely to be the alterations in private experience for women, and men 
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and children as women have entered the law world? 
With so little research undertaken in the area of women and law 
education and practice, suggestions will be made for further exploration 
and research. This study represents an effort to deepen our 
understanding of the implications of a major shift in women1s work, so 
that future inquiries, scientific or theoretical, will take into account 
the breadth of issues addressed in this study. 
Autobiographical Note 
"The person doing the studying - the analyst - sorts out what is to 
be included and excluded according to a number of personal and 
professional reasons."[17] Only the most disingenuous would assert that 
the objectivity to which one may not lay claim in a study such as this, 
which elicits and sifts material from other women, will miraculously 
appear in confronting the self. Autobiographies notoriously conceal 
what we may have wanted to know about the writer; at the same time, they 
are revealing in their consonance with the writer's work. I shall, 
therefore, hope only to turn my attention to myself in this 
autobiographical note as a means to accentuate the themes that are 
important in this study, to acknowledge the studier in relation to the 
studied. 
It is clear that I am related to the women I have interviewed, 
although I have neither studied nor practiced law. Many people, on 
learning of this dissertation topic, have asked me if I plan to go to 
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law school. This response seems part of the current view of law as a 
desirable field for women, almost to the point of being fashionable, so 
that I find myself somewhat embarrassed in explaining that I have no 
interest in pursuing law as a career. 
So why am I interested in studying women lawyers? As I explain 
elsewhere, women and the field of law offer a paradigmatic opportunity 
to study women in relation to a movement in society, to consider their 
opportunities in a male-dominated profession, and to explore the impact 
of women entering the profession of law on other structures, groups, and 
individuals. But let me come in a little closer, by telling some 
stories. 
When I was a girl and thinking of what to be when I grew up, I was 
sure that I wanted to be a teacher. Eventually, when I chose English as 
my subject, I went to university expecting to become an English teacher. 
I came to the United States to do graduate work, and returned to England 
as a teacher. Until my last year of college, I never questioned my 
plans. I loved to read literature, I enjoyed school, I admired several 
of my teachers, I imagined I would be very happy teaching. Briefly, at 
the end of my undergraduate career, I had a sudden vision of 
schoolteaching as limiting and dull and, partly because of this, went 
abroad to avoid the sudden transition from the joys of Oxford to the 
confines of a school. 
I recall clearly that only a few other professional possibilities 
ever occurred to me or were suggested. I had one conversation as a 
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child with a friend about the possibility of our becoming nurses. We 
agreed that we were too awful at science for this to be realistic. On 
another occasion, a mistress suggested that my closest friend would be 
well suited to library work. I, too, thought that would be interesting, 
to be surrounded by books every day, but I felt that teaching was a 
profession offering more chance for activity and action (I probably 
meant talking). Thus, the three classic career options for an educated 
girl were presented: teaching, nursing, and library work. I did 
secretly consider being a missionary as more active and dramatic than 
any of these, but the Anglican rationality of my school and family was 
not conducive to such an aspiration. As an older schoolgirl I was, 
however, presented with another option by my father. He suggested that 
if I did not obtain a place at a good university, I could be articled to 
a solicitor, a process whereby I would have been qualified as a lawyer 
at the end of five years. I do not know why he made such an unusual 
suggestion so seriously to a daughter at a time when there was a 
negligible number of women solicitors or barristers in England. Its 
effect, however, was to enlarge my sense of career possibilites, while 
suggesting that law was something one might do if one couldn t do 
something really good, such as study the subject of one s choice. In 
light of the feminist commentary of the last decade, the extent to which 
I "chose" the study of English (the most popular field of study for a 
girl at that time in England) or the profession of teaching is doubtful. 
It appears that, as a girl, my career choices were limited, but that at 
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the same time the absence of career pressure contributed to my freedom 
to study a subject for which I had and still have a passion. 
For several years I had been very involved in theatre, and acted 
every term X was at Oxford. Several of my contemporaries went on to 
successful, and less than successul, careers in theatre, film, and 
television. I talked about this phase with Lisa Berger and Mary Hurley, 
who interviewed me during their Women's Oral History class in May, 1981: 
Jacqueline: I was very occupied with the theatre. And, of course, the 
way plays are written, there are only at the most three 
parts for women in any given play. There's the older 
character woman, and there's the ingenue, and then maybe 
one other part. So the theatre world is very dominated by 
men. The directors and producers are always men. Then 
there are always some slightly overweight women who play 
the character parts. And then there's this very small 
group of young women who compete for the leading role. So 
it's a very competitive, overtly sexist world - directors 
and producers quite openly say why they're picking a 
particular woman for a particular part and expect, quite 
overtly expect, these women to follow through on the 
implicit agreement. 
Lisa: So at the time that just seemed like the way things were. 
Jacqueline: Yes, what that challenged me to do was to work my way 
around it. I would think "Ah hah. This is the way it 
goes." You've got to sort of get the director to take you 
on. It wasn't auditions; after the first few plays, you 
don't generally audition. They just pick you from other 
plays. If you want to act, that's the way it is. It's no 
good walking around saying, "I don't play this game." You 
don't get any parts. They're not interested. You can go 
have your political stand somewhere else. 
So the object is just always to be right on the alert. 
Play the games, parry the jokes; you get the parts, and you 
just don't keep your part of the agreement that they think 
they are making with you. And you just keep on your toes. 
Very odd world. I'm not sure why it was so important to^me 
to be part of it. Very hostile, crazy, competitive. It's 
your whole self that's out there. This time it's not just 
15 
your mind - it's not your mind, really, at all. It's you, 
right out there. You make one mistake, and you'd just as 
soon drop through the floor, you know. 
Mary: Hostile to men and women? 
Jacqueline: Oh, yes. Everybody's just doing each other in constantly, 
very cut-throat. 
All of this seems enough to explain why I didn't pursue a career in 
the theatre. It also seemed to require a commitment which I was 
unwilling to make to anything, and yet had about it too strong an air of 
frivolity. 
So, in an apparently serious move, but in fact with an attitude of 
some frivolity, I went to graduate school in the Midwest. Graduate 
school abroad presented itself as a cross between a late finishing 
school and an avoidance of "settling down," whether to work or family. 
My escapism was in conflict with the serious aims of the institution. I 
wrote an occasional good paper and considered becoming an airline 
stewardess, to demonstrate, lest anyone remained in doubt, that I was 
not an intellectual. 
Instead, I returned to England, married, and became a 
schoolteacher. Then followed a period of several years in which I gave 
little thought to "what I wanted to do." I assumed that my work was 
secondary to my husband's, and that I was neither ambitious nor 
particularly talented in any way that was relevant to a career. I 
missed teaching, but teaching jobs were not available to me as a 
foreigner when I returned to the United States. In an unthinking way, I 
drifted into residential work with undergraduates. At first it seemed 
very much a faculty wife job, rather pointless, with little to do, but 
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as other positions were offered I became interested and involved. 
In 1970 I had a baby and read Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (years 
later I would discover from my Oxford tutor that "Dear Kate" had been 
tutored by her), and both were immediately catalytic. As a mother, I 
began to take myself more seriously, but I knew that it would be fatal 
for me in some way to stay home every day with my baby; and Millett's 
book crystallized for me many half-formed feminist thoughts. In spite 
of knowing absolutely no other woman who maintained her professional 
involvement while caring for a young child, I continued - part-time for 
a few years - to be an administrator. I was doing work that interested 
me, I was learning a great deal, but I did not see myself as having a 
career. Certainly I had not chosen a profession. 
After another child and a number of years, I took a small leap. I 
took an administrative position with substantial responsibility and I 
began a doctorate, in a more earnest manner than I had undertaken 
previous graduate work. Now, a few years later, I have a professional 
position of yet more responsibility, and my doctorate nears completion. 
This developing seriousness of purpose has brought me into a closer 
relationship to the women in this study, who are eight to fifteen years 
younger than I. My sense of purpose developed in a way which involved 
years of academic and professional drifting, the norm for women of my 
generation. The women I spoke with for this study are very clear about 
their professional focus and goals; they are consciously steering, not 
drifting. I wish to delineate the changes this altered attitude has 
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wrought for women and their careers, particularly in the law, and some 
of the costs and benefits in private life and the public sphere. 
A Note on Terms 
The term "law education" is used throughout this study. "Legal 
education," while a more appealing term, raises confusion between 
education in the law and education that is legally required. Law 
education is the process by which prospective practitioners are 
introduced to concepts and precedents in American law; it has become 
increasingly synonymous with attending a law school. 
The "second wave" of law school admissions for women will be used 
as a phrase to avoid repeated reference to the fact that approximately a 
hundred years after 1869, when the first women were admitted to a law 
school, an unprecedented increase in admissions of women to law schools 
began. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF LAW EDUCATION 
The Development of Law Education 
Most histories of the law and the legal profession in America begin 
either with a commentary on de Tocqueville's perceptions of the legal 
profession in 1831 or with an account of ways in which the history of 
the law and the history of America are closely entwined. Many consider 
both. This tradition will be maintained and examined in this study. 
Both the de Tocqueville imprimatur - lawyers are the aristocrats of 
America - and the theory of law history as American history ennoble and 
aggrandize the legal profession. Lawyers and law historians inevitably 
demonstrate some self-interest in adhering to these tendencies, even 
when they are critical of the elitism of the legal profession or the 
nature of the link between judicial and political history. 
Of course, one must review de Tocqueville*s brilliant comments on 
"The Temper of the Legal Profession in the United States, "[1] if only to 
acknowledge how much that has been written on the subject continues to 
focus on his central observations, which pertain to the nature and 
composition of the legal profession and its influence on society. 
Lawyers "naturally constitute a body," developed by shared study and 
knowledge, and particularly the habit of mind and method acquired by 
their study. They are privy to the mystique of law by precedent, the 
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sole interpreter of an occult science," and thus become supramen with a 
pivotal function in America: they "belong to the people by birth and 
interest, and to the aristocracy by habit and taste; they may be looked 
upon as the connecting link between the two great classes of society." 
And what do they do at this point of linkage, what is their effect? 
They are "attached to public order beyond every other consideration. ..if 
they prize freedom much, they generally value legality still more." 
Deference to precedent inevitably tends to lead to conservatism, so that 
"lawyers, as a body, form the most powerful, if not the only, 
counterpoise in the democratic element." De Tocqueville touches in this 
essay on matters equally alive today for study and dispute: the 
"mystique" of the legal profession, the impact of law by precedent, the 
social and political force of the law and its practitioners. He also 
notes briefly that withal lawyers are men and are, therefore, also 
"governed by their private interests, and especially by the interests of 
the moment." This contradicts the lawyer's public role as impartial 
arbiter, is assiduously concealed in definitions of the role of courts, 
and is firmly opposed by most legal education. 
But before we pursue this matter of the profession of law, who 
professes it, how and why, let us look for a moment at the law that is 
being professed. Law and a system of laws are matters of pride and 
importance in the history of America. Life without them has not been 
conceivable for Americans. No sooner did the pilgrims land at Plymouth 
in 1620 than they signed their document of governance by which they 
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agreed to "enact, constitute and frame, such just and equal Laws...from 
time to time as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the 
general good of the Colony j unto which we promise all due submission and 
obedience."[2] In this appears the reverence for the law which suggests 
that there is a quality of reason or wisdom which arises in people's 
devising and implementing laws which would not otherwise be present in 
human intercourse. In practice, much of eighteenth-century American law 
consisted of adopted English common law and statutes, so that while 
histories of law discuss the shifts in the nature of law in step with 
changes in American society, it is also likely that it naturally took 
until the nineteenth century for the full genius of American law-making 
to flower. In the eighteenth century, there was a clear distinction of 
purpose between enacted statutes and judicial interpretations of common 
law, based on notions of principle and custom. The nineteenth century 
saw the emergence of judges as lawmakers, as implementers of an 
"instrumental conception of law."[3] 
Law is no longer conceived of as an eternal set of principles 
expressed in custom and derived from natural law. Nor is it 
regarded primarily as a body of rules designed to achieve 
justice only in the individual case. Instead, judges have 
come to think of the common law as equally responsible with 
legislation for governing society and promoting socially 
desirable conduct. This emphasis on law as an instrument of 
policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate 
legal doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about 
social change.[4] 
Other legal historians note the significance of this concept in the 
development of American law. James Willard Hurst presents it in 
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practical terms: 
People did not regard either the state or the lawmakers with 
awe. To them government represented a tool to further 
ambition and energy. Because other institutions were weak, 
the law had much to offer in bounty and protection. 
Understanding this, we understand how it became natural for 
Americans to use law to win their partisan, business, or 
social ends.•.to use it as a means to bring about immediate 
practical results.[5] 
Or, in Lawrence Friedman's plain words: 
In modern times, law is an instrument; the people in power use 
it to push or pull toward some definite goal.[6] 
Legal historians may analyze the instrumentality of the law, but 
the popularly promulgated view is that the law is impartial in its 
proceedings, rendering justice in a manner as wise and god-like as 
humans can contrive. Deification reaches its highest point in accounts 
of the Supreme Court, where men reach a great age, are eulogized, and 
speak the last word on matters judicial. It is by rending this veil 
that The Brethren appeared as such a shocking book. Contradicting the 
tendency to deification has been an absence of awe for the law which 
manifested itself most vehemently in Daniel Shays' Rebellion. There is 
a dilemma for the legal profession in this double strand. On the one 
hand the image of a noble, honorable, impartial law profession has clear 
advantages. But if lawyers become totally impartial, they will achieve 
a kind of social passivity which will limit their capacity to be 
instrumental. And instrumentality affords another kind of power which 
god-like distance does not. Blatant instrumentality, on the other hand, 
tends to evoke hostility and resistance. In general, therefore, the 
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resolution has been to maintain the professional and procedural image of 
impartiality while implementing a form of law tightly interwoven with 
specific interests in American social, political and economic 
development. This duality serves to confound analysts of the legal 
system, particularly those groups and individuals which experience 
exclusion from power and privileges in American society. As David 
Schuman points out, the developed biases of the legal system towards the 
protection of private ownership and the individual adversary method 
stand in formidable opposition to groups making collective demands for 
justice.[7] 
The American legal system will clearly have an attitude towards 
women. It will appear in the laws, in the legal system, and in its 
training of lawyers. A review of the history of legal education and 
training will provide a basis for an examination of this attitude and a 
grasp of the educational and professional process which for so long 
excluded women. Notions of American legal education tend to be based on 
customs in the eastern states, a particularly discouraging tendency for 
a student of women's education. 1870, with the appointment of Dean 
Langdell at Harvard Law School, marks the beginning of a modern legal 
education with a model which was to have massive influence on all law 
schools in America. But it was this same institution which excluded 
women as students until 1950, while law schools in other parts of the 
country had begun to admit them much earlier. Although there were 
significant variations in different parts of the country, broad 
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movements in legal education did substantially transcend regionalism, 
and it is helpful to note them as a background to current discussions of 
appropriate law education and as part of the commentary on the role of 
law in the country's history. 
Of the fifty-five men attending the Constitutional Convention, 
thirty-three were lawyers. Lawyers were clearly influential in public 
life before the Revolution, although even at that early stage not all 
men who became lawyers received the same training; their training, then 
as now, did predict to a considerable extent their status in the 
profession and thus in society. In England, the profession of law was 
and is formally divided: barristers, who practice in the higher courts, 
are members of one of the Inns of Court; solicitors, who practice in the 
lower courts and represent and advise private and corporate clients in 
such matters as tax, trusts and estates, complete an apprenticeship as 
an articled clerk. For a variety of reasons, the matter of prior 
education at a university in the fields of law and medicine has been 
less pressing than in America. In pre-Revolutionary Virginia, a similar 
system began to develop, as some young men went to England to the Inns 
of Court, while others served local apprenticeships. Since Inns were by 
that time only formally educational institutions, the real base for 
legal training in America was apprenticeship, whether the student had 
attended Harvard or one of the Inns of Court, or directly apprenticed. 
An apprenticeship to a lawyer required "learning by doing," frequently 
doing fairly repetitive and minor tasks. At the same time, the 
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apprentice was required to study the law by reading, with or without 
direction from the lawyer to whom he was apprenticed. Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in England 1765-69 and in 
America 1771-72, formed the basic text, and Tucker's annotation of it in 
1803 confirmed its place for all students and practitioners of law. 
James Kent of Columbia College published his Commentaries on law in the 
United States between 1826 and 1830. Those books were valuable to the 
apprentices and reinforced the concept of apprenticeship as a valid 
preparation by their supplementation of the practical experience with 
good readings. Both Tucker and Kent held early professorships of law in 
American colleges. The first such professorship was at William and Mary 
College in 1779, where Jefferson had George Wythe appointed, and St. 
George Tucker succeeded him. Such men as these lectured on fundamental 
principles of law, the study of which they believed to be part of a 
liberal education. Their teaching was not the "professional 
preparation" which emerged in the colleges in the 1820s. This existed 
far more substantially in small, private law schools where apprentices 
could gather for lectures. Judge Tapping Reeve's Litchfield School 
(1784-1833) was the first and most famous of these. Apprenticeship, 
varying in length, rigor and educational content, remained the primary 
mode for law training through much of the nineteenth century. Of 
importance historically, and for the elite of the profession, were the 
first law professorships established specifically for the teaching of 
law to future practitioners, rather than as a part of the liberal arts 
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curriculum. The development of Harvard Law School as a professional 
school comparable to those of medicine and theology began in 1817, with 
Isaac Parker's appointment to the Royall professorship of law. The 
endowment of the Dane professorship and the appointment of Joseph Story 
to it in 1829 supported the movement at Harvard for a college-based law 
preparation, directed by eminent lawyers and judges who would offer 
lectures. Parker was chief justice of Massachusetts and Story a justice 
of the United States Supreme Court. Other faculty were full-time, but 
the understanding was clear that law schools would not alter the concept 
of the apprenticeship in this regard: the study of law was to be 
undertaken at the direction of successful practitioners. The strength 
of this notion is apparent in the slow growth of the law schools in 
relation to the continuing apprentice system. By 1840, there were only 
nine law schools connected to colleges or universities, with a total 
enrollment of 345 students,[8] and their standards of admission were not 
high. During this mid-century period, apprenticeship requirements were 
reduced or abolished in many states, and some states ruled that any man 
"of good moral character" could be eligible for admission to the bar. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the causes of the 
conscious move away from restrictive standards in the era of Jacksonian 
democracy. Its impact on law school education, however, was clearly to 
minimize the importance of these educational institutions for a 
profession which was prospering and taking a leading role in society. 
1870 is generally recognized as the beginning of legal education as 
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we know it. Timothy Dwight of Columbia Law School from 1858-1891 was 
immensely influential in promulgating the approach to law education by a 
study of principles rather than simply by practice. His influence 
extended beyond the school, to the New York bar, of which he was a 
founder.[9] It was Harvard, however, which became the leading law 
school of the period and influenced almost all others to follow. 
Christopher Columbus Langdell was appointed Dean of the Harvard Law 
School by President Eliot in 1870 and remained in the position for 
twenty-five years, instituting the case method of study and the Socratic 
method of teaching, and laying the foundation for law school as a three- 
year program to be preceded by an undergraduate degree. The 1860s had 
seen the beginning of university law schools, private and public, west 
of the Mississippi, of Howard University Law School, of part-time law 
schools. Now Harvard's role became one of developing a model of law 
education which was to be widely and consciously adopted by most other 
law schools, and which remains today without major modification. It has 
been noted earlier that at the time of Dean Langdell's appointment, it 
was generally held that the courts rather than the legislature were the 
principal point of legal development. The introduction at Harvard of 
Dean Langdell's case method as a main form for law study should not be 
underestimated in this context. Law students were to go out to practice 
having imbibed the principle, not simply by the material of their 
education but by its very form and style, that the law is developed by 
the men who weigh the individual cases, not by the men who write the 
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statutes. 
Langdell's approach to law education within a law school also 
heralds the beginning of a movement which lasted for eighty years: the 
drive for standards in education for the legal profession. This 
movement is a major part of the profession's swing to the furthest 
distance from the conception of it embodied in the provision that any 
man of good moral character" should be eligible for admission to the 
bar. The founding of the American Bar Association in 1878 and the 
Association of American Law Schools in 1900 strengthened the drive for 
such standards as a college education prior to law school, increased 
length of time to be spent in law school, and requirements for the 
approval of law schools which would eliminate many part-time or night 
schools and other proprietary law schools. Histories of individual law 
schools portray this direction as one of laudable educational progress 
towards a scientific and sophisticated training which contrasts 
advantageously with the simple apprenticeships of the mid-nineteenth 
century. A larger view of national directions in law education clearly 
reveals the grim side of the drive for standards: elitism and exclusion 
by powerfully connected law schools and bar associations of ethnic 
minorities, Blacks and women. Different arguments and techniques were 
called into play for each of these groups, and certainly not all the 
discrimination in the law profession is attributable to the movement in 
law schools and bar associations; except for schoolteaching for women, 
all professions and institutions of higher education in America severely 
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limitsd the entrance of Blacks end women* The attempt to bar ethnic 
groups from the practice of law is forcefully surveyed by Jerold 
Auerbach in Unequa1 Justice«[10] While it was democratic and American 
in the middle of the nineteenth century to have an open law profession, 
albeit only to white males, the influx of immigrants later in the 
century suggested to the legal profession that American democracy and, 
of course, self-interest would best be served by strengthening those 
standards which effectively eliminated ethnic minorities. Clearly, an 
open profession was not acceptable if Jews and other immigrants began to 
take advantage of it: how could they be truly American lawyers? 
Democratic ideals in a multi-cultural America were energetically 
deflected by the law establishment and revised as ideals of rigorous 
education and a patriotic bar. 
The "standards" movement did not succeed easily. Even by 1917, no 
state required a law school education for admission to the bar. The 
history of the period shows an immense flow of reports, proposals, 
regulations and enforcement mechanisms emanating from professional and 
education associations. They record the tenacity with which the notion 
of "standards" was pursued. At the same time the night schools, 
proprietary schools and even correspondence courses achieved such 
strength in numbers and popularity that they were a forceful opposition 
and only likely to be defeated by severe regulation. Gradually, these 
regulations were largely achieved in the twentieth century with the 
ending of open admissions (a hallmark of modern law school admission, 
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the LSAT, was begun with the introduction of an aptitude test at Yale in 
1928), the requirement of a college degree, the three-year program, 
state bar requirements of a law school education, and the approval of 
law schools by the ABA according to strict criteria. 
The history of curricular development in the law schools after 1870 
is similarly a history of homogenization. The Harvard model, begun with 
the case method of Langdell and followed by the "legal reasoning" 
emphasis of his successor Ames, was so widely followed that modern law 
school education is probably the most uniform and least-changing 
educational program in America. The appointment of Ames also 
represented a demarcation between practicing lawyers and law professors, 
since Ames had never practiced law. Teaching of law began to develop as 
a separate profession, which could give its full attention to law 
education, thus strengthening the process of raising standards. In 
comparison with the education law professors could offer in the law 
schools, a practicing lawyer's direction of an apprentice began to 
appear second-rate. There were some efforts in the 1920s and 1930s to 
introduce new elements into this homogeneous education, particularly at 
Columbia and Yale. The notion that law could not be an isolated 
scientific study, unconnected to social sciences, received some support 
and suggested some curricular changes. In addition, assaults on 
Langdellian claims to scientific objectivity seriously introduced into 
the law schools for the first time the countering view that the law 
offers a vehicle for implementation of social and personal values and 
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judgments. Again in the late 1960s some law students, as part of a 
national trend in higher education, questioned the relevance of their 
education to the social and political roles they hoped to play in a 
society which they perceived as authoritarian and unjust in many 
respects. In response to this questioning, minor curricular changes 
were made, usually in the form of electives, although a traditional core 
curriculum continued to absorb most of the student's time. A more 
important response was the introduction of a clinical or internship 
experience for second and third year law students at many schools. In 
this respect, law education has come full circle: the clinical 
experience is a twentieth-century name for a nineteenth-century 
apprenticeship, but now tightly controlled by the law schools. This 
particular irony of the last ten years serves to underline the 
fundamentally limited nature of law education to this point. It is 
limited as education by its failure to address the nature of the social 
and political force of the law and its practitioners, to which de 
Tocqueville called attention. The great debate between the law's 
objectivity and its social involvement has not been joined by the law 
schools. The strength the law schools derive by this limitation is in 
their power to educate future practitioners (and together with bar 
associations, they have effectively eliminated other forms of law 
education) according to a legal and social status .quo. They are thus 
professional training schools rather than an intellectual force for the 
study of law. The prestige of the law schools is very high today and 
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undergraduates compete fiercely to be admitted, so that a critique of 
raw education as partial and limited, as, in fact, training rather than 
education, is dismissed by the majority of the law profession. Training 
suggests a clear and accessible process, and the law profession is at 
pains to maintain itself as "the sole interpreter of an occult science," 
a profession with a mystique. 
A brief examination of the legal mystique and the power it exerts 
is helpful towards an assessment of legal education in general; and like 
any mystique it has a meaning for the uninitiated, as women have been 
for so long. The notion that the law is a mystique and lawyers akin to 
priests initiated into secret rites appears strongly in lawyers' 
writings about their profession. De Tocqueville's perception of the 
high esteem in which the legal profession is held is based in part on 
his view that dependency on legal precedent rather than codes and 
statutes presents the lawyer as "the sole interpreter of an occult 
science." Naturally, lawyers have not cared to dispel this notion, 
rather reinforcing the concept that they are unique and indispensable. 
The language of the mystique is specialized and somewhat obscure. A 
cold eye might observe that most legal prose is deficient, with its 
awkwardness, jargon and Latin tags; it serves perfectly, however, the 
purpose of excluding the lay person from ready comprehension. 
Similarly, the formality and ritual of the courtroom, accentuated in 
some countries by wigs, robes and other accoutrements, create a closed 
world in which plaintiff and defendant are often ill-at-ease, but 
32 
lawyers on both sides are linked by their shared knowledge and 
experience. As a novice in criminal court, Helen Johnson, a young 
Assistant District Attorney in the Bronx, assessed the courtroom as a 
place where "nobody's supposed to make waves." First offenders appeared 
naive and out of place; only repeat offenders had some comprehension of 
the rites of the court.[11] 
Many of the elements of the legal mystique are parallel to those of 
the Church, historically even more exclusionary of women. One of these 
parallels is in the material, the domain of these institutions. The 
law, like the Church, encounters every aspect of human behavior and 
takes up a position with regard to it. The most base kinds of behavior 
are considered in the courtroom, but lawyers, like priests, are believed 
to regard such baseness with wisdom and without being infected or 
seduced by crime or evil. The traditions of the profession are 
developed to enable lawyers to view violence or corruption with a calm 
logic, a dispassionate wisdom. Emotion in the courtroom is usually 
assumed to be histrionic, part of the ritual, rather than spontaneous 
emotion. In order to become priest-like in their supramundanity, 
lawyers must pass through an initiation. It is when law school is 
viewed within this context that so much of its style and content makes 
sense. The rigid adherence to forms devised a hundred years ago 
strengthens the notion of professional continuity, not perhaps as far- 
reaching as Apostolic succession, but similar in its force. To take 
one's place in a long historical line of legal postulants, in a law 
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school whose ways are mysterious but fixed, offers little alternative to 
"dropping out" or submission on faith. And since a true faith is not 
tested under benign conditions, the pain of the Socratic method is an 
important element of the initiation. Particularly in the first year of 
law school, the great demands on the student's time, the encouragement 
to compete, the adversarial relations in the lecture hall, the returning 
of adults to large classes, the professional method tending to humiliate 
rather than support, and an apparent rejection of previous education and 
experience, all these contribute to the impact of a "total institution" 
with "encompassing tendencies." These are the phrases Erving Goffman 
uses in Asylums to describe such total institutions as prisons and 
monasteries. [12] They are certainly appropriate to the Harvard Law 
School depicted by Scott Turow in his account entitled One L: An inside 
account of life in the first year at Harvard Law School (my 
emphasis).[13] A mystique can exclude the uninitiated; it can also 
imprison the initiated. 
Women1s Law Education 
The first woman to appear as a practitioner in the annals of 
American law was Margaret Brent, who came to Maryland in 1638 and 
conducted her affairs in an assertive and successful manner. She was a 
great landholder and acted in her own business interests. Governor 
Calvert of Maryland appointed her executor of his estate, and she was 
for Lord Baltimore, Proprietor of the colony, by the 
appointed attorney 
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Provincial court. She was so active in legal and business affairs that 
she asked for two votes in the Assembly, which was also the only court 
of law, at a time when her administration of the affairs of Calvert and 
Lord Baltimore played a crucial role in avoiding a rebellion by soldiers 
in the colony. Her request for votes, one as a freeholder, one as the 
Proprietor's attorney, were denied, whereupon she "protested agst all 
proceedings" in the Assembly in which she was not allowed to vote. 
Margaret Brent then moved to Virginia and there acquired more 
property.[14] The capacity, theoretically and occasionally practically, 
for women to act as attorneys was facilitated by the pre-profe86ional 
state of the law in the early Colonial period. In a period when a man 
could enter a suit on his own behalf, so could a woman, although other 
factors lessened the likelihood; the development of a paid and regulated 
legal profession with apprenticeships, state bars, and the teaching of 
law at institutions of higher education closed to women, all these 
erected firm barriers to women's access to the law. 
The beginning of women's assault on this male preserve began at the 
very moment that the regulation and professionalization of law education 
and practice was entering its most decisive phase. 1870, with the 
appointment of Dean Langdell to his twenty-five year Deanship of the 
Harvard Law School, marked the beginning of modern legal education. For 
the next fifty years, the movement for "standards" and regulations in 
education and practice steadily triumphed over earlier individualistic 
and variable approaches to the study of law. 1870 was also the year in 
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which Ada Kepley graduated from Union College of Law (now Northwestern), 
the first woman to graduate from an American law school. In 1869 Lemma 
Barkaloo and Phoebe Couzins were admitted to St. Louis Law School (now 
Washington University), and in the same year Arabella Mansfield was 
admitted to the Iowa state bar. In other more discouraging famous first 
efforts among women, Myra Bradwell in 1869 was denied a license to 
practice by the Illinois Supreme Court, on the basis of sex, and the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the decision.[15] In 1875, in a 
famous ruling, Lavinia Goodell was denied admission to the Wisconsin 
bar,[16] and in 1881 Lelia Robinson's application for admission to the 
Massachusetts bar was also unsuccessful.[17] Belva Lockwood, who was 
admitted to the District of Columbia bar in 1873 and eventually became 
the first woman admitted to practice before the United States Supreme 
Court, was denied admission to the Virginia bar,[18] which continued to 
exclude women until World War I.[19] 
A chronological summary of women's entrance to law schools and to 
practice naturally suggests a progression from exclusion to admission, 
of institutional barriers falling in the face of energetic petitions by 
a number of individual women of strength. Any examination of the 
process shows, however, that the achievements of individual women and 
the yielding of legal institutions did not constitute a movement in the 
sense that the 1970s saw a movement for women's legal education. 
Individual gains were made, but they frequently failed to set 
significant precedent for other women. While the autonomy of state bars 
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afforded women their best opportunity, it also contributed to the 
difficulty in achieving admissions across the nation, and the United 
States Supreme Court validated autonomy in a way which demonstrated the 
best and the worst of federalism in this movement for equal professional 
opportunity. Certainly, the state-by-state process was an exhausting 
one (a process which wears down many a movement for social reform and 
was echoed recently in the attempt to ratify the Equal Rights 
Amendment). For example, in 1869 Arabella Mansfield, who had studied 
law with her brother and her husband, was admitted to the Iowa bar 
without difficulty. She thus became the first American woman regularly 
admitted to the practice of law. In the same year, Myra Bradwell 
applied to the Illinois bar and, although she passed examination, she 
was denied admission on the basis of her sex. When Bradwell took her 
case to the United States Supreme Court, its denial of her petition 
clearly established state jurisdiction in such matters. The power of a 
local authority or institution to choose whether or not to admit women 
has a specific force against women, whose status within a family rarely 
enables them to move independently to another area. Carrie Burnham 
Kilgore, who had married Damon Kilgore in 1876, after studying law with 
him, offers a classic example of this limitation. After being denied 
admission to the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1871, she made 
numerous efforts to gain admission and to be allowed to take bar 
examinations, until she was finally admitted to the law school in 1881. 
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This ten years of struggle alone would be discouraging; worse is the 
absence of any other woman from the law school until 1895.[20] The 
gains made by women before 1900 are individually impressive, and many of 
their stories reveal heroic efforts to gain access to the law and a 
belief in the value of the study of law even though there was often 
little likelihood of practicing. However, the total numbers of women 
who were admitted to law schools and law practices was very small. By 
1900, only 108 women had been granted law degrees; by 1910, only 
slightly more than 1% of law school students, graduates or practitioners 
were women; and by 1920, they were still fewer than 2%. [21] The initial 
flurry of women applying to state bars and law schools was not followed 
by progressively substantial gains. Nearly a hundred years after the 
achievements of Kepley, Mansfield and Couzins, women still comprised 
fewer than 4% of law school enrollment or practitioners.[22] 
For women seeking to enter the legal profession, the overt 
arguments and obstruction they encountered is clearly recorded in the 
cases of such pioneers as Goodell, Bradwell and Lockwood. The most 
fundamental legal barrier to women's admission to the practice of law 
was the position that precedent in common law prevented consideration of 
their fitness to become lawyers. The argument that women had not been 
admitted to practice became a basis for continued exclusion. 
Additionally, a married woman's legal inability to enter into a contract 
without her husband's consent was held to be a further disability. 
Certain recurrent arguments and patterns of thinking combined to 
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contribute to a fundamental attitude of exclusion of women from the law 
profession. The primary exclusion arguments have been based on the 
"fair sex" and the "woman's place" theories. These are the poles of the 
male vision of women, and either singly or combined they are an 
important element in any argument for women's exclusion from a group or 
activity to which they aspire. The "fair sex" attitude places women on 
a pedestal and speaks on their behalf: they are delicate and lovely, 
but should not soil their hands with the business of commerce, war or 
politics. Their right is to be protected, not to seek the ability to 
protect themselves. This perspective infantilizes women and mandates an 
entirely different education from men's: women must learn to become 
worthy of protection - develop their moral and artistic abilities - 
while men must acquire the skills to enable them to protect women and 
children - make money or laws. The fallacies of this argument have been 
frequently explored in American feminist literature. There is a long 
history of women objecting to this view, pointing to those women and 
children clearly unprotected or abused, noting that the view is blind to 
working class realities, and demanding a choice of role. The 'fair sex 
argument remains alive today, however, in modified and modernized form, 
because it combines powerfully with the "woman's place" thesis. The 
woman who argues that she does not want to be treated as the fair sex or 
placed on a pedestal is at first gently urged to stay where she is. 
Repeated or insistent refusal to accept that position meets hostility 
which is justified by the contention that the woman has relinquished her 
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rightful place of privilege; she is now fair game for the less gentle 
argument of "woman's place." Although this is also presented in some 
contexts as a noble calling for women (for example, in much religious 
teaching or in pre-war Nazi propaganda), it has more sting than the fair 
sex approach. Woman's place, of course, is in the home, bearing 
children, caring for them and for her husband. It has always been an 
awkward feature of this argument that some women do not have husbands or 
children. Nonetheless, it is the more earnest argument presented to 
women who do not wish to be the fair sex; when general acceptance of it 
weakens, considerable social, legal and educational means can enforce 
it. Only in recent years, as a massive assault on this has been 
underway, has a third major argument arisen against women in their new 
spheres, including the legal profession. This is the "you can't do it 
all" argument. The "fair sex" argument is fading; women have fought the 
"woman's place" view with sufficient success to change attitudes and 
legal barriers to their participation in many fields; woman's place is 
now legitimately the workplace, but still, of course, home as well. 
Hence the new cry, "you can't do it all." 
The "fair sex" and "woman's place" arguments are less legalistic 
than those of precedent and inability to contract, but are advanced as 
civil law, with reference to natural law and divine law as support. In 
1872 in Bradwell v Illinois, the United States Supreme Court heard a 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Bradwell's exclusion from the Illinois 
state bar,[23] and in 1875 Justice Ryan of the Supreme Court of 
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Wisconsin ruled on the petition of Lavinia Goodell to practice before 
the state bar;[24] the language of these two cases makes it clear and, 
in the case of Goodell, dramatic, that the courts were prepared to argue 
in several directions at once to attempt to exclude women. The days of 
Margaret Brent were forgotten, and the opposing forces of an organized 
male law profession and an emerging group of women's rightists 
marshalled their arguments. An excerpt from the opinion of Justice 
Bradley concurring in Bradwell offers a summary of several exclusionist 
arguments: 
...the civil laws, as well as nature herself (sic), has always 
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and 
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's 
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it 
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution 
of the family organization, which is founded in the divine 
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the 
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain 
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, 
of interests and views which belong or should belong to the 
family institution, is repugnant to the idea of a woman 
adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband. 
After noting a married woman's inability to make independent and binding 
contracts, Bradley addresses the problem of excluding the unmarried 
woman: 
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by 
any of the duties, complications and incapacities arising out 
of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general 
rule. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to 
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This 
is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society 
must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and 
cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 
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It is ironic to note in the case of the repugnance to the notion of 
a woman s adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband" that Bradwell had studied law with her husband and that, before 
his admission to the bar, they had owned a school together. However, 
such elements of reality have no force against an argument which uses 
common law precedent and idealistic but self-serving notions of natural 
and divine law to define the role of woman as it should be, so that no 
failure, discrepancy or exception requires attention. It is useful, 
also, to note the dismissal of women's capacity in mind and character to 
practice law. Justice Ryan in Goodell and Justice Bradley in Bradwell 
both cite women's delicacy; Ryan expands on this: 
The peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its 
quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility, its purity, its 
delicacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination of hard 
reason to sympathetic feelings, are surely not qualifications 
for forensic strife. Nature has tempered woman as little for 
the juridical conflicts of the court room as for the physical 
conflicts of the battle field. 
Delicacy is an attribution which has an ancient history as a cause for 
inhibiting women's activity; in a specific bodily sense, it was a charge 
which all of women's education had to answer. Such leaders in women's 
higher education as Alice Freeman Palmer felt obliged to address the 
fear that too much learning would be injurious to a woman's health,[25] 
and led many of them to stress the place of exercise and hygiene in 
women's colleges. 
The claim that woman is emotional rather than rational also has a 
long history and has proved a particularly forceful charge in the field 
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of law. Woman's different and inferior mental capacity is a notion 
which is implicit in many ways today; in the nineteenth century it was 
explicit in such analyses as the one to be found in an essay on "Mental 
Peculiarities of Women."[26] In this, the "two great defects" of women 
are considered: "want of imagination, and a disinclination to extend 
their observations over a large range of facts before forming general 
conclusions."[27] The charge of woman's weakness in rationality, 
variously described, has inevitably provoked women's rights activists to 
great heights of rational exposition. Many of the speeches and writings 
of Stanton, Anthony and the Grimkes are examples of formidably eloquent 
argumentation. At the same time, the accusation that women lacked the 
reasoning powers of men, deemed superior to the attributed emotional 
capacities of women, provoked women to attempt to demonstrate their 
equality with men within the terms defined by men. If men said that 
women were emotional not rational, women would prove otherwise, even at 
the cost of denying the value or defensible existence of emotion. This 
effort continues today with specific application to women lawyers who 
plead cases of overwhelming emotional import within the framework of 
legal, linear, apparently rational language. For the nineteenth-century 
feminist, it contributed profoundly to the nature of oppression: men's 
laws and customs placed her in an inferior position from which she would 
find the route to achievement by attempting to change each of these laws 
and customs, and she would employ the modes of men, since any associated 
with women would have the stamp of inferiority and therefore defeat. 
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In 1970, however, the second wave of women's insistence on 
admission to the study and practice of law was underway. This time, a 
hundred years later, the figures show massive gains for women, at great 
speed. By 1971 9.5% of law students were women, by 1974 19.6%, and by 
1981 a third of all law students were women.[28] What had altered in 
the aims and understanding of women and in the nature of the opposition 
to or support for change? In 1929, Woody summarized women's 
professional gains and placed them within the history of women's 
education from ancient times. He concluded: 
The oldest learned professions - teaching, law, medicine - 
have admitted women after considerable protest...There is 
nothing more significant for the position of women today than 
the fact of their steady increase, in recent years, in the 
professions which were once held almost exclusively by men. 
Women's entrance into the highest professions, demanding the 
best powers, physical and mental, as well as the best 
educational facilities, is a more certain mark of her 
emancipation from the dominion of man and her freedom from the 
drudgery of life than her recent political privileges.[29] 
This is a classic formulation of the optimistic, gradualist, reformist 
view of social progress. It has an encouraging, even inspirational 
quality, but ignores the reality of how very few women had entered the 
law profession between 1869 and 1929. It is predicated on the notion 
that a series of individuals, who are of the same sex, by taking similar 
actions, will become a force, inevitably gathering numbers and momentum. 
This was to a large extent the view of most women involved in 
confronting impeding institutions and laws until the beginning of the 
twentieth-century women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the 
Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848 addressed a wide range of issues 
pertaining to the social, political and religious status of women, the 
great women s organization of the nineteenth century emerged in the form 
of the two suffrage groups, the American Woman Suffrage Association and 
the National Woman Suffrage Association, founded in 1869, finally 
merging in 1890. At the distance of a hundred years, it is easy to 
simplify the goals and activities of nineteenth-century feminists as an 
exclusively suffragist movement. Women were certainly active on a 
variety of fronts to promote the welfare of women, in education, social 
work, the temperance movement, the anti-slavery movement, in organized 
religion. However, the main force of organized women was directed 
towards elective franchise. A number of the women who became lawyers in 
the nineteenth century were active in state and national suffrage 
associations; their focus on securing the vote rather than extending 
their own professional and educational opportunities by the sort of 
political organization they employed towards suffrage is parallel to 
that of many other nineteenth-century women activists.[30] They worked 
towards the good of all women, or for other women, but rarely for 
themselves in a specific and political manner. 
With the twentieth-century women's movement came a shift in focus 
so that a kind of political self-interest was encouraged, with a 
variable concept of sisterhood to prevent total fragmentation. Thus, 
every woman in every sphere was encouraged to consider her particular 
situation and examine the particular oppression and discrimination she 
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experienced. This process, explicitly encouraged in consciousness- 
raising groups, was frequently undertaken in the work place or a 
neighborhood, among a group of students or professionals. Thus, plans 
of action arose from groups of women examining similar issues together. 
Within the great majority of professional and educational organizations, 
a women's caucus developed more or less formally. Thus, law schools 
throughout the United States saw the formation of associations of women 
law students and, in 1970, the first National Conference on Women and 
the Law was held. These women who were lawyers and aspired to be 
lawyers differed from their counterparts of a hundred years earlier in 
that they used the organizing models of other campaigns to fight their 
own. Of course, not all women law students identified themselves with 
the issues of making law schools more accessible and relevant to women. 
However, the rigorous sexism of law education combined with the 
political self-interest of women's law associations to attract a broad 
range of women law students to the causes of mutual support, increased 
admissions, curricular changes, and opposition to discriminatory 
recruitment by law firms. This kind of self-interest movement is highly 
effective in achieving clear goals which do not fundamentally change any 
major structures in society. Women along with men have studied law by 
the case method and been exposed to the great weight of law by 
precedent. By self-selection, these women tend to accept the societal 
status quo, and their education reinforces this tendency. It is no 
surprise that these women are deeply concerned with the issues of women 
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in the legal profession which present themselves in the first and, to 
some extent, the second layers of discrimination.[31] A review of the 
topics addressed at the 12th National Conference on Women and the Law in 
Boston in 1981 shows an overwhelming majority of such topics as "Age 
Discrimination in Employment," "Battered Women: Litigation," "Equal 
Credit Opportunities for Women," "Rights of Pregnant Workers," and 
"Building Coalitions for Affirmative Action in Law Schools." Issues of 
the third layer are confronted by only a few women under such titles as 
"Law and Patriarchy." 
The changes women have made in access to the study and practice of 
the law have been dramatic. It is important to give them due weight and 
understand their origins and impact while recognizing the limitations of 
even such a massive shift. The changes have not, of course, been 
achieved exclusively by the efforts of women concerned specifically with 
the field of women's law education. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to consider the vast range of differences between the role of 
women in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in this country which 
contributed to the limited numbers of women lawyers following the 
pioneers of the 1870s compared with the great wave of women entering law 
schools in the 1970s. One fundamental and influential change which must 
be noted, however, is the change in childbearing patterns. The 
nineteenth-century women who did become lawyers were largely atypical of 
their generation in that they had few children. They were single or 
widowed early or married late, so that they avoided the usual 
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curtailment of activity beyond the domestic sphere demanded by child 
bearing and rearing over the extended period. This was a common pattern 
for women of achievement into the twentieth century; Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton was an exception with her seven children - and exasperated Susan 
B. Anthony by it. By 1970, few women expected to bear many children, 
and the pill afforded at least middle-class women entirely reliable 
prevention of pregnancy. At the same time, the women's movement 
initiated widespread exploration of approaches to child care which would 
free women to work outside the home. There was relatively little 
achieved in this area in practical ways, but the psychological support 
which the discussions provided encouraged women to work outside the home 
in spite of the remaining requirement that they be the primary providers 
of child care - hence the "trying to do it all" syndrome. Thus, women 
went to law schools believing that times were changing, that 
possibilities of shared child care were emerging, so that they could 
expect to practice law and be mothers if they wished. The testimony of 
women lawyers in 1981 suggests that these expectations are realistic 
only at great physical and emotional cost, but women are continuing to 
plan to "do it all."[32] 
Just as there can be no final explanation for the emergence of a 
vigorous women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s, it is difficult to 
delineate with certainty the rush to law schools that occurred within 
the framework of the women's movement. Certainly the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 afforded women a powerful tool in their pursuit of equal 
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employment. It was also undoubtedly influential that Betty Friedan's 
The Feminine M^stiflue, published in 1963, addressed the fact that white, 
middle-class American women who had been well educated in ways that 
nineteenth-century women had fought for were leading trivial lives in 
the domestic sphere, with no thought of meaningful work. These were 
precisely the women who within a few years would choose law school over 
early marriage and many of whom would affiliate with the National 
Organization of Women (NOW). More important than any individual act or 
development, however, was that 1970 was a point of historical alteration 
in the four structures of woman's situation, as Juliet Mitchell posits 
them: production, reproduction, socialization of children and 
sexuality.[33] Changing sexual mores and improved methods of birth 
control combined to liberate women in some ways from their subservient 
status. From there, Mitchell stresses the need for "Any emancipation 
movement... (to) concentrate on the economic element." She makes the 
distinction that "Economically, the most elementary demand is not the 
right to work or receive equal pay for work...but the right to equal 
work."[34] With it, of course, came in the minds of some women a belief 
in the need for women to become legally literate, for women lawyers to 
work for "change from within the system," for women lawyers to represent 
women's interests in the courts, and for women to prepare themselves by 
the traditional law school route for seats in legislatures, whence they 
might effect changes on behalf of women. At the same time, many women 
simply wanted equal work with men, the opportunity to achieve the status 
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and financial rewards of the law profession. The 1970s showed great 
progress for women in the area of production and the educational systems 
supporting it; socialization of children remained the almost exclusive 
charge of women, inhibiting equality in the work world. If women place 
their faith and energy in the linear progression of affirmative action 
statistics, without attention to their confinement within other 
structures, emancipation may prove again a chimaera as it did to the 
women who labored womanfully to secure the vote, only to find that it 
made for less difference to the quality of their lives than they had 
anticipated. Faith in such linear progress is alluring in its 
simplicity and allows the comfort of apparently meaningful, progressive 
activity. However, the failure to attempt to grasp the complexities of 
woman's inequality limits the impact of all such reformist activity. 
In the general cause of women entering the law profession, there 
has been some deepening of understanding. While in the 1870s women 
lawyers supported the women's suffrage movement, in the 1970s the 
women's movement supported the entry of women into the law profession. 
In 1870 women were concerned with breaking down the barriers to law 
school and bar admission, with the expectation that much would follow. 
Their fight for law school admission was contemporary with a broad 
movement for higher education for women: by 1875 Vassar, Smith and 
Wellesley had opened for women; and Oberlin, several midwestern state 
universities and the University of California had admitted women. By 
1970, the fight for equal access to an undergraduate education was over, 
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and Friedan had dramatically drawn attention to the failure of such an 
education to lead to women's assuming a significant political or 
economic role. On other fronts, there was an awareness that barriers 
might be broken but few women go through and there was a wariness of 
tokenism. 
This review of women's admission to law education and practice, 
within the context of differing social and political frameworks of 
women's experience in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, prepares 
the way for an examination in Chapter III of historiographical and 
theoretical issues of women's status which have an impact on the 
significance of women's law education. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
In concluding Women in Law, Epstein notes, "I have resisted using 
political rhetoric in this book, partly because such words as 
'domination,' 'oppression,' and 'patriarchy' are slogans often used by 
ideological movements of a certain cast, obscuring the complexity 
typical of the processes of social exclusion."[1] In this study, such 
words will be used, though not as slogans (and what is wrong with 
political rhetoric? Rhetoric is speech; without speech there is 
political silence, then sociological surveys could continue, but without 
any possibility for action). This study will consider the concepts of 
domination, oppression and patriarchy. An examination of them, of who 
understands what by them, of who uses them for what ends, provides a 
critical underpinning to a focused study of the meaning of law education 
and practice for women in the last decade. In order to place women's 
law education in a context broader than "equal education" or statistical 
gain, in order to press the questions of whether equal education and 
statistical gain make a difference, this chapter will examine critical 
theoretical issues as a framework within which the central questions of 
the study are to be comprehended: 
1. Concepts of achievement and oppression. 
2. Feminist theories of patriarchy. 
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3. Views of public and private spheres. 
Concepts of Achievement and Oppression 
In "New Approaches to the Study of Women in American History," 
Gerda Lerner wrote in 1969 of the importance of moving away from a 
feminist historical perspective which regards the history of women only 
as a history of their oppression and struggle. [2] Lerner argues for a 
more complex view which encompasses an evaluation of the power that 
women have exercised, even though excluded from the main institutions 
and organizations of power. Certainly the story of women's oppression 
and their struggle for equal rights in America is a stirring and 
inspiring one, and the prose of the nineteenth-century feminists has an 
enduring force. Such women as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucy Stone 
repeatedly described the injustice of women's position in society: "In 
education, in marriage, in religion, in everything, disappointment is 
the lot of woman."[3] However, these women bemoaned their fate only as 
a prelude to a call to action: "It shall be the business of my life to 
deepen that disappointment in every woman's heart until she bows down to 
it no longer."[4] Or, in Sarah Grimke's words, "All I ask of our 
brethren is, that they will take their feet from off our necks and 
permit us to stand upright on that ground which God designed us to 
occupy."[5] Indeed, the great Seneca Falls Declaration of 1848 follows 
this formula. A powerful list of the "repeated injuries and usurpations 
on the part of man toward woman" is followed by the twelve resolutions, 
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including the call to secure the right to elective franchise.[6] 
Gerda Lerner's suggestion that the "oppressed group model" be 
discarded leads to a different focus on the role and activities of women 
in American history.[7] The examination of women's roles in teaching, 
community building, and activism suggests women's significant 
involvement and contribution to the economic and political life of the 
country. This examination focuses on women's achievement rather than 
their oppression. 
In considering the views of woman as primarily achiever or 
oppressed, it is important to note that the nature of the oppression of 
women was understood differently by the nineteenth century feminists 
than by feminists today. A preliminary distinction is that such women 
as Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton focused primarily on the 
symptoms of male tyranny; twentieth century analysts, particularly the 
socialist feminists, have more insistently examined the nature and 
structure of this tyranny. The Sentiments of the Seneca Falls 
Declaration includes: 
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct 
object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To 
prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. 
In entering upon the great work before us, we anticipate no 
small amount of misconception, misrepresentation, and 
ridicule; but we shall use every instrumentality within our 
power to effect our object. We shall employ agents, circulate 
tracts, petition the state and national legislatures, and 
endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in our behalf. 
In the first of these paragraphs, the fact of the massive oppression of 
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women is recognized. The proof submitted is then a list of ways in 
which women have been oppressed, a list of deprivations and exclusions. 
There is no analysis of how man has done this to woman. In light of 
this absence, the notion of the possible efficacy of submitting such 
lists "to a candid world" appears startlingly naive. The second 
paragraph articulates the head-on approach of the zealot in all causes: 
"we shall be mocked but shall not give up." In 1848 the list alone was 
a radical and radicalising act, probably the single most consciousness- 
raising document in the history of American women. Over a century 
later, when issue after issue on the list had been confronted, in some 
cases successfully, it was inescapable for some feminists that changes 
in laws and enfranchisement had not fundamentally changed the status of 
women. Thus, while many women continued to work towards achievement of 
the goals of the Seneca Fall Resolutions, others directed their 
attention away from such reforms and towards an analysis which might 
suggest a new approach. As the understanding of the nature of 
oppression changed, the definition of achievement has also shifted. In 
the nineteenth century, to understand oppression as no vote, no voice in 
the pulpit, no access to the professions meant that achievement was a 
vote, a voice in the pulpit, access to the professions. This notion of 
linear progress dictates that a woman's movement work horizontally from 
disenfranchisement to enfranchisement, and often vertically from one 
prioritized goal to the next. In the twentieth century, some feminist 
theorists have come instead to view oppression as a complex, 
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interconnected set of structures. This casts doubt on the efficacy of 
much of the activity which comprises apparent progress for women. There 
is thus a danger that in rejecting such "achievement," feminist theory 
may now suggest a pessimistic view of the world in which oppression is 
more fully comprehended as the fact of women's existence, but in which 
liberating achievement is scarcely possible. At best, however, 
achievement is now understood to be difficult and susceptible to 
undermining, so that alternatives to the nineteenth century concept of 
linear progress are explored. 
In assessing the understanding that nineteenth century feminists 
had of their oppression, the historiographical debate over the role of 
Blackstone in their thinking provides a central example. Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in England in 1765-69 and 
shortly thereafter in America, was the basic text for American students 
of the law in their apprenticeships and later in colleges. Its orderly 
and readable explication of English law made it an enduringly popular 
and influential basis for the study of law. Blackstone reviews the 
legal status of married women in the section on husband and wife, in the 
series of sections on such relationships as master and servant, parent 
and child, guardian and ward. In his famous words: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that 
is, the legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of her 
husband, under whose protection and cover she performs 
everything. 
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In consequence: 
For as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law intrusted 
him with the power of restraining her by domestic 
chastisement, as he would punish a child or an 
apprentice...the courts of law still permit a husband to 
restrain his wife of her liberty, in case of any gross 
misbehavior. [8] 
These assertions and their consequences formed a great part of the 
nineteenth century picture of women's oppression. While a single woman 
(feme sole) could own and administer property, common law dictated a 
civil death to a woman upon marriage (feme covert). The preamble to the 
Seneca Falls Resolutions ingeniously turns Blackstone upon himself by 
citing him on the law of nature, "dictated by God Himself...obligatory 
upon all. No human laws are of any validity if contrary to this...the 
law of nature...will tend the most effectually to our own substantial 
happiness."[9] Thus, the resolutions against existing statute and 
precedent could be justified within Blackstone's terms. After this, the 
emphasis is on the specific nature of women's disabilities and the need 
to eliminate them. Blackstone's words on the woman's status in marriage 
were cited and relied upon by lawyers, and were cited and opposed by 
feminists. Mary Beard in Woman as Force in History affirms the great 
influence of Blackstone on the practice of law in America but also 
stresses the alternatives available to women in equity, which Blackstone 
omitted to mention in his definitions of the legal consequences of 
marriage in common law.[10] Beard notes that in 1848 women were barred 
from legal training and so accepted as fact the strictures of common law 
as presented by Blackstone because they were ignorant of the 
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possibilities of greater financial independence enforceable in equity. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her associates thus emerge as reinforcing 
their own oppression by insistently publicising the worst options 
available to women while failing to see the more positive legal avenues. 
Beard stresses the missed opportunities available to women in course of 
equity to the extent that she concludes that for the mid-nineteenth 
century feminists "the full-fletdged thesis of woman's historic 
subjection to man was grounded on the belief in Blackstone's 
doctrine."[11] Further, "the dogma of woman's complete historic 
subjection to man must be rated as one of the most fantastic myths ever 
created by the human mind."[12] She views critically the nineteenth 
century women's emphasis on oppression over achievement, on the fight 
for legal and political equality rather than on their "force, 
potentialities, and obligations." 
It is a major weakness in Beard's argument that she suggests that a 
legal possibility could have been used extensively by women to effect 
widespread change in their status. Marylynn Salmon has questioned the 
extent to which principles of equity were applied in favor of women, and 
noted that even where separate trusts or estates were established in 
equity for married women the husband's consent was required.[13] In any 
case, regardless of the extent of their ignorance of existing legal 
options, Stanton and her associates did not exaggerate the practice of 
oppression. Over time, the effect was to emphasize the fact of the 
oppression and delineate and attack the major symptoms of it, rather 
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than to discover and develop legal loopholes within an overwhelmingly 
oppressive system. Blackstone was influential, and the women protested 
his influence. 
As this study considers the significance of the second wave of law 
school admissions for women, it is important to take into account the 
achievement and oppression models. If women describe themselves 
insistently as victims, their self-designation reinforces their 
oppressed status; an exclusive emphasis on their role as achievers, 
however, lacks conviction. The achievements of women individually and 
collectively in their pursuit of access to the law must be recorded and 
assessed; at the same time, the nature of the opposition to them must be 
examined. Opposition does not define achievement, but achievement can 
not be assessed without comprehending the force and nature of the 
opposition. This synthesis will allow a perspective on women's entrance 
into law education and practice which denies neither the courage and 
energy which women have displayed, and the gains they have achieved in 
their status in the law profession; nor the severe restrictions they 
have met and the potential limitation of any fundamental change in 
women's status to follow from their new access to the law. 
Feminist Theories of Patriarchy 
Rifkin notes that intense scholarly attention has been paid to the 
nature and meaning of patriarchal social order,[14] and Beechey points 
to its history within twentieth century feminist thought.[15] In 
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contemporary feminist analysis, it has been the central concept for 
exploration of women's continuing inferior status in a society which has 
largely eliminated the legal barriers to women's access to educational, 
economic and professional opportunity. Beechey summarizes the use and 
usefulness of this concept: 
Politically, feminists of a variety of different persuasions 
have seized upon the concept of patriarchy in the search for 
an explanation of feelings of oppression and subordination, 
and in the desire to transform feelings of rebellion into a 
political practice and theory. And theoretically the concept 
of patriarchy has been used to address the question of the 
real basis of the subordination of women, and to analyse the 
particular forms which it assumes. Thus, the theory of 
patriarchy attempts to penetrate beneath the particular 
experiences and manifestations of women's oppression and to 
formulate some coherent theory of the basis of subordination 
which underlies them.[16] 
In 1969 Kate Millett, in the publication of Sexual Politics, fired 
some of the first great shots of contemporary feminism. In her chapter 
"Theory of Sexual Politics," she attempts to prove that "sex is a status 
category with political implications."[17] She acknowledges that 
patriarchal organization appears in varied forms in different periods 
and societies, and that "contradictions and exceptions do exist within 
the system."[18] However, she takes "patriarchal government to be the 
institution whereby that half of the populace which is female is 
controlled by that half which is male," and "the principles of 
patriarchy appear to be two fold: male shall dominate female, elder 
male shall dominate younger."[19] Focusing on the first of these 
principles, Millett considers the ways in which the patriarchal mode is 
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exemplified, and the spheres of human life which it enters, influences 
and controls. She perceives patriarchy as government by consent, a 
consent achieved by a socialization which profoundly influences the 
temperament, role and status" of men and women: temperament is a 
matter of personal psychology, sex roles are the sociological component, 
and status is political. The three interact to reinforce the 
patriarchy, which has an immense power deriving from its "universality 
and longevity" and "its successful habit of passing itself off as 
nature."[20] 
Millett refutes the notion of biological difference between men and 
women as an explanation either for psycho-social difference or for the 
foundation of patriarchy. Within civilization, it is not the physical 
strength of men and the weakness of women that determine the patriarchal 
structure; it is "the acceptance of a value system." The critical 
institution in reflecting and perpetuating this value system is the 
family; in its organization it mirrors the patriarchal state, and in its 
socialization of children it affords the fundamental lessons in 
acquiring "patriarchal ideology's prescribed attitudes towards the 
categories of role, temperament and status."[21] As a girl grows up she 
receives a different kind of education than a boy, she goes on to earn 
less than a man, and her patriarchal status is "interiorized" as she is 
"continually obliged to seek survival or advancement through the 
approval of males as those who hold power...either through appeasement 
or through the exchange of her sexuality for support and status. [22] 
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Millett's theory of patriarchy has an historical importance in the 
development of contemporary feminism. Its bold and inclusive approach 
to the issue of male domination and female subordination lifted the 
woman question far beyond the issues of the middle-class housewife as 
vividly presented in The Feminine Mystique.[231 Sexual Politics had a 
major national impact; the book was widely read and discussed, and 
Millett's literary attacks on important male writers assured her of a 
literate debate. It is important to give due weight to her contribution 
to a popular understanding of woman's status; but as a sustained theory, 
its weakness lies in its avoidance of any fundamental explanation of the 
patriarchy. However, her descriptive hypothesis is compelling, she 
rejects biological reductionism, and she insists on a complex structure 
to account for the durability of woman's inferiority. 
In 1971, Shulamith Firestone proposed, in The Dialectic of Sex, 
that the simplest answer be accepted to the question of why men are the 
ones in power: "Nature produced the fundamental inequality."[24] Since 
women bear the children who continue the species, and until recently 
this involved a great physical toll on them, men alone were freed for 
the business of the world. This "fundamental inequality was later 
"consolidated, institutionalized, in the interests of men," and led to a 
cultural and psychological division between men and women which 
diminished in both the potential for fully human existence.[25] 
Firestone proposes an alternative: the family should be destroyed by 
freeing women from their child-bearing and child-rearing roles "by every 
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means available, thus eliminating the physical and economic dependence 
of women and children.[26] 
In 1972, in her article "The Anti-Feminist Woman," Adrienne Rich 
extended the concept of patriarchy by emphasizing the nature of the 
separate realms to which men and women are assigned in it.[27] Men 
occupy the practical and political world, women's capabilities are 
mystical and aesthetic. As an artist, Rich is concerned less with 
"rights" and "fairness" than with the loss of creativity and imagination 
in a fragmented society, in which the worlds of the political and the 
aesthetic are separate, and in which qualities of sympathy and 
"motherliness" are delegated only to women. She argues that the nuclear 
family inhibits community support, and that the aggressiveness apparent 
in technological capitalism makes it imperative that the "female 
principle" be freed from the confines of the family. She offers the 
poignant image of the loneliness of the pregnant woman in this most 
"unmotherly of societies" as "an archetype of the loneliness of all 
life-expanding impulses in a society created out of the triumph of force 
and will."[28] Rich's aim is to offer not a theory of patriarchy, but 
her vision of some of its critical manifestations. It is problematical, 
however, that she does not address the question of what changes the 
"female principle" may undergo, what may happen to sympathy and 
motherliness, once women are released from the confinements of the 
domestic world. 
Millett and Firestone, as radical feminists, made a major impact on 
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the American understanding of women's experience of oppression. Each of 
them delineates ways in which women are restricted and held to inferior 
positions in various spheres, because they are women; by naming the 
separate pieces of the oppression puzzle, they led the way to a 
possibility of constructing a total picture of the patriarchy. Marxist 
feminists then attempted to relate patriarchy to the capitalist mode of 
production in an effort to integrate the feminist struggle into a 
Marxist analysis, demonstrating an historical perspective which would 
lead to a clearer grasp of the status of women in contemporary 
capitalist society. In Mitchell's words, they would "ask feminist 
questions, but try to come up with some Marxist answers."[29] Juliet 
Mitchell is the most thoughtful and articulate of this group. In 
Woman's Estate (1971), she struggles with the questions: "We have to 
see why women have always been oppressed, and how they are oppressed 
now, and how differently elsewhere.[30] Later, in Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism, she modifies the questions: "'Why did it happen' and 
'historically when?' are both false questions." The questions that 
should be asked are "how does it happen and when does it take place in 
our society?"[31] Arguing that ideology has presented woman and the 
family as "aspects of nature itself," she proposes that an analysis of 
women's place in society and a strategy for change must destroy the 
notions of woman as an indifferentiated species, with eternally enduring 
qualities, and of the family as a similar fact of nature. Woman's 
condition must be understood as "separate structures, which together 
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form a complex - not a simple - unity."[32] She postulates four 
fundamental structures of woman's condition: production, reproduction, 
socialization of children, and sexuality. With a brief account of 
woman's role in each of these areas, she argues persuasively that a 
modification of woman's position in one area is frequently offset by 
restricting alterations in another. She cites the increased emphasis on 
a mother's role in child-rearing (socialization of children), as child¬ 
bearing (reproduction) has become a lesser task. Mitchell's thesis adds 
two dimensions to the theory of patriarchy: an historical understanding 
of its changing manifestations, and a theoretical base from which to 
assess means to change the complex subordination of women. Since the 
four structures alter in significance at particular historical points, 
it is futile to attempt to eliminate discrimination or oppression in 
only one area. One must assess the current situation in light of these 
structures and their historical and cultural development. 
In Psychoanalysis and Feminism, published in 1974, Mitchell was the 
first English-speaking feminist to consider psychoanalytic theory, 
particularly its understanding of the operation of the unconscious, as 
an attempt to "comprehend how ideology functions" and to offer "an 
analysis of the place and meaning of sexuality and of gender differences 
within society."[33] "Long before a situation is analysed, people wish 
for its overthrow," Mitchell writes of Firestone and other Utopians.[34] 
Mitchell insists on returning to the Freudian analysis, undeterred by 
Freud's unfortunate failure to denounce what he analysed. In addition 
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to the probable factors of biological handicap and economic 
exploitation, a mental and emotional process has remained firmly in 
place to maintain the oppression of women in the patriarchy. Her 
insistence on the role of the unconscious in maintaining gender 
differences in the transmission of cultural laws is Mitchell's principle 
contribution in this book; her pursuit of the question "when did it all 
start," in spite of her own questioning of the value of looking for the 
historical origins of patriarchy, leads her to a doubtful dependence on 
Levi-Strauss's theories of kinship with an emphasis on the notion of 
women as exchange objects. Out of this, she does usefully assert that 
patriarchy is not primarily the opposition of men and women in the 
culture; it is a "father-dominated social structure." Once again, the 
concept of the patriarchy has become more vivid and encompassing, but 
the search for its origins, while more seriously undertaken by Mitchell 
than by the radical feminists, is the weakest theoretical link. Her 
historical sense of patriarchy does, however, lead her to the position 
that while patriarchy has endured as an ideology it is in contradiction 
to the complexities of the capitalist economy. For Mitchell the 
implications are that women should undertake a cultural revolution, a 
struggle against patriarchal ideology, a demonstration of the inutility 
of patriarchal law at this stage of social development; this would 
herald the demise of patriarchal culture as the class struggle brings 
capitalism to an end. 
Zillah Eisenstein develops the position that the relationship 
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between patriarchy and advanced capitalism is becoming "uneasy."[35] 
She cites the increasing numbers of women in the work force and the 
numbers of single women as evidence of the discrepancy between fact and 
ideology. She sees law as functioning pivotally in the attempt to 
reconcile the conflict between patriarchy, in which women are a sexual 
class, and capitalism, with its liberal ideology of the individual.[36] 
She sees £he potential for subversion of the patriarchal system as the 
law fails in this effort, as certain reforms begin to uncover the view 
of women as a sexual class. It seems equally probable, however, that 
the failure of law in this role is compensated by the recurrence in 
every era of appeals to the natural, divine or higher order which will 
maintain women in their subordinate position, however much its 
appearance has changed. 
As women advance in law education and practice, it is important to 
keep in view the theories of patriarchy. In the variety of feminist 
positions on the concept, there is an underlying possibility of 
pessimism about the potential for meaningful action to change the status 
of women. None of the theories proposes a probable origin for 
patriarchy, and Mitchell is most credible when she discountenances such 
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a search. But whether she suggests a remote origin or none, each of the 
feminists discussed insists on the durability of patriarchal 
organization. This is a theory which maintains that the origins of 
patriarchy are ancient; its effects are present in all aspects of 
social, psychological, political, economic and cultural life; it can 
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accommodate to changing political and economic structures; and it 
subordinates one half of the human race. As the analysis becomes more 
thorough and total, where is the hope for its overthrow, or even its 
penetration? 
Certainly the feminist analysts of the patriarchy are outnumbered 
by reformist women. The difference between the 1970s and the 1870s is 
that this analysis has been made and it is known. Betty Friedan can 
continue to proclaim, but not with the same faith of Stanton. She has 
heard the critique of her position, and it is discomfiting. The 
feminist of today has an historically based sense of the inadequacy of 
linear progress. If she chooses to go with it, she does so without 
total faith in its efficacy. Where does this leave the aspiring or 
practicing woman law student or lawyer? The woman lawyer is deep in 
this dilemma. She has become initiated into the language and process of 
law, perhaps in the belief that such knowledge will enable her to effect 
social change. But, as Rifkin maintains: 
The power of law is that by framing the issues as questions of 
law, claims of right, precedents and problems of 
constitutional interpretation, the effect is to divert 
potential public consciousness from an awareness of the deeper 
roots of the expressed dissatisfaction and anger. The 
ideology of law serves to mask the real social and political 
questions underlying these problems of law. At the same time, 
the paradigm of law which historically has been and continues 
to be the symbol of male authority is not only unchallenged 
but reinforced as a legitimate mechanism for resolving social 
conflict.[37] 
Thus women lawyers are enmeshed in the problem of involving themselves 
in the legal system at the risk of being co-opted by it and increasingly 
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vslidsting it ort on the other hand, establishing alternative structures 
which may become impotent or irrelevant and undermine women's legitimate 
right to participate in the structures of power. 
One reason that the patriarchal analysis does not have a popular 
appeal is that it does not directly propose a program for action. As 
women emerge from political passivity in an era which places a high 
value on action, there is naturally some dismay at the thought that 
although we know that society is organized in such a way that women are 
at a profound disadvantage, perhaps we don't know enough about that, 
about how and why it is so. Observing presentations on law and 
patriarchy to young lawyers and law students, one sees defensiveness and 
frustration at the prospect of engaging once again in theoretical 
discussion which requires rigorous questioning of the value of their 
professional activity. It is more reassuring to believe that a woman 
lawyer can make a difference for women - perhaps by litigating Title VII 
cases - than to consider the need once again for reflection and 
theoretical analysis. 
Views of Public and Private Spheres 
Feminist theories of patriarchy have in common the notion of 
separate primary spheres for men and women: men in public, working, 
producing, practical and aggressive; women in private, housekeeping, 
reproducing, passive, and associated with the mystical and aesthetic. 
Most feminist analysts point to the loss of full humanness for both the 
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women and men in this division; but they are particularly concerned with 
the double deprivation for women, by their exclusion from the spheres of 
men and by the inferior value placed on their own sphere and attributes. 
It will be helpful to take a closer look at what may be understood 
by public and private. As women enter law schools and become lawyers, 
they are entering a part of the public world previously occupied almost 
exclusively by men. If we are to consider the impact of this movement 
on law education and practice on the one hand, and the quality of 
private life on the other, an appreciation of concepts of public and 
private will inform our understanding of the stories of women lawyers 
and law students. It will contribute to the aim upheld by Hannah 
Arendt: "To think what we are doing."[38] 
In Arendt's examination in The Human Condition of the public and 
private realms, she takes the latter to be the world of the house and 
family, in which life is maintained, community is a matter of necessity, 
and man provides food by his labor while woman assumes the survival of 
the species by giving birth. Necessity precludes freedom, for men or 
women. Freedom is possible only in the political, common, public world. 
Arendt does not counterpoise the private world to a generalized public 
one, but to a specific political realm, accessible only to men of 
wealth. There is a clear hierarchy: the private household founded in 
necessity is a pre-political locus, from which some can emerge to the 
higher place of the polis. That women, like slaves, cannot rise in this 
hierarchy doubles their limitations and subjects them to the possibility 
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of violence permissible within the unfree world. Reason and persuasion 
are the art and form of the polis. Since Arendt does not address the 
implications of this for women as individuals or as a class, one can 
only lament the loss, accept the limitation, and pursue her analysis. 
It adds little to our understanding of Arendt's thinking to come up 
against the realization that she would not have been admitted to the 
polis; Arendt herself does not consider this. What is important for her 
in the polis is that it is the realm of freedom, deriving from equality 
in the society of peers. 
Arendt avers that "speech is what makes man a political being."[39] 
People must be able to talk to each other in order to experience meaning 
in a plural setting. For Arendt, speech is indispensable to political 
truth and, together with action, enables people to "appear to each 
other."[40] Without speech and action, we would be "dead to the 
world."[41] The great opportunities of the political world are for 
courage, the "immortal deed," the demonstration of individuality and 
uniqueness, who one is, "really and inexchangeably,"[42] and only one's 
peers in the political world can testify to this. Excellence cannot be 
displayed or named among one's inferiors or familiars in the private 
world. The rise of Christianity, according to Arendt, reversed this by 
elevating individual human life, life understood as the first step 
towards eternity. No longer is excellence in word and deed the ideal, 
the way to bid for immortality; the Christian, looking to eternity, 
perceives the world and its opportunities as vainglorious. In making 
71 
life itself (Arendt does not distinguish between "life" and the soul) a 
higher value than the world, the political realm inevitably loses its 
standing. If the political life is the summum bonum. Christianity is 
the villain. 
Jean Elshtain takes up Arendt's "claim to primacy" for politics: 
"Politics, like every other human endeavor, must make its 
case...Christianity challenged the primacy of politics."[43] Christ 
called people away from rendering the best unto Caesar; there was a new 
world (Arendt would say, unworldly) order, and it had a profound effect 
on the concepts of public and private. Christians were to obey just 
laws, but could resist them if they did not conform to God's higher law. 
The Christian community did not afford the pluralism of the Greek common 
world; it was a group bound by a common interest and purpose. With the 
decline of the vitality of the public realm implicit in this, there was 
a shift in the value of the private world, both movements occurring as 
the notion of the citizen (the concept St. Augustine used explicitly in 
City of God) expanded to include every human being. Women were thus 
swept into its mainstream of life at the moment that life on earth was 
held secondary to life after death. However, Elshtain claims forcefully 
that "Christianity ushered a moral revolution into the world which 
dramatically, and for the better, transformed prevailing images of male 
and female, public and private."[44] In defense of Christianity, she 
colorfully attacks the notion that it emerged and flourished "in a world 
overflowing with exemplary city-states, models of democratic probity 
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with citizens searching for the common good - all killed off by the 
bacillus of Christian otherworldliness...The only politics in the 
(Roman) empire was the passivity of subjects quashed by fear and 
hopelessness or the power-machinations of the ambitious spurred by greed 
and ambition. [45] Having established its impeccable historical origin, 
with a view towards justifying its diminution of public, worldly values, 
Elshtain makes the most significant claim for Christianity's effect on 
concepts of public and private: in its sanctification of each 
individual life, it elevated everyday life, especially of the lowly. 
Women, included in the Christian community, found there extolled the 
"qualities most often associated with her activities as mother - giving 
birth to and sustaining human life; an ethic of responsibility toward 
the helpless, the vulnerable, the weak; gentleness, mercy, and 
compassion."[46] Elshtain rightly sees in this a morality which 
incorporates individual conscience and domestic virtues. But the 
development points towards two new matters for consideration in 
understanding the terms and the meaning of public and private. The 
"rise of the social" is the first of these and, associated with it but 
presenting different problems and questions, is the issue of whether 
"motherly" virtues may be translated unaltered to the public realm. 
The emergence of society - the rise of housekeeping, its 
activities, problems, and organizational devices — from the shadowy 
interior of the household into the light of its public sphere, has 
not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, 
it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the 
two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and 
the citizen.[47] 
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Thus, Arendt begins her commentary on the rise of the social. As the 
public world has become increasingly occupied with matters of societal 
maintenance, the mode of organization is that of the pre-political 
household. In the aggregate of households the possibility of the 
plurality, freedom and equality of the polis disappears; instead, the 
despotic conformism of the household now becomes the conformism of all 
of society. In its latter form, bureaucracy - "a kind of no-man rule" - 
supercedes the necessity for one-person absolute rule.[48] Arendt notes 
that the late eighteenth and nineteenth century developments in art are 
a testament to the discovery and elevation of the intimate as a sphere 
for creativity and for escape from the conformism of society. Certainly 
the elevation by the Romantics of the value of intimate life changed, in 
its rebellion against the encroachment of society, concepts and 
expectations of private life. No longer is the private world one of 
deprivation, or mere necessity, the darkness from which some may emerge 
to the light. Instead, "due to the enormous enrichment of the private 
sphere through modern individualism," with its rich and complex notions 
of intimacy, it stands, as best it can, in opposition to the devouring 
tendencies of society, which has assumed, in new form, the requirement 
to obedience of the earlier household.[49] 
In Arendt's terms, the great loss in this development of society is 
that the opportunity for action is diminished. The rules and 
organization of society require regulated and predictable behavior; 
exceptions to this are perceived as abnormality and deviance. While it 
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is not part of Arendt's focus, it is critical to this study to note that 
if differentiation and distinctions are not possible in public, the 
private world will bear an enormous burden as it becomes the only realm 
- and it is not well protected from society - for the discovery and 
display of uniqueness. And as the political world changes to a social 
world and the private world of necessity changes to one of intimacy, our 
expectation remains the same: men are to be primarily in public, women 
in private. Only the new wave of feminism has begun to challenge this 
assumption both by argument and by large numbers of women moving into 
the public sphere. Women are now in one of two main groups: those who 
remain primarily in the private sphere and those who, like men, go back 
and forth between the public and private realms. But it remains usually 
true that, "Whatever work the woman may do elsewhere, the work at home 
is hers."[50] And, "Not only must women bear the physical 
responsibilities for child care and home management, but in addition the 
psychic burden of the problems is theirs alone."[51] This may shed 
light on the phenomenon of women "trying to do it all." While women may 
have begun to enter law schools and practice with some hope that child- 
rearing and household management would not remain primarily their tasks, 
their continuing to do this in the face of evidence to the contrary 
suggests a strength of motivation not perceived at the beginning of the 
new wave of law school admissions. Writing often out of personally 
painful and isolated experiences in the private realm, women have tended 
to subscribe to the evaluation of the private sphere as inferior to the 
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public, and thus sought to enter the public realm with little 
investigation of its value and opportunity. As power appears to reside 
in public professions, offices and institutions, women have believed 
that access to them will afford an opportunity to exercise a determining 
role for themselves and other women. But if we understand the public 
realm to be one of social norms and behavior, rather than reason, 
persuasion and action, the possibility for such decisive influence 
recedes. And still women keep "leaving the home" to enter this world. 
Perhaps we need to turn the picture upside down. If the public world 
does not provide an authentic opportunity for action, perhaps the 
impulse to escape the private realm is primary, and sufficiently strong 
to prolong avoidance of recognition of the diminution of the 
opportunities of the public sphere. 
It will not be helpful to elaborate the litany of ways in which 
women have, because they were women, labored at particular tasks and 
simultaneously been excluded from others, with the concomitant physical, 
mental, economic and psychic cost. At this stage of feminist 
development, broad descriptions of women's inferior status can no longer 
be considered persuasive. Major works since Mary Wollstonecraft' s A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women have described and documented the 
case, and in the 1980s women are trying to understand how best to act on 
such documentation. But if women are leaving a private world of 
unhappiness for a public world of uniformity of behavior, it is 
important to look back at the experience of the private world. If it is 
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the sphere of intimacy," it may afford more opportunity for humanness 
than the public, social sphere, since in intimacy differences may be 
exhibited and perceived. Juliet Mitchell tells us that in analyzing 
such issues we need "pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will," 
and it is such a pessimistic course that I shall pursue.[52] As speech 
and action are no longer possible in society, the potential for them 
moves to the private and intimate world. However, Arendt demonstrates 
that this is not a simple displacement. There is a qualitative change 
as the opportunity for excellence is lost. There are rich opportunities 
to distinguish oneself by word and deed among one's intimates, but 
amongst them one cannot excel. Within this pessimistic framework, 
Richard Sennett looks in detail at eighteenth and nineteenth century 
notions of public and private, although with two unfortunate omissions: 
he acknowledges neither Arendt's work nor, in any serious way, the 
different experiences of men and women (references to women in public 
are not to their "appearing" but to their "appearance").[53] He 
subscribes fully to the notion that there should be clear dividing lines 
between public and private, and that some qualities and functions belong 
discretely in each area. The blurring of lives leads to unbearable 
stress in one area or both. Thus he sees "dead public space" as a 
symbol and result of an empty public life, which then contributes to an 
unbalanced personal life. "People are more sociable the more they have 
some tangible barriers between them, just as they need specific places 
in public whose sole purpose is to bring them together."[54] In his 
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analysis of changing concepts of public and private, Sennett ranges from 
commentary on the modern city, the modern office, the family, solitude, 
and sexuality. He takes silence to be the barrier which is raised 
between people when the true dividing lines between public and private 
are lost. Thus, in an open office, sociability decreases as workers are 
brought together under surveillance; silence is then the only individual 
protection. While silence may protect, unlike speech it cannot 
distinguish. Sennett also takes up the issues of the increasing weight 
placed on private, specifically family, life in the nineteenth century. 
His understanding of the shift from the Greek public life is that the 
Romans sought an alternative in religious transcendence, which later 
"burst into the world, and became itself a new principle of public 
order."[55] In modern times, self-absorption has overtaken the 
possibilities for political or religious life. Psychoanalysis, setting 
out to free us for thought, speech and action, has turned us back 
insistently on ourselves, and we have looked for meaning in our lives 
exclusively in self-understanding and in relations with intimates. This 
renders private life burdensome, and public life a world of 
"personality." Of its effects on public life, Sennett asserts that 
"confusion has arisen between public and intimate life; people are 
working out in terms of personal feelings public matters which properly 
can be dealt with only through codes of impersonal meaning."[56] On the 
corresponding impact on private life, Sennett first refers to that time 
before confusion arose. Even then he believes that there was a strong 
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desire to escape the family and its rigors."[57] In the nineteenth 
century, for Arendt a social not a political century, but for Sennett a 
period which, in comparison with contemporary society, retained a 
significant public realm, men who found this tiring could retire to the 
privacy of their homes. But since this too was tiring and rigorous, 
clubs and cafes afforded an escape to the silence of "public privacy." 
Sennett briefly notes that, of course, this was a movement available to 
men far more readily than women, but drops that observation in favor of 
his broad thesis that "as the public itself has been erased from our 
minds and our behavior, the family has become steadily more demanding. 
It is our only model for defining what emotionally 'real' relationships 
are like. The voyeuristic escape from the family available in the last 
century should not, therefore, be totally dismissed; at least some 
people got to escape."[58] Sennett names the important necessities of 
separated private and public spheres, and the ability to move between 
them. His disingenuousness in referring to "some people" obscures the 
historical reality that such movement was open only to men. He thus 
circumvents any exploration of the historically different experiences 
for men and women in the private world, from the period of potential 
movement between private and public for men; to the time when the weight 
of private life and the lack of freedom in the public world caused this 
movement to degenerate to a matter of "escape"; to the present when all 
people are equally subject to the demands of private, intimate life. 
Sennett's analysis of the degeneration of public life and the 
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burdening of private life is a clear lens through which to view this 
movement, but in his avoidance of direct exploration of the experiences 
of women he adopts an apparently "inclusively 'human"' perspective, 
which reduces also the possibility for understanding the experience of 
men.[59] We are left with a strong sense of a dynamic, but little 
understanding of the human experience of it. 
In beginning to look at this experience, I now take up the question 
of "motherly" or "womanly" qualities assumed to exist in and 
characterize the intimate private sphere. With the shift of the private 
world from one of necessity to intimacy, women's capacity to nurture has 
been celebrated in art, religion and popular cultures, and this 
celebration transcends class and race. In the past, this celebration 
has been a means for men to describe for women their attributes, roles 
and sphere. As feminists look at this issue, they confront a dilemma. 
As they press for equal opportunity with men in the working world, the 
tendency is to downplay the differences between men and women: "It is 
commonly believed that women are more oriented to social concerns, more 
altruistic than men, and less practical in regard to political and 
fiscal matters. Evidence provided by a number of contributors to this 
book indicates that women's attitudes are similar to those of men in 
similar structural positions."[60] Other feminists emphasize male- 
female differences as a means to "make female experience visible,"[61] 
to turn "a steady, passionate attention to all female experience, [62] 
and thus to affirm the values embedded in this largely private 
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experience. Few feminists conclude from this that women should stay in 
the private world in order to protect these values, although Elshtain, 
citing Carol Gilligan's studies on male-female differences in moral 
language and development - women showing greater concern for others and 
for relationships - cautions that "we must think about what would be 
lost if the private sphere erodes further or if we seek to alter our 
intimate relations entirely."[63] More commonly, women are urged to 
bring their womanly qualities and moral sensibilities into the public 
realm as a means to redeem society. Adrienne Rich presents this 
position apocalyptically: 
We have come to an edge of history when men - insofar as they 
are embodiments of the patriarchal idea - have become 
dangerous to children and other living things, themselves 
included; and we can no longer afford to keep the female 
principle enclosed within the confines of the tight little 
postindustrial family, or within any male-induced notion of 
where the female principle is valid and where it is not.[64] 
In theoretical terms, such belief in the inalterability of female 
qualities is consonant with theories of innate male-female differences, 
many of which bring the attendant woe of separation of spheres from 
which women hope to escape. Such calls to activation of the "female 
principle" also evoke the malevolent saviorism decried by Lawrence in 
those women "who are most busy saving the bodies of men, and saving the 
children: these women-doctors, these nurses, these educationalists, 
these public-spirited women, these female saviours. [63] Women are to 
know best and do better, men thus becoming infantilised under the new 
order as women were in the old. Arendt states the case most eloquently 
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'Because of its inherent worldlessness, love can only become false and 
perverted when it is used for political purposes, such as the change or 
salvation of the world."[66] In working terms, it is, of course, 
vitally important to try to retrieve the history of woman, to attend to 
their experience, listen to their language, and understand the forms by 
which women have survived and emerged. Recognizing the bleakness of the 
public world and the burdens of the private, observing women's move from 
the private to the public realm; and in our pessimism acknowledging that 
this may be primarily an escape to a debased world, as nineteenth- 
century gentlemen escaped to their clubs; we must demonstrate optimism 
in our pursuit of women's history, experience and thinking. These are 
paths towards Elshtain's "reconstructive ideal of public and private," 
which will incorporate the attempt to understand the meaning of this 
movement unprecedented in history; one half of the population moving 
steadily into the public realm, previously occupied almost exclusively 
by the other, within which movement women's entry to the legal 
profession is paradigmatic. 
CHAPTER IV 
WOMEN AND LAW IN THE 1980'S: LAW STUDENTS 
Methodology 
In Chapters IV and V, women law students and lawyers in practice 
will be interviewed. It is important to place this part of the study in 
the context of the total inquiry. It will be one of the three major 
sections of the dissertation. Following Chapter II on the historical 
framework and Chapter III on the theoretical context, Chapters IV and V 
will attempt to understand at an immediate level what it is like to be a 
woman in the field of law. 
The methodology will be in the tradition of phenomenological 
studies, with a particular consciousness of their application to public 
policy. The methodology derives philosophically from the phenomenology 
of Schutz and Husserl, and incorporates the dual sensibility of 
phenomenological inquiry: attempting to understand the subject of 
inquiry in a way which acknowledges the values and sense of meaning held 
by both subject and inquirer. Hummel, in his review of recent books by 
phenomenologists focusing on planning, policy and administration, notes 
that "the task for all phenomenological inquiry is to so approach things 
that these things are permitted to show themselves in their own 
terms."[l] He simultaneously emphasizes the necessity of the "directed 
glance that draws attention back to the perceiving subject as the 
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originator of all knowledge about objects."[2] 
The interviews in Chapters IV and V will be open-ended. Each woman 
will be told that it is because she is a law student or lawyer that she 
is being interviewed. She will be interviewed on two separate 
occasions, and no pre- determined questions will be asked. This 
"engagement of what used to be called 'respondents' differs radically 
from the question-asking (and therefore answer-implying) approach of 
behavioralist interviewing and survey research."[3] It is instead the 
engagement that Schuman enters into: "direct dialogue with those he 
wishes to study in order both to help clear the air for effective 
discourse and construct, rather than 'observe,' social and political 
truths."[4] The substance of the interviews will allow for reflection 
on the historical and theoretical concepts of earlier chapters. The 
integration of these perspectives will make possible the reframing of 
questions pertaining to the meaning of women in the field of law, and 
will set directions for further research. It is not, therefore, a study 
for duplication but for incorporation by other scholars. 
The Women To Be Interviewed 
Four women will be interviewed: two law students and two 
practicing lawyers. Among them will be women single and married, black 
and white, in large and small practice, from more or less prestigious 
law schools, with and without children. Categories will be secondary, 
however, to the women's individual stories. These interviews are a 
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critical component of this study for the following reasons: 
1. This is a theoretical study. It is important, therefore, to look 
not primarily at statistics related to law education and practice on 
the one hand, and private life on the other, but to hear the stories 
of individual women who are lawyers or in the process of becoming 
lawyers. For example, statistical studies might give us comparative 
divorce rates for male and female lawyers, or for lawyers in 
varying kinds of practice. But what would this mean? In order to 
pursue the search for meaning - what it means for women to enter the 
field of law at this point in the history of America - we must allow 
the women to speak, as fully as possible, about their own 
experiences. This kind of thoughtful exploration will also define a 
background, a context from which empirical tests can emerge with a 
wide range of questions. 
2. Elshtain cautions against a "single, overarching logic of 
explanation which can do everything for us."[5] It is important to 
avoid a form of inquiry which reduces human beings to objects by 
manipulating their reality for simplifying ends. As a method of 
inquiry, Elshtain approves of Dorothy Smith's approach: A "self¬ 
description of subjects in context," followed by "the analyst's 
rendering of these self-descriptions in a manner that makes them 
more widely and generally accessible by assimilating them into a 
theoretical framework that gives them explanatory power at a more 
abstract level of understanding."[6] This mode of inquiry is vital 
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for any theoretical development which encompasses the unexpected, 
the diversity of subjects. For the consideration of the meaning of 
women s entrance into the field of law, it is the most fruitful 
approach. Since we wish to know something of the impact on the 
private sphere - so little susceptible to scientific study and, by 
its nature, an individual experience - we shall have to ask 
individual women their thoughts and feelings on the matter. In 
feminist terms, it contributes to the breaking of the silence which 
has surrounded women's experience. 
3. Arendt proposes that, "Action without a name, a 'who' attached to 
it, is meaningless."[7] As this "who" is revealed, within an 
"already existing web of human relationships," the impact is felt on 
others with whom she is in contact; but because of the unique nature 
of each of those others, the impact can never be predicted. This is 
an important perspective to maintain as one attempts to understand 
why large numbers of women have taken similar steps and how the 
results may or may not have been as they or others individually or 
collectively anticipated. 
"Who somebody is or was we can only know by knowing the story of 
which he is himself the hero - his biography, in other words; 
everything else we know of him, including the work he may have 
produced and left behind, tells us only what he is or was."[8] By 
interviewing these women, it is hoped that they will talk about 
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their own histories and aspirations. I shall be sensitive and open 
to each woman's own view of her acts and their impact; as the 
narrator 1 shall also accept the responsibility of interpretation, 
of contributing to the making of the story," even though it cannot 
yet be fully told. By this process the "who" as well as "what" they 
are will begin to emerge, their uniqueness as well as their woman 
lawyerness. Interviewing will thereby provide an antidote to 
assessing the achievements of women exclusively in terms of what 
they have done in law school, in law practice, and in the family, 
thus bringing some light to the question of the meaning of their 
efforts. 
In examining this movement of women into the world of law, it is 
hoped that questions will be raised appropriate for further analysis in 
areas beyond the law profession. Women will be interviewed because they 
are the subjects, the ones making this change.[9] In its novelty, it 
will tend to be vividly experienced by the women and those around them. 
In sorting and analysing the material of these interviews, however, it 
will be important to hold in view the probability that many issues of 
conflict and fulfillment will be similar for men and women. "The 
ambiguities and uncertainties of fulfilling oneself as a man or a woman 
sometimes mask the more profound anguish of simply being human."[10] 
Cindy 
Cindy is a twenty-four year old white woman. She attended Newton 
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South High School, the University of Massachusetts, and now New England 
Law School. Neither of her parents attended college; her older brother 
is a dentist, and her younger sister "wants to be a doctor and find the 
cure to cancer." In the summers during college, Cindy worked in 
Filene's Basement in Boston, making money for her education and, 
according to her, being where "everything is happening." She has a 
somewhat impassive manner, which belies her passionately held views on 
oppression, particularly of women, and the need for change. 
Cindy's parents paid for most of her higher education, and she 
returned to their home for the first year of law school in Boston: "My 
mother did all my laundry and cooking for me... She was like my 
babysitter." At the end of that year, she took an apartment in 
Cambridge with her lover. 
When Cindy and I first talked, she was a senior at the University 
of Massachusetts; she had made a decision a year earlier that she wanted 
to go to law school. 
Cindy: I guess it wasn't my primary choice going through high school 
and college. My ultimate dream is to become a writer and sit 
beside a babbling brook under a large shady tree and write 
short stories and poems. I don't think - I'd like to do that 
- but I don't think it's very practical and realistic, in 
terms of my own writing even. And so, I guess what I'm very 
interested in is words and language, and other interests are 
oppression and discrimination, and I have always been the kind 
of person that likes to .do things, and when I see something 
that's wrong - or what I consider to be wrong - I'd like to 
attempt to make a change or persuade people to make a change. 
I thought one way to incorporate all of these interests - you 
know I've always been interested in politics and government - 
would be a legal education. 
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Jacqueline: How would all that come together in your mind? 
Cindy: ...hopefully, I could - by going to law school - I could be in 
a position to, say, help pass the ERA. I could see something 
very positive coming from it. I don't know - it could be 
anything. Even as Town Meeting member, I see that as a 
political position where I have a deal, a greater deal of 
power than someone who isn't a Town Meeting member, and I'd 
like to further that. I like to be in a position where I can 
do things the way I want them done. 
Jacqueline: But through certain kinds of channels...? 
Cindy: You have to play the game the way it's set up, and I suppose 
being a lawyer you would be in a position of having an in to, 
say, legislative proceedings. I don't know - if I would be in 
a position to, say, help a battered woman who perhaps couldn't 
even afford some legal representation. I'd like to be in a 
position to help someone like that. Right now, I'm not 
limiting myself to one specific avenue or goal. 
Cindy pursued her objective with the single-mindedness which its 
difficulty of attainment appeared to her to require. Her parents 
support their children's educational plans and want Cindy to "make 
something of herself." At her local public high school, Cindy played 
sports and did very little work. She enjoyed high school and applied to 
three colleges: Dartmouth, Boston College, and the University of 
Massachusetts. Dartmouth put her on a waiting list, and the other two 
accepted her. She went to the University in order to live away from 
home, and stayed in a residence hall for women for the four years. Her 
concern for social oppression and discrimination does not come from her 
family. She believes, "U. Mass, brought it out in me." 
Cindy: As a freshman I was the most closed-minded, unexposed, ^ 
inexperienced person you could ever want to meet... I didn't 
think about anything. I didn't know they (racism, sexism) 
existed. 
89 
Jacqueline: But how did you begin to find out? 
Cindy: Maira's R.A. Selection Committee (the committee to hire 
student advisers in her residence hall). That's where it all 
stems from. She got me when I was young. 
Later Cindy herself applied for a position as a Resident Assistant, 
and was selected: 
I think for the past couple of years, I have always been in 
the position that people look up to me and respect what I say, 
1 think I ve taken advantage of it in a positive way — 
and I'd like to continue that. 
Although Cindy "always wanted to be a writer," she also thought for a 
brief period of becoming a psychiatrist. She is interested in "people 
and their personalities": 
What's more interesting than their minds and how they 
think?... I'd like to deal with people. I see a lawyer as 
dealing with clients and their problems and offering advice 
and counseling. Being an RA, I really enjoy that very much. 
As the fall semester of her senior year came to an end, Cindy felt 
intense pressure to write good essays for her law school applications, 
while maintaining high grades in her courses. She spent the first part 
of the semester preparing for her LSAT exams, taking a preparation 
course to maximize her chance of a good score. She put a great deal of 
effort into this, having received only an "average" score when she took 
the exam the previous summer. She was disappointed, but took a Kaplan 
course, took the exams again, and achieved a "good" score. Now she had 
to do equally well with her application essays and her courses. She 
assesses the sacrifice and the stress: 
Well, I made the decision last week to forget everyone else 
until the end of the semester and get all this done. And then 
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I can have fun next semester. I have to be disciplined. I 
wasn't doing that, I was having fun too, and I don't have time 
to. I am taking one independent study that I have not even 
begun yet, and other courses - I'm not applying myself as much 
as I normally would. And that's why I'm here. So - forget 
all my friends. Like this weekend, I' m just going to stay in 
and do my work... It's difficult because people don't realize 
how much pressure I'm under, because those applications should 
be in now - and they're not - and I've got tests coming up. 
What do I do? Do I do applications because they are more 
important or do I do my tests because I have to maintain my 
cum? I don't know, then someone on the floor has a crisis... 
a lot of pressure. And everyone says, "Oh, you'll do 
fine."... When I was studying for my law boards, I think I was 
very bitchy. They just don't understand all the pressure, the 
anxiety of waiting to get my scores back, and I kept saying, 
"Well, this is my whole future," and people would say, "No, 
it's not, it's just one test." Although it is just one test, 
it is my future, too. 
The personal and the political possibilities of Cindy's life as she 
plans and anticipates it emerge in this talk. Personally, she has 
relinquished entirely her "dream" of being a writer, at this point she 
is almost eliminating time with friends, and she expects that by going 
to law school she will "give up fun for three years." What is the 
nature of her vision that will urge and support her in this process? 
She will certainly please her parents while pursuing a path to a life 
which she feels will enable her to make changes in American society, in 
however small a sphere. Also, she feels that law school and practice 
will provide a suitable arena for her ambition. She describes herself 
repeatedly as a very ambitious person: 
That's the one thing I never appreciated about my major 
(English)... it hasn't produced some real change somewhere... 
I mean, I see so many things that need improvement... the only 
success I could really consider would be improving these 
things... My ambition would be to do it, attempt to do it. 
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Her experience as an R.A. at the University has led her to develop 
a faith that a person in a certain role can have an impact on other 
people's lives and alter their way of seeing and behaving. The parallel 
she projects between being an R.A. in relation to the women on her floor 
and a lawyer in relation to women in need is an uncertain one. The 
women most susceptible to her influence on the floor are first-year 
students away from home for the first time, living in a situation which 
supports their relying on Cindy for advice and direction. Those are not 
much like battered women with children in poor urban housing, with few 
prospects and considerable suspicion of the legal profession. But even 
granting the possibilities of the parallel, how will Cindy maintain her 
values and ideals through law school? The choices an individual makes 
in giving up certain things in order to get other things are 
complicated. Cindy is explicit about giving up friends and fun for the 
semester in order to achieve entrance to a law school. 
Jacqueline: Do you think about what you might be called upon to give up 
when you go to law school? 
Cindy: Everyone's telling me now that I'm going to be brainwashed in 
three years. Maybe I will, I don't know. I haven't gone 
through it yet, I can't really judge... I know it's very 
rigorous. But the way I see it now is that I'd rather give up 
three years of having fun and then - have fun. 
So now, as the period of postponement of personal pleasure extends 
from a semester to three years, one begins to imagine how different a 
person Cindy will be at the end of three years. I think of a student I 
knew ten years ago who could never postpone pleasure; his needs for 
immediate reward led him very rapidly to fail in his courses, to become 
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dependent on drugs, and finally to spend his time in and out of jail 
for theft and sale of drugs, the quickest way he knew to achieve the 
money and status he wanted. Cindy's projection for the next few years 
so totally reverses the notion of instant gratification that its equal 
singleness of view suggests a comparable constriction, another kind of 
jail. 
Cindy's terms and expectations portray the projected experience of 
law school. She approaches it expecting it to be rigorous and demanding 
the sacrifice of many activities and interactions that she enjoys. She 
considers the possibility that law school may be a process of 
brainwashing. She is ready to brave all these perils in the belief that 
a law school education will better equip her to fulfill her sense of 
ambition and effect change. 
Cindy has notions, both idealistic and practical, which are not 
yet integrated. Speaking of her desire to "improve things," Cindy says, 
"I'm a very idealistic person, I guess." Her vision is tempered, 
however, by a realism that seems to stem in part from her background. 
Associating writing with idyllic settings and absence of income, she 
acknowledges that she would love to leave law school application 
pressures and " go to the Cape, which is deserted now, and just sit 
there and do nothing and get away... but that's not very realistic 
either because I don't come from a very wealthy background at all. And, 
oh, I do have to eat." Also, Cindy has no clear sense of how one goes 
about attempting to effect change. In answering the law school 
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application question, "What aspects of American society do you consider 
to be in greatest need of change?" Cindy waxes eloquent. She continues, 
And the second part of the question is: As a lawyer, how 
would you perhaps change some of these things? And I have no 
idea. 
Jacqueline: You have no idea? 
Cindy: No. 
Jacqueline: But you aren't going to dental school. You have some 
notion that going to law school, that lawyers effect change, 
you think, more than dentists. 
Cindy: True... I don't know how realistic any of that is. I mean, 
there are so many people who have dreams of changing the 
world... would it be more frustrating being a lawyer in the 
community than being an R.A. on a floor? You know, I can see 
so many things that you'd like changed. And you can't really 
change them. You can only rearrange them. 
One senses that for this young woman who has never travelled or 
been exposed to a variety of professional alternatives, both "becoming a 
writer" and "becoming a lawyer" are remote from her experience, and her 
visions of life as a writer or a lawyer derive from minimal 
information. There are, however, direct paths to becoming a lawyer, and 
even if the paths are hard to travel they lead, Cindy believes, to a 
position of activity, effectiveness and financial reward. 
Let us look carefully at how Cindy displays something of "who" she 
is in the "what" she does in beginning to travel the law school path. 
Jacqueline: So your parents were happy to hear of your career thoughts. 
Cindy: Uh huh. 
Jacqueline: And what point are you at? 
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Cindy: Well, I took my LSAT's this past summer... did just average on 
them... I was very disappointed. And they were disappointed 
and I was a little disappointed... not really disappointed... 
Jacqueline: Yeah... 
Cindy: And so I said... "Well, I know what this means... this means 
I 11 take a Stanley Kaplan course. I'll work very diligently 
and very hard and I'll take them again in October," which I 
did and I did much, much better. I got my scores yesterday. 
Jacqueline: Did you? Are you going to tell me? 
Cindy: I got a 670. 
Jacqueline: That's wonderful! 
Cindy: I'm so happy! So, I'm very pleased that all that work paid 
off. But now my grades are suffering because I spent the 
second half of the summer and the first half of the semester 
studying for that exam. And now I have all my applications to 
do and I don't have the time for school. My cum sort of 
suffers. 
Jacqueline: You did something very interesting which was that you took 
them (LSAT's) in the summer and you did badly, so that you 
knew that meant one thing, and many people would think that 
meant quite different things than you thought it meant. 
Cindy: It was the only alternative. 
The discussion continues with Cindy unswerving in her view that the 
issues are clear: in order to go to law school, you need to take the 
LSAT's and do well on them. She doesn't like taking such tests, and 
she doesn't believe they reflect ability, but that's the game - so, "I 
had no choice." 
Arendt proposes that "Action without a name, a'who' attached to it 
is meaningless,"[11] and Schuman partly explicates this: Without a 
context, it is difficult to give a fact much meaning."[12] The action 
under consideration here is Cindy's taking her Law School Aptitude Tests 
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over in order to achieve a good score. The fact is that she achieved a 
good score the second time. What does this reveal about Cindy, "the 
agent, and what meaning does her achievement have? Thousands of men 
and women take the LSAT's each year, many take them over, most of those 
who will obtain law school places will score well. Part of Cindy's 
context is one of social class. Her achievement is a conspicuous one in 
a family in which neither parent attended college. Her older brother 
has completed college and professional school; as the second child, she 
aspires to do as well; and already the third child hopes to become a 
doctor. Cindy would help realize her parents' hopes for the family: 
"Everyone has dreams." 
Then there is the context of her peers, none of whom applied to law 
school; nor did Cindy see them as a source of understanding and support 
in a time of stress. To her, friends represent fun and relaxation, and 
so they needed to be excised from her life in order to focus on her 
goal. But even more vivid than Cindy's appearance within the networks 
of family and friendship is her single voice, clear, decisive, 
determined, and unaware or unacknowledging of other ways she might have 
acted. This is the voice of a person who is single-minded, whose vision 
of progress and development is linear. As she looks ahead to becoming a 
lawyer, Cindy sees a number of required steps. If she errs in one, she 
will retrace the step; if she encounters anything or anyone on the path 
she does not perceive as furthering her progress, she will separate 
herself from them. This is a Bunyanesque, not a Chaucerian, pilgrimage. 
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The linear mode leads readily to assessment and resolution of problems 
by the either/or" approach, the use of exclusive rather than inclusive 
solutions (friends v. work, studying v. fun). This mode will be 
consonant with that of the legal world (plaintiff v. defendant, Smith v. 
Brown). If Cindy remains in this world, how likely is it that she will, 
as she imagines, reintegrate people and experiences she has eliminated? 
It is particularly difficult to make predictions because Cindy is 
at a stage in her life when developmental changes follow quite rapidly 
one upon another, so that a strong career orientation need not be an 
indicator of her life style twenty years hence. Fun may or may not 
return to her life. It is possible that the fun she describes in her 
adolescent life was simply her pleasant existence before she found a 
demanding career focus. In her conversations with me, Cindy said 
nothing to indicate that she had had close or intense relationships with 
her family or friends; such relationships may not be necessary to her. 
Cindy and I talked again at length when she is in the middle of her 
law school years. She described her senior year of college as one of 
pressure; now she gives a vivid account of her first year of law school. 
The first year was absolutely torturous, brutal, and horrible, 
because of the amount of work that was required to be done. 
The first year's impossible to do, so you have to do as much 
as you can. The amount of work that's required to be an A 
student is impossible to do. They give you work of forty 
hours a day, seven days a week and, of course, you can't do 
that. And it's frustrating, the professors are intimidating, 
and it's not that the subject matter is difficult to 
comprehend; it's just too much there. Towards the end of the 
year - the courses go from August to the end of May and it's 
not broken down into semesters, they're year-long courses - 
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and after a while, day after day with no breaks, I just 
couldn't apply myself like I was able to in the beginning of 
the year and so I started going out one night a week just 
because I had to - I was going crazy. And so maybe I did that 
for too many weeks in a row, that one night out... for law 
school, you cannot miss one day because they give you so much 
work; if you miss one day, it's impossible to do two days' 
work in one day. And everything builds on everything you 
read, so if you miss a class or miss a day's reading, you're 
lost, because you don't know what's going on in class. 
Each day Cindy got up between six and seven in the morning, 
reviewed and did homework, went to classes until one or two in the 
afternoon, then studied all afternoon and evening. Added to the 
pressure of the amount of work came the unpleasantness of her experience 
in her sixth course, her writing course, in which she prepared a brief 
for moot court: 
... the atmosphere was so paranoid that you'd want to work 
with people, but people were so competitive that they'd give 
you something, they'd give you a case that might help your 
case, but you'd know that they had something else that they 
weren't giving you that could win it for them. People were 
cutting cases out of books and giving people bad cases that 
had been overturned or something. It was absolutely horrible. 
It brought out the worst, the absolute lowest in people... We 
all had this false pretense of wanting to help each other, but 
then again anyone would have stabbed anyone in the back to get 
the winning piece of information. And, of course, we all know 
now that it didn't exist. 
This was her experience of her fellow law students. And her 
friends? 
Cindy: It was especially difficult because I had just graduated 
college with all my friends who had just graduated college, 
and that means no more school, no more books, just go to a job 
nine to five and then you go out and play, seven days a week; 
and that was especially difficult for me because I know a lot 
of people around here who just got out of college and I 
couldn't share any of that. It was difficult, at first; 
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eventually, they stopped calling, but it was hard when they'd 
call and say it was Friday night - let's go out - and I 
couldn't. 
Her lover? 
Jacqueline: Were you involved in a relationship with anybody at the 
time? 
Cindy: Yes. 
Jacqueline: How did you manage that? 
Cindy: After I'd get done studying, I'd call the person up and we'd 
talk on the phone for about an hour every night. And that 
would be about it. And maybe a little time on a Sunday 
afternoon in between, if I planned to take a break. 
Jacqueline: You mean you'd just see her for an hour or two? 
Cindy: Yes... We both understood it was something that won't last for 
a long time, so we just waited for school vacations. It was 
very difficult. 
Jacqueline: Would you have time to yourself during Christmas and spring 
breaks, or were you still studying over vacation periods? 
Cindy: Still studying. That was the time when you start doing 
outlines because the courses were so long, you had to make an 
outline for the whole year, so that was the time when we 
started that. But I took a week off during Christmas break, 
it was about four or five weeks long, so I took a week off and 
just played. I was upset that I did afterwards. I felt 
guilty and I couldn't really enjoy the week. 
These, then, were the conditions of her life during Cindy's first 
year at law school. The second year she found "tolerable" and, halfway 
through it she took a job with a woman attorney in general practice - 
"which I absolutely love. I enjoy working there so much." 
Cindy expects to join the practice after graduation, so now she has 
a picture of how she will spend the next few years. She can imagine how 
much time she will give to the law, and the form that will take. Within 
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that frame, I asked her to reflect on her earlier comments about 
effecting social change. 
Cindy: Her practice is the kind of practice I would like to have 
someday. That's how I feel right now. I don't know if I'll 
change, but she has a little bit of everything with a feminist 
bent. 
I don t think that I could effect much of a social change. 
But I can make a big change in a lot of people's lives, client 
by client. On a small scale, with individual people, I have a 
lot of power, will have a lot of power, and I think I can, 
I 11 be able to do a lot. An example? Battered woman who's 
married to the husband who batters her. If I could, if she 
wants a divorce, to get the best possible settlement in her 
favor. 
Jacqueline: How do you feel about the law as a mechanism for... 
Cindy: It's a joke. There is no such thing as the law. It's just a 
bunch of words that you can use either way. Every case is a 
plaintiff and defendant. The law is just a device you use to 
get the outcome you want. My goal? Just use the proper 
strategy that wll get me the outcome I want. 
As I leave Cindy in the middle of law school, she has moved from 
high school, where she was "very, very athletic" and did "no work" to 
the University of Massachusetts where, again, she worked little until 
her last year, but "had fun," to law school, which she does not enjoy, 
but which occupies most of her time; she is looking forward to a time- 
consuming but engrossing first job. She is already worrying about the 
bar exam: 
That's going to be the next brutal step, taking that, because 
after I graduate next year, they tell me the next day you 
start going to this bar review course, which is a seven-day-a- 
week, ten-hour-a-day marathon to prepare yourself for the bar. 
Cindy has learned to work very hard. She has also toughened up. When I 
ask her at the end of our talks if there is anything she would like to 
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add, she raises the subject of sexism in law school, but notes that she 
now finds that "more motivating than infuriating." Is she glad she went 
to law school? 
Yes, very much. I enjoy law, and I have a sense of 
accomplishment and I'm learning a lot. It's something totally 
new, which I enjoy, which is learning new things. And it's 
useful and it's extremely practical." 
Cindy describes herself as "much more realistic." She has resolved her 
earliGf idealistic/realistic dilemma by abandoning social notions of 
change and personal dreams of other ways to live. 
Donna 
Donna is a twenty-four year old black woman from South 
Philadelphia, in her final year at Harvard Law School. Always an 
accomplished and hard-working student, she attended Philadelphia High 
School for Girls and Cornell University before going to Harvard Law 
School. Her mother is a clerical worker, and her father does recruiting 
and job placement for a manpower program. He had two years in college, 
her mother none. Donna's parents divorced when she was thirteen, and 
her mother supported her sister and her on a small income. But, in 
Donna's words: 
The things that I've always wanted, which I think were 
sometimes out of line in our socio-economic class, my mother 
was always able to provide, and provide without sacrifice. I 
mean when I say "without sacrifice," I mean without 
sacrificing a need that we had. Perhaps sacrificing things 
that she may have wanted to do individually. For example, 
when I was in junior high school I went to Spain for two 
weeks, and she's never been out of the country. 
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Donna is engaged to be married to an architect who is working in 
Washington, D.C., but who will move to Philadelphia when she joins a law 
firm there. Her older sister is a doctor, now interning in pediatrics. 
In high school, Donna was part of a small group of young women who all 
went on to colleges of some prestige, and thence to professional or 
graduate schools and careers. But, first, her home: 
Donna: Education has always been something stressed - it was 
understood, never forced, because my sister and I both enjoyed 
school so my mother never had a difficult time carrying out 
her mandates because it was always understood from 
kindergarten, because we all had these little readings, as 
early as first grade and kindergarten, and it was always 
understood that education came before pleasure. When we were 
children, during the summer, some of our activities were to 
play school. I had a little playroom in the basement, and my 
father was a little bit obnoxious about it. On the way down 
the staircase, he'd lined the walls of the basement with times 
tables, so I could not avoid seeing times tables whenever I 
walked down the stairs. The influence of education was always 
in my household. There were always loads of books and sets of 
encyclopaedias for Christmas and, you know, so education was 
always stressed. 
Equally important in forming Donna's approach to schooling were her 
mother's style and methods. According to Donna, her mother is 
"extremely methodical, extremely meticulous and extremely organized." 
Donna tells numerous stories to illustrate this: how her mother's 
family files can answer every obscure inquiry; how every item of canned 
goods is accounted for in the supply in the basement; how graduations, 
including hotel reservations, are planned years ahead; that when Donna 
went away to college, "she sent me away with enough toiletries to last 
for four years. I swear." Donna has considerable respect for her 
mother's organization; she acknowledges that it is unusual, extreme, but 
102 
she does not mock it. She has benefited materially from "the 
chronological, methodical way she's conducted her life." 
Donna: That's also helped my education because I'm extremely 
organized in the way I study and how I study. I literally, to 
this day, have to be organized to study. I can't just, you 
know, confusion, pick up a book and study. I have to set all 
the papers out that I'm going to use for this subject, with 
little papers, and I can do it only to completion. I 
can t just half-leave it and - that's somewhat bad for me 
because you know that the quantity of work you get in college; 
it's sometimes better to do a little of each rather than all 
of some and none of the other. Thank God I do it the way I do 
it - I'll do all of this one and put it back, then all of this 
one» You know, that's how my mom really operates. 
For Cindy it was a new mode in law school, but for Donna the habit 
of studying is the habit of a lifetime. Each of them seems to hold onto 
a talismanic model of studying as a way to cope with apparently 
impossible quantities of work. Cindy spends every available hour 
studying; Donna - who also spends almost all her time studying - puts 
her faith in a methodical approach. But she found herself bitterly 
disappointed in her performance at Harvard Law School. She understood 
that many bright, hard-working students did not make A's or Law Review, 
but she had believed that hard work could make these achievements 
possible. It was her first encounter with failure, particularly the 
failure of her system which had served her so well until this point. 
Donna: I've always been an anxious person, I think, and somewhat 
compulsive. I think that compulsive attitude has helped me to 
achieve as much as I have. I've always been a driven student. 
I've always competed on a scale, against what I considered to 
be a scale, of absolute perfection. 
In terms of the future, I'm trying now to develop an 
attitude that I know I'm trying to do my best or I usually do 
my best and when I've done my best, there's usually nothing 
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else I can do. To that extent, I think I'm trying to get a 
more realistic attitude toward approaching any type of 
project. So it has been positive in that sense, because if I 
had never met with the stress that would finally break me 
down, I would have continued to go on like that and never just 
stop and enjoy things and casually get involved. So I think 
that s the impact it's had — to make me want to change the 
attitude I had. 
At the end of our talks, Cindy is summarizing: "I've learned the 
extent of my abilities. Never to be the special element is quite 
disappointing," but "this is my time to be not in the limelight. It 
took me three years to be able to say that." Law school is a toughening 
experience for Cindy, one that makes her feel more knowledgeable and 
powerful. Donna is a sadder but a wiser woman. Having demonstrated her 
extraordinary aptitude and drive by admission to the most prestigious 
colleges in America, the lesson for her is that she is a person of 
limited abilities, that all will not yield to her, even if she works 
hard and thoroughly. Ironically, this reduced sense of ability as 
defined by Harvard Law School may afford her an opportunity to "stop and 
enjoy things and casually get involved," to rethink how to do her life 
in a more complex, integrated and inclusive way than by the exclusive 
method of finishing one thing before going on to another. Given her 
history and habit ("To be honest, I don't think I've stopped the cycle 
yet. I think that after I'm away from law school and I've had a few 
successes, I'll fall right back into the pattern of - critical 
judgment."), this will be difficult for Donna, but beginning such a 
process may afford her some ways to think about how to live 
simultaneously in the roles she hopes to assume as wife, mother and 
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lawyer. 
Donna is also explicitly rethinking the ingrained habit of 
deferring pleasure. She tells the story of delaying an eviction by 
several months for a client. 
Donna: I was thinking, my gosh, six months from now she'll have to go 
through it all over again. But delayed gratification has 
always been something that I have been able to do, obviously, 
whereas for her six months meant the world because immediate 
gratification meant more to her than it did to me. I plan in 
terms of what am I going to be doing two years from now. Of 
course, I plan next week, tomorrow, day by day, but immediate 
gratification from what I do today has never been important. 
However, immediate gratification is becoming more and more a 
priority because after seven years of higher education and you 
don't see anything as a result of it... 
Sometimes I'm very tired now. I am really getting tired of 
this threshold after threshold. 
In our conversations, Donna dwells most on her academic history, 
interests and ability. She speaks in almost obsessive detail about a 
variety of aspects of her schooling, with an almost exclusive attention 
to her academic performance as demonstrated in grades, class 
participation, papers, PSAT's, SAT's, and LSAT's. However, she focuses 
on two other areas: her social concerns and her thoughts on career and 
family. 
Donna's primary interest in law is real estate investment and 
mortgage financing. She considers that an unusual interest for a person 
of her background, and explains in some detail her avoidance of criminal 
law: 
Donna: I realize that there are a lot of people who turn out to be 
criminal defendants who are themselves victims of socio¬ 
economic plight. But it disturbs me, and it's this 
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disturbance that will keep me from being a defense attorney, 
that most of the victims are also subject to the same plight 
or some sort of plight, and even if they weren't, I still 
can't come to grips with justifying some sort of crime against 
any victim, whatever socio-economic class - as a result of 
socio-economic plight - since there are millions of Americans 
who are subject to that same deprivation who do not commit 
crimes and it's that that keeps me from being a defense 
attorney. But it's also the sympathy - knowing that the 
criminal justice system is far from perfect, and also the fact 
that the penal system is offensive - that would keep me from 
becoming a prosecutor. So it's these mixed emotions that keep 
me away from criminal law altogether. 
Nor does she expect to contribute to social justice by the kind of law 
practice she anticipates. She believes that pro bono work could have a 
larger impact than on any one individual, in spite of the profession's 
focus on individual relationships with one client, but she expects that 
time constraints will allow her only an occasional pro bono case, at 
least for five to ten years. Her work with legal services has 
intensified her sense that there are "systematic vices." 
Donna: But what I've decided to do in terms of getting over my own 
feelings about what I intend to do about helping people, 
particularly poverty people, is that there are so many other 
areas outside the law where I could be helpful - community 
organizations, social and political movements and that sort of 
thing - and that's the way I justify in my own mind the fact 
that I won't be doing very much work in terms of poverty law 
after I graduate. 
It is not possible to know as Donna concludes her three years at 
Harvard Law School how great an involvement in matters of social justice 
she will require to feel that she is living her life wisely and well. 
Will her concerns prove largely theoretical, matters for discussion and 
consideration but not action? Or will the development of who she is 
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include an emerging involvement in attempts to address systematic and 
individual vices? It is interesting, in any case, to note that she 
speculates considerably about meaning and experience related to social 
involvement and to career and family, but she is unable to find any 
explanation for her interest in real estate law. Certainly, in her 
examination of this interest, she makes no mention of the most obvious 
possibility, that of "big cash prizes."[13] 
Donna expects to assume fairly conventional sex roles when she is 
married. While she "would fight for any feminist cause," she claims not 
to mind some of the roles that women fall into, and expects that she 
will undertake the major share of child-rearing. 
Donna: But if you ever said you were going to take my career from me, 
I think a lot of the conventional parts of me would evaporate 
rapidly. I really do. I think I'm very, very career- 
oriented. But I think the reason why it's easy for me to fall 
into a conventional role is because of the fact I think I've 
taken it for granted that child-rearing and having a career 
were not mutually exclusive goals. Women have done it 
forever. And I think they always will. 
She plays out with me some of the possible implications of her certainty 
that "I would never stop ray career to have a family, but I would never 
not have a family because of my career." She would be willing to delay 
having a baby for a year or two if she felt that it was not a good time 
in her practice, but she would not let it "never be a time when I could 
have a baby." If necessary, she would change practice, reduce her 
caseload. Having a working mother has given Donna considerable 
confidence that it can all be managed. When she thinks about the 
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details of how it is to be managed, however, given that she would like 
to start a family within two years, she worries about how it is to be 
done, how much time she would stay home from her practice, whether it 
all would be good for the baby. She casts around for models, and notes 
that they are scarce. The one she is most aware of is Carol, a woman 
partner in the law firm she will be joining, who has two children. 
Donna: Unfortunately, she has set what 1 feel is a very bad precedent 
in that she has gone home on Thursday or Friday, had the baby 
and been back to work on Monday or Tuesday. I don't know if 
that's a rumor or a joke in that it seems so fast. 
Carol emerged in the course of my conversations as a minor myth in the 
area of combining career and family. Eileen, an associate in the law 
firm Donna will be joining, and whom I talked with for this study, 
mentioned her. She is the one woman partner out of thirty-three in the 
firm. Eileen describes Carol as "a star. Carol was kind of their dream 
of what a woman lawyer would be in some ways, and she had her first baby 
and came back after three weeks. She had her second baby over a 
weekend and was in court on Monday. I mean she's a woman, but..." 
Donna tells me she would definitely want to talk to Carol about 
this; indeed, she uses the phrase, "I'd like to talk to her about it" in 
reference to each of the few women lawyers whom she has heard have had 
children. She has a fundamental faith that it is possible; she has 
difficulty imagining how the initial conflicts between professional work 
and baby are resolved; in general, she feels that figuring it out is, at 
this point, "beyond me." She will hope to learn more about how to 
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combine the early years of career and family from other women who have 
gone before her. In Chapter V, the two women who are practicing lawyers 
will talk about these issues at greater length and with considerably 
more experience of the possibilities as well as the difficulties. 
As we ended our conversations, Donna spoke of the things she wants 
in life: peace of mind, a family, the sense of being "special or 
different from the average person." She focused most vividly, however, 
on the appeal of the law for her. She is "not an intellectual," but she 
has an active mind and finds that law affords the kind of challenge and 
material which enable her to focus, think and act. For her, this 
appears to be a requirement for security, even sanity. 
Donna: I would probably end up a basket case right now if I didn't 
have some sort of project to aim at. If you just have a mind 
to wander, you will end up a bag lady. Our society is built 
around focusing on some goal, be it what's going to happen a 
week from now or ten years from now. You constantly have to 
go from goal to goal. And people who are homeless, jobless or 
whatever, have nothing to... And if you have nothing to, no 
activity to control the thoughts of your mind, they just go 
out of control. And you just get delirious and you just walk 
around in a daze. I think I need something to focus ray mind 
as I think all people do, but I think I need something very 
challenging to keep my mind in order. 
Cindy's interest in control is primarily directed outwards: "I 
like to be in a position where I can do things the way I want them 
done," or "get me the outcome I want." Donna's desire for control is 
one calculated to subdue potential psychic or intellectual disorder and, 
for her, their social corollaries, homelessness and joblessness. Her 
vivid language on this topic makes it clear that in assessing people s 
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goals, knowing something of the wisdom of their choices, understanding 
the linear mode, we must take into account not only their vision of the 
possible, but also the particular demons they flee and feel protected 
against in their decisions. 
The cost and the pain for Cindy and Donna in attending law school 
has been considerable. But neither of them has thought of abandoning 
the field, and they both expect to be practicing lawyers. If we step 
back from their particular feelings of conflict and resentment 
engendered by the stresses of law school, these are the facts: they have 
attended law school, they will become lawyers, and only a very small 
percentage of their time in law school has been spent in the private 
world. Cindy complains that she has been unable to fit fun into her 
life during law school; Donna is dismayed that, in spite of great 
effort, she was unable to achieve the success to which she aspired at 
Harvard. Their complaints do not constitute a fundamental challenge to 
the methods of their law education, which have elicited their attention 
at the expense of almost all other interests or attachments. Who are 
these women who signed on for a program which leaves little time for 
intimacy or pleasure? The simplest explanation must be that they are 
women for whom intimacy and pleasure are not - at least at this stage of 
their lives - the critical aspects of life. If this is true, these two 
members of the second wave of law school admissions, part of the 
movement of women from the private to the public world, are making the 
Their insistence on the challenge and shift without notable regret. 
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appeal of the law, together with their lack of reference to the lost 
experience of a private world, indicates that they are natural refugees 
from the private world to which women were previously confined. It is 
therefore far-fetched to interpret Donna and Cindy's entrance into the 
public world as one which will fundamentally alter the practice of law 
by the introduction of the "female principle" of motherliness, with its 
virtues of care and non-competitiveness. In the simplest terms, Donna 
and Cindy have become law students because they are the kind of people 
who are relatively comfortable with the demands and restrictions of law 
education and practice. In this light, Cindy's desire to "do something 
for women" is no more or less significant and no different from a law 
student's desire to "do something about the environment." 
This simplifying view is important as an antidote to the kinds of 
grand hopes and claims that such feminists as Adrienne Rich advance for 
the potential impact on society of women emerging from the domestic 
world. Donna and Cindy, and thousands like them, will not make a 
radical change in the way that law business is conducted, nor vastly 
affect the quality of American public life. It is equally unlikely, 
however, that their arrival on the public scene will make no difference. 
While Millett, Firestone, Rich, the Marxist theoreticians, and other 
analysts of the patriarchy fail to explain convincingly the origins of 
the division, they all describe two spheres: one male, one female, each 
with its own characteristics which influence the development of men and 
women in every generation. Reform feminists likewise cite the different 
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cultural influences on temperament and personality development for men 
and women. And Carol Gilligan's study of identity and moral development 
in young adults demonstrates women's focus on interdependence, 
contrasting with men's drive towards separation; she also argues that 
women conceptualize decisions within an ethic of care, while men cleave 
to an ethic of rights.[14] Knowing, as so many studies indicate, that 
women think, decide, act and communicate differently from men, we shall 
expect some behavior change in the world of law as women enter it in 
large numbers. It is unlikely, however, that the attitudes and values 
that women bring to the public world will persist as a discrete force 
for more than one or two generations. By that point, a pessimistic view 
would have women fully incorporated into the law profession, and their 
behavior more influenced by the values and manners of the profession 
than the practice of law will be influenced by women. An optimistic 
view would have "womanly" qualities of interdependence, inclusive 
decision-making, and care bringing about change in the concepts and 
practice of law by all lawyers. It is particularly doubtful that the 
latter change will prevail without a consciousness on the part of women 
entering the law profession that this is what they hope to achieve. It 
is generally thought that a few women entering a profession are likely 
to be co-opted, to become "tokens." While it may be a pre-condition for 
change that a substantial number of women enter a profession, numbers 
alone are as likely to devalue the profession as influence its values 
while it8 prestige is maintained. Natasha Josefowitz, commenting on 
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this question in the world of business management, asserts the 
importance of a coalition of numbers of women with a similar set of 
values.[15] I would add to this that in order to create the 
possibility for change in the law profession, women must enter not only 
in numbers, many of them with values that are similar and different from 
the prevailing legal values, but they must also have a consciously 
developed goal for change, with an attendant strategy. Cindy and Donna 
will swell the numbers of women; their values are those of women in the 
culturally determined sense; but they have no expectations of 
influencing the way in which law is practiced. 
Donna sees an orderly and demanding life in law. Harvard Law 
School has been vigorous and exacting, her law firm wll probably be the 
same. Far from seeing herself as sufficiently powerful to alter this 
system, she is drawn to it as an extension of her early education, in 
which she was methodical and driven. Her main question is whether she 
will be "up to it," while somehow "fitting in" a family life. Cindy's 
resolution of her idealistic/realistic dilemma appears to have been 
accomplished sufficiently swiftly and totally to suggest that it was not 
profound. Perhaps her dreams of being a writer or leading a pastoral 
life were closer to senior fantasy than to a serious pull in the 
opposite direction from law school. 
As we leave Cindy and Donpa, to listen to Janice and Eileen, they 
appear as women suited for the law as it is practiced. Opening the 
doors of the profession has offered them an exit from an exclusively 
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domestic world or work to which they would have been less suited. This 
is undeniably an important opportunity for women. It makes a material 
and psychological difference for Cindy and Donna that their range of 
choice has been extended. It appears unlikely, however, that it will 
make a difference to the law that they practice it. 
CHAPTER V 
WOMEN AND LAW IN THE 1980'S: LAWYERS IN PRACTICE 
Eileen 
Eileen was raised by her mother in a lower-class neighborhood. She 
attended her local high school and then the University of Massachusetts. 
There she distinguished herself as a student and became one of a group 
of friends who had strong intellectual interests and expected to enter 
first-rate graduate schools. Although Eileen achieved the distinction 
of a place at Harvard Law School, she accepted the values of this group 
sufficiently to doubt whether law school was as academic, as "pure" as 
graduate school. She justified her decision to this group by suggesting 
that she planned to become a legal historian. But she had begun to 
develop reasons for being a lawyer when she was a child. 
I think it was a combination of practical things and also of 
ignorance and romantic notions about what it was like to be a 
lawyer. I think my vision of what lawyers did was very 
romantic before I went to law school...by being a lawyer I 
would be able to accomplish all kinds of social goals in 
everyday kinds of cases. I also thought that being a 
lawyer would allow me to be independent, which was one of its 
main attractions to me - that once you are a lawyer, you are a 
lawyer. You do not have to be employed by any particular 
group or association or corporation, and I thought that 
would be wonderful. That it was a skill that I could acquire 
and which would not necessarily be at the mercy of 
economic needs in a given year for nurses or college 
professors or something, and I also thought that being a 
lawyer meant being initiated into certain mysteries. 
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Eileen's romantic vision of law did not persist, but her belief is 
still strong that access to the law affords her some degree of 
independence and autonomy. The circumstances of her childhood gave her 
a strong desire to seek the means to control her fate: 
I can remember when I was growing up that my mother had a lot 
of legal problems, economic problems, and almost lost the 
house, and we always seemed to be dependent on whether a 
lawyer would do this or would do that, or a lawyer thought 
it was the right thing for my mother to do or not to do, 
and whether we would lose the house or lose the car or be 
able to get custody of the children...all the things that 
were the most earth-shaking decisions always seemed to be in 
the hands of lawyers. And very frequently, bad things 
happened to my mother and the rest of us because of the lawyer 
and the courts. And I remember thinking, "Well, this is all 
happening because we are at the mercy of these people who are 
initiated into the mysteries, and we aren't. So if I become 
initiated into these mysteries, no one will ever be able to do 
these things to me, because I will know what is going on." 
Throughout our conversations, it is clear that Eileen has a strong 
impulse to assert herself in ways that allow her to have control in a 
situation. It emerges that she is willing to give up a great deal of 
pleasure and private time in order to achieve a position of control in 
her professional life. Her first experience of achieving a little of 
this was in a job she held for a year before going to law school. 
...one of the things I discovered that year, when I had a 
certain amount of autonomy - I was for the first time 
telling them things, what to do — and I discovered I never 
wanted to be in a position again where I was totally 
helpless, at the very bottom rung of the hierarchy. I never 
wanted to be the secretary. 
Control was an important goal for Cindy: getting things done the 
way I want them done." For Donna, control was essential; without it, 
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she feared psychological and economic dislocation. Likewise, it is 
central in Eileen s choice of profession, and the manner in which she 
has pursued it. Beset by childhood recollections that homelessness and 
the break-up of the family loomed, she strives to be the most lawyerly 
of lawyers, her expertise beyond question. At a corporate closing, she 
was asked by the president, "Are you a lawyer?" "Inside counsel said, 
'She may be more of a lawyer than any of the rest of us in the room. 
She went to Harvard.' Well, there's no doubt about it; I mean, you 
really must a lawyer if you went to Harvard Law School. There's no 
question." The president's insulting question was directed at her 
because she was a woman. Eileen achieved the means to that response not 
by being a woman, but by being a person who has used her skills in a 
particular way to find a position of strength and control for herself in 
the world. The historical reality is that the means would not have been 
available to her twenty-five years earlier; Harvard Law School did not 
admit women until 1950. 
When Eileen was accepted to Harvard Law School, she was encouraged 
by "the absolute buoyancy that everyone on my street felt." But she was 
afraid that she would not "fit in," and her recollection is that 
initially she did not. By class, education, economic status and sex, 
she was an outsider. As she looked for someone with whom to share an 
apartment, she "didn't even think about calling someone who went to a 
good school." She apparently accepted or ignored most of the ways in 
which Harvard undermined her sense of confidence. But incidences of 
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sexism still evoke Eileen's anger as she recalls them. On the first 
day, she introduced herself to a fellow student as from the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst. '"Oh,' he said, 'I went to Yale. U Mass: 
Where the Boys Are. Is that why you came to Harvard, to find a 
husband?' Those were the first words out of his mouth. I said, 'Not if 
they are like you.'" On another occasion a woman student objected to 
the professor s presentation in an estates class, in which women never 
received more that a life estate or ever had a substantial sum of money 
to leave. She was "hissed and hissed and hissed; another woman tried 
stepping in for her defense, and the hissing got worse, and it just 
became pandemonium until the professor finally decided to make a 
sarcastic apology which was clearly intended for the boys: 'Now, let's 
humor them to get this under control.' It was a terrible scene and I 
just walked out with my blood boiling." 
But even in her early days at Harvard, as she encountered an 
elitist institution in which women were outnumbered four to one by men, 
Eileen found the means to manage the situation: 
I became very friendly...and it really was torture because 
they had to be polite to me - they had to be nice to me. I 
discovered that one of the most painful things to do to 
somebody is to march up to them and say, "Have lunch with me 
today." There was nothing - they were too polite to say no. 
And I would go to lunch and not talk about anything 
political. I would just be charming. I didn't flirt, but I 
would be charming, and in spite of themselves they had to be 
nice to me. Then, when I went to class...I would have 
friends, and they couldn't hiss at me. 
Eileen controlled her behavior and hoped thereby to control that of her 
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potential tormentors. Much of Harvard Law School was an experience of 
insult and put-down for Eileen, as a student and a woman. This 
assessment of her law school experience is similar to my view of my 
involvement in theater which I presented in Chapter I. Her stories of 
her first years in her law firm suggest that this experience was an 
appropriate preparation for her working life. 
But before I move on to present Eileen as a lawyer in Philadelphia, 
it is enlightening to hear her tell a story about a case she won in her 
hometown when she was in her first term at Harvard. Eileen tells the 
story in a leisurely manner, with a wealth of detail. She begins in the 
style of a children's story or a fairy tale: 
Around the corner from our street lived a little old widow. 
She owned a large lot of land that had been subdivided by 
zoning into two parcels. She lived in an old white farmhouse, 
and on the other plot was a neighborhood grocery store, which 
was divided into two portions. She sold little bottles of not 
very good red wine and white wine in one side and on the other 
side she sold milk and eggs and penny candy and sodas during 
the summer, and it was just enough to keep her going 
basically, and it was where your mother would send you to get 
milk or bread on a summer afternoon. 
The widow died, and an all-night liquor and grocery store chain bought 
the property with a view to building a new, large drive-in store, which 
would bring additional traffic to the street and noise at night. 
Eileen's mother and her neighbors decided to fight to oppose this 
development. After they had employed every legitimate delaying tactic, 
they needed a lawyer to rebut the developer's lawyer's brief. Eileen's 
mother called her. "I kept saying, 'No, no, you don't understand. I 
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still don't know where the ladies' room is here.' And they said, 'No, 
no, you represent us. You're at Harvard and you're going to save us."' 
So Eileen undertook to research the case and prepare a brief under the 
supervision of her writing program instructor. She went with her mother 
and her neighbors to the zoning board appeal, where the opposing lawyers 
and the head of the zoning board made sarcastic and provocative remarks 
about Eileen's youth and ignorance. Finally, the zoning board ruled in 
favor of Eileen and her neighbors. "That was my first victory as a 
lawyer - six weeks into law school - my first brief being taken by 
people in the street. He (the lawyer who was head of the zoning board) 
did turn to my mother as I was leaving, and said, deliberately for me to 
overhear, 'Well, what I said was going to happen has happened, 
Charlotte. Your daughter has lost all her femininity.' That was his 
private shot. He was forced to rule in our favor, but..." 
Eileen's victory in this case represents an achievement of romance 
and control, of the kind she envisioned when she planned to be a lawyer. 
She was able to play a heroic role in a contest between the good folks 
of her neighborhood - those who "thought that the fact that I was going 
to Harvard Law School was the greatest thing since baseball" - and the 
bad folks, developers and the small-town male legal community. Being at 
law school, particularly at Harvard, created a magic about her in the 
eyes of the people on her street. It was a certain belief in such magic 
that had led Eileen to Harvard. And in this instance, it proved a 
powerful magic. And this time, she was sufficiently initiated into the 
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mysteries of the law that she could save her mother, her neighbors, and 
herself. She was no longer at the mercy of lawyers; she could take 
control of the situation. To have her personal myths of a law education 
take such dramatic shape so early in her career was a powerful 
validation of Eileen's aims and motives. She described the sequence of 
events as "one of the most wonderful experiences." As she progresses 
through law school and practice, becoming more completely initiated, we 
shall see that such a simple and dramatic sense of achievement on the 
adversarial scene does not appear again. Instead, her need for control 
persists and transfers itself to all the professional situations in 
which she finds herself, although the original need for it has 
diminished and the sense of romance is reduced. 
During her first months at the law firm in Philadelphia where she 
has been for four years, she was given by a junior partner a research 
assignment for "Ralph, one of the two or three most powerful members of 
the firm." Eileen hoped to make good use of this assignment to bring 
herself to Ralph's attention: 
I was put in an office which was about four offices down from 
Ralph's, and every night at 6:10 Ralph would put on his coat, 
pick up his briefcase and walk down the hall. And at 6:08 one 
day I had planted myself in the doorway, and as I saw Ralph 
walking down the hall, I made a little exit. Never met him 
yet. And I said, "Oh, Mr. Bryant, I'm Eileen Howard, how are 
you?" "Oh," he said, "very nice." He was a very charming 
man. He said, "Very nice." I said, "I got this assignment 
from you, and I want you to know how really excited I am about 
it," and he frowned and you could see that he really didn't 
know what to say to me. "Well, I'll be frank, Eileen. You 
got this assignment because Alan Jones convinced me that you 
were really good, and this had better be good because I'll 
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tell you something. This firm wanted to hire women years ago. 
I opposed it and I am still not comfortable with it." And 
with that, he went off to his train. So I thought, "Why did I 
come to Philadelphia, why did I join this firm? I had to be 
out of my mind." So I went off and did the assignment and I 
did a really good job on it. 
Consequently, Eileen was put on "a really good case" for Ralph at the 
end of her first year. "I worked so hard, I ended up in the hospital 
because I got no sleep." And when Ralph gave out rewards when the case 
was over, Jeremy and Jack, the other junior associates who had worked 
with her, received good assignments. "I was given traffic tickets and 
social security disability. Shit cases...One of the things I realized 
was that Ralph will never overcome his sexism and he will never give me 
anything decent, so I have very quietly and tactfully withdrawn myself 
from all of his work." So, when the odds are overwhelming, Eileen will 
give up, but in story after story of similar odds and discouraging 
beginnings, she never gives up on the first round. Eileen seems to 
enjoy triumphing over the widespread sexism she encounters. It becomes 
hard to imagine her in a less combative world. Sexual harassment, 
usually considered an extreme form of sexism, Eileen takes in stride. 
When a colleague harasses her, she knows that she is expected to handle 
it herself, because "the client comes first" and dissension between 
lawyers working on a case is bad for the client, and because "there are 
too many balances of power going on in a partnership. People are simply 
not going to become outraged on your behalf and storm down to the 
partner's office and say, 'How dare you do something like this to a 
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woman lawyer.' Things don't work like that." 
At the end of our first conversation, Eileen has talked at length 
about her law school years and her first year of practice. Her tone is 
angry and bitter, she focuses primarily on her relationships with men - 
professors, fellow students, colleagues - and she mentions in several 
contexts that she is good at what she does, she is hard-working and 
competent. 
In our second conversation, a year later, Eileen focuses again on 
life in her law firm, its sexism and her prospects. She also talks 
about her feelings about the quality of her private life and her hopes 
in that sphere. Her tone in general is less strident than a year 
earlier. She is still very competitive, but less combative. She is 
acquiring the confidence of her own style: 
I'm enjoying being a lawyer more than I did my first year. I 
think that what I've found, particularly in the last year, is 
I now know enough about the basic skills that I don't have to 
be anxious all the time about whether I'm doing something 
right or not doing something right, and I'm beginning to, I 
think the last year, I have, I really realize that I have my 
own style...And I think that is a great problem for any new 
lawyer. I think that it is even more of a problem for women 
lawyers, because there are fewer role models available...and 
the way in which one presents oneself with authority, 
masculine role models don't work. 
Eileen's sense of personal style naturally involves finding appropriate 
ways to appear as a woman in a man's world and to control situations. 
She reflects on two topics that are frequently discussed by women 
lawyers: personal appearance and making the most of one's femaleness in 
the adversarial world. Here is Eileen at some length on the subject of 
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appearance, bringing a good mind and a competitive spirit to bear on the 
matter: 
One of the things that any trial lawyer wants to do is so 
simple as to be almost ridiculous, is that you want to be the 
center of attention. And that the first thing that you want 
to have happen when you go into a courtroom, you want to have 
everyone look at you as opposed to the other guy. And one of 
the things that I realized and have changed in the last year 
is the way I dress. When I started, I went out and bought all 
these cute little Brooks Brothers suits that looked exactly 
like men's suits only with skirts, and I wore Oxford cloth 
buttoned-downs and little plain bowties that were somewhat 
feminine, but, and plain pumps and so forth. And I looked - 
and this is a topic of great discussion among the women in the 
firm - I faded into the background, like a good corporate-type 
person. The problem, I think, is that women shouldn't fade 
into the background. I think that it's much riskier for a 
woman to fade into the background than it is for a man. And 
so I decided that I didn't want to fade into the background. 
And one of the ways in which I could be a center of attention 
is to use the fact that I can dress differently. I can wear 
colors that a male attorney would never be able to wear in 
court. There's no male attorney in the world who would ever 
wear a red suit to court; but I have a very elegant, red silk 
suit that I thought about and decided to buy, and I wear it to 
court the first day. And it's very effective, because when 
I'm in that sea of brown and gray and navy blue, whenever I 
move I catch people's eye. And I want the jury to watch me. 
I don't want them to pay attention to the other lawyer, I 
don't even want them to look at the judge. I want them to pay 
attention to me, because I want to be in control of what's 
going on in that courtroom. And I want the jury to be 
distracted when my opponent gets his chance, and the smallest 
movement when you're in a white suit or a red suit is 
noticeable. And I also think it makes a better impression on 
a lot of people encountering women lawyers for the first time 
if you're not too masculine. You aren't projecting an image 
of "just pretend I'm male." Because there's no way you're 
ever going to be a successful imitation of a male...I went out 
and bought very tailored but definitely feminine suits, and 
I've been doing things like wearing feminine belts and 
earrings and, not cluttered, but I have definitely decided 
that when I walk into a room now, it is important to have 
other people look at me and think that I am well dressed. 
Because that is another way I think that one has of projecting 
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confidence and control, and I want also to project the fact 
that I'm perfectly comfortable with being female and that I am 
also, that one can do all these things and also look quite 
professional. So that's something that 1 don't think I could 
have thought through a couple of years ago. 
Eileen, like Donna, talks in almost obsessive detail on a topic. 
These are the two most conventionally high-powered of the women 
interviewed they went to the most prestigious law school and are 
embarking on highly competitive careers. Their need for control is in 
each of them rooted from childhood. They think and decide deliberately, 
after weighing a mass of detail, about matters great but also, more 
often, small. Eileen's discussion of courtroom dress is similar in its 
length and detail to Donna's assessment of her test-taking ability. 
Women's talk about clothes has been as traditionally female as men's 
talk about baseball has been male. In this traditional arrangement, men 
and women have rarely found matters for common discussion. And men have 
held women's topics to be trivial. Mr. Bennett in Pride and Prejudice 
exemplifies the scorn of the educated male for the conversation of 
women. Hearing his daughters chatter about officers and regiments, he 
tells his wife, "They have none of them much to recommend them... they 
are all silly and ignorant like other girls." In Eileen's conversation, 
the women's topic of clothes is transposed from the ballroom to the 
courtroom. The quality of Eileen's attention to detail - of dress, 
motive, and aim - is striking. It is a testament to the perseverance of 
a women's topic into a new arena. It also leaves one sadly wondering, 
in the words of Milton's Adam after the Fall, "Is this the end/Of this 
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new glorious world?" Is this what there is to show for the great surge 
of women in law school admissions - an informed and thoughtful opinion 
on whether to wear a grey or a red suit? 
Let us look at how Eileen addresses the issue of finding her 
personal style in "making the most of being female." It will then be 
helpful to see that gaining control is significant in this as in the 
matter of dress. 
Men will tell me things that they won't tell a man, and 
sometimes it isn't even the subject matter, it's the quality 
of the detail... I can come in during a deposition and I can 
be polite, friendly, and ask questions and be interested, and 
be in some ways a sympathetic ear. And the person tells me 
things that he might not have told a man. 
Eileen cites the case of a man fraudulently claiming that he had 
sustained an injury at work. Eileen interviewed him: "I let him think 
he's got control of the situation... And he didn't know I had the goods 
on him until the last three questions... after he had decided that 'I'm 
really in control here and I'm really going to snow her.'" In the 
practice of law in a capitalist enterprise, Eileen finds ways to 
capitalize on her femaleness. Her focus is on how to use it and turn it 
to account in order to achieve success and profit in a world dominated 
by men. There is no indication that Eileen has any conscious goal of 
introducing "womanly qualities" into the practice of law in such a way 
as to change it. 
As we consider Eileen's views on appearance and appearing in a 
man's world, there is no sign - although she is almost constantly aware 
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of the male/female dynamics in law practice - that she hopes to bring 
traditionally female values or virtues into the world of law. There is 
no hint that Eileen expects to introduce the "ethic of care" (Gilligan) 
or the "female principle" (Rich) into this arena. And yet there is an 
enormous energy in her daily encounter with men in law, and she seems 
paradoxically to derive some of that energy from being a woman, from 
repeatedly gathering her strength to overcome obstacles and rejections. 
John Hunt has offered a theory of the difference in development for a 
man and a woman which suggests an explanation. In the growing years, 
everyone has experiences along a spectrum from powerless to powerful. 
For men, the weight is on the powerful end; for women, the experience of 
powerlessness is more common. [1] The need to move from the powerless 
end of the spectrum to the powerful is a normal developmental process as 
a person grows from small to large, but this process may be accentuated 
for women. Since the distance from powerless to powerful is greater for 
a woman than a man, it requires a more intense drive for her to achieve 
the same point. The drive may be most intense when, in addition to the 
"normal" female experience of powerlessness, there has been a childhood 
in which the woman or her family appeared powerless and ignorant either 
in relation to the law or in ways that suggested that knowledge of the 
law would be empowering. Donna and Eileen have shown the immense drive 
which has enabled them to overcome their double disability; the same 
drive has made them quite likely to succeed within the competitive terms 
of the law profession. It is not useful to say that these women are 
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"like men." Women whose primary goal is to achieve power and control - 
over their personal and professional circumstances now and in the future 
- are simply using and extending the means available to achieve their 
goal. Law school and practice are accessible and some women have 
decided to "go for it." In the simplest terms, the women most likely to 
succeed in law are not the women who demonstrate the greatest attachment 
to the ethic of care, to nurturance and connectedness with others. 
What does Eileen see in her future, in her profession and in 
personal relationships? "I'm aware that I'm about to hit the next big 
hurdle, which is three years away, but this is when you really have to 
start thinking about it...I'm at a point right now where they're going 
to start thinking about whether to keep me or get rid of me." What are 
her chances? 
Jacqueline: Are there any women partners in your firm? 
Eileen: There is one, there is one. She's a star. 
Jacqueline: Out of how many? 
Eileen: Well, she's the most senior woman in the firm. She's thirty- 
four. 
Jacqueline: How many partners are there in your firm? 
Eileen: Thirty-three - one out of thirty-three. But Carol was kind of 
their dream of what a woman lawyer would be in some ways, and 
she had her first baby and came back after three weeks. She 
had her second baby over a weekend and was in court on Monday. 
I mean, she's a woman, but... 
Jacqueline: You'd hardly notice. 
Eileen: You'd hardly notice, exactly. And to be fair to Carol, she 
was coming up through the ranks when things were even muc 
worse than they are now. 
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Given the odds, Eileen maintains a realistic perspective. She explains 
that the main difficulty does not lie in a simple opposition, of the 
kind that Ralph exhibits. In fact, "Nowadays a lot of the attorneys in 
my office department have concluded after all it isn't so terrible to 
have women attorneys." The central problem is that "they don't want you 
for a partner because you want a partner who can bring in business. And 
real business comes from male clients, and what male client, with all of 
the good male lawyers in the world to choose from, is going to send his 
business to a woman lawyer?" So Eileen is making no guesses about 
whether she will achieve a partnership. She will stay with the firm, 
hope for partnership, but expect to take her experience elsewhere if she 
has to leave. 
In discussing partnership and her capacity to bring in business, 
Eileen makes frequent reference to age - her present age and what she 
thinks she may do at thirty-five or at forty-five. Age is likewise on 
her mind when she talks about having a baby. Carol Gilligan defines the 
central assumption of her research as, "that the way people talk about 
their lives is of significance, that the language they use and the 
connections they make reveal the world that they see and in which they 
act."[2] Throughout our conversations, Eileen tended to return over 
and over again from a variety of topics to that of making it in the 
law profession, specifically in her firm. This central focus becomes 
most apparent when she begins to talk about having children. Eileen has 
recently had a miscarriage. Now, 
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... maybe I want to wait another three or four years, and 
maybe thirty-three isn't such a bad time to get pregnant. I 
mean, does it really make a difference if I get pregnant at 
thirty or thirty-three? And not to mention which, I'm now at 
the point where I have available to me, it's potentially going 
to be one of the most exciting periods of learning to be a 
lawyer because I'm getting to do more of the fun stuff... I 
won a big case. I won a million and a half dollars in my big 
case a month ago, and my stock has risen... it's important to 
me, even if I don't stay in the firm, to be known throughout 
my community of lawyers, the Philadelphia bar, as someone 
who's winning these big cases and to make the clients and 
contacts and to get the referrals. And that's going to take 
almost a hundred percent of my time. I'm not going to be able 
to really sit back and relax at all for the next three years. 
As she talks about her miscarriage and juxtaposes it to her work 
experience, it is vividly apparent how important to Eileen is the kind 
of success that is available to her in law practice. 
I was pregnant last year and lost the baby, and was very 
depressed about it afterwards. I was very frustrated because 
I think that was the first time in my life I'd ever decided to 
do something and had no control over it. I was very angry... 
I don't want to try again until I know that it's not going to 
bother me to fail, and right now if I failed again I'd be very 
depressed about it. And I don't think that I'm willing to 
take the risk again until I also know that I'm not going to be 
overwhelmed by a potential failure. And also because, at this 
point, I don't want to be pregnant right now. I can't ride in 
cranes if I'm pregnant; they won't take me to Toronto in a 
helicoptor if I'm nine months pregnant. And I would not be 
able to work until midnight on a fascinating deal if I were 
pregnant. And right now I'm getting these opportunities and I 
haven't had them before, and I don't want to suddenly take 
myself out of that stream of work because I'm not necessarily 
sure I'd be able to step back into it first of all, and 
secondly because I can look down the road and see that there 
is in that next stage a lull and that maybe what I want to do 
is try to schedule my babies in for that lull. 
This is a monologue of distress peculiar to the professional woman of 
the last ten years. She carries with her the traditional expectation of 
130 
motherhood and has the new access to professional achievement. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, most of the women who achieved 
notable success outside the domestic realm had few or no children; they 
were spinsters, widowed early, or late in marrying. With few methods of 
birth control available or practiced, married women were largely 
occupied with bearing and raising children. Modern methods of birth 
control give Eileen the illusion of control; she believes that she can 
not only prevent pregnancy, but "schedule" it. The miscarriage was a 
depressing reminder that her control is not complete. Yet expectations 
of herself and of her culture conspire to suggest to her that she has 
failed by not bearing her child. And the professional opportunities are 
very alluring to her. She speaks for many women when she says, "I'm 
getting these opportunities and I haven't had them before." For the 
time being, Eileen is pursuing these opportunities and postponing 
confronting the dilemma of children and work. 
Janice 
My interviews with Janice were very different from those with the 
other three women. Janice laughs a lot, she appears relaxed, and she 
has two children. She is also the oldest of this young group, having 
gone to Northeastern law school directly after completing her B.A. in 
1973. 
Janice's first topic of conversation is child care arrangements. 
When I ask Janice to tell me about her day, she displays the mix of 
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hectic activity, flexibility and a sunny nature which characterize her 
life as it emerges in our conversations: 
Well, it started at 8:30 this morning after my husband left at 
7:00 because he had an early appointment. At 8:30 my 
babysitter hadn't shown up yet, and I was due in court at 
9:15, so I called her. I couldn't decide whether she'd been 
in an automobile accident or she had just overslept. Luckily, 
she had just overslept. I put the kids in the car and brought 
them to Northampton where she lives, left them there while I 
ran to court. It really was quite nice, it was a beautiful 
day. I was glad about that. And also that they were very 
cooperative. I mean they just popped into the car with me and 
off we went. 
Janice accepts that "I'm not the type who could stay home with the 
kids and enjoy it." She had begun university as an elementary education 
major. But, 
... after I'd taken education courses for two years and worked 
at a playground with kids for two summers, I decided, I 
realized how much I hated working with kids, it was just not 
my thing. I would lose my patience all the time, and I like 
to have adults to talk to. I mean I just don't relate to 
children well for long periods of time. So I said, this is 
definitely the wrong profession for me. 
In 1969, Janice expected "to be a teacher when I graduated, what 
every woman did." Janice shows no bitterness about this tracking, nor 
any guilt about her unwillingness to be a full-time mother or child- 
educator. Not given to psychological analysis, Janice simply realized 
how she did not want to spend her time, and so went in another 
direction. Professional choices for women prior to 1970 were made in a 
simple framework: teaching, nursing or library work. Any other 
possibility was ill-defined. It was a rare woman who attempted to 
without first seriously considering one of the Women's pursue a career 
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Three. Once Janice had decided against elementary school teaching, she 
took one or two law courses and found them interesting. She was 
looking for a profession," law was "very interesting," and "I said, 
well, I don't like science, so I can't be a doctor." So, "Off I went; 
once I decided I was going to do it, I just went full steam ahead and 
took my SAT's or LSAT's or whatever, applied to law school, and here I 
am." 
Young as she is, Janice is from a different career generation of 
women from Eileen, Donna or Cindy. It is unthinkable that any of these 
three would have considered a career entirely unsuited to their skills 
and temperament simply because it was traditionally a female occupation. 
By the time they went to law school, becoming a lawyer was an acceptable 
occupation for a woman. Men have always had a great many more careers 
and occupations open to them than women; and certainly opening "male" 
professions to women, extending women's options, affords women human 
choices and offers society services provided by interest or ability 
rather than by sex. In spite of theoretical options, however, it should 
be noted that American young men graduating from Amherst College and 
similar institutions are restricted in the paths they pursue: medical, 
law or business school, and graduate school in an academic discipline 
are their four.[3] It will do little to enlarge the quality of 
American public life if women simply abandon women's professions for 
men's professions, particularly if men do not begin to incorporate 
women's professions among their options. It has already, for example, 
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greatly undermined the quality of school education in this country that 
teaching has been thought to be a woman's profession, and is held in low 
esteem as such; it will be even worse if many bright young women who 
once would have been teachers now become lawyers, and no corresponding 
men enter the teaching profession. 
Janice also, unlike the other three, whether by temperament or by 
parenthood, raises the question of "why am I doing all this?" She 
describes herself as "definitely sane by lawyer standards. Probably 
insane by anybody else's." Her approach to life is, "If you want it, do 
it." 
You do whatever is necessary to continue to have what it is 
you want. It's difficult, because we want everything, we want 
to have children, we want to have careers, we want to have 
time with each other, and we want to relax every once in a 
while, have friends. 
She admits that "it all falls apart every once in a while," and that on 
a bad day she and her husband come home from work exhausted, the 
children whine, and Janice wonders "am I pushing myself too hard, are we 
all trying to do more than we can really do?" Her frustration 
crystallizes around her inability to leave her young children for more 
than an occasional weekend. She would love to go away for a week with 
her husband, but her mother is unwilling to take care of such young 
children for more than a weekend, and Janice is unwilling to leave them 
for so long with anyone else. A week in which she could live somewhat 
as she did before she was a mother is Janice's most immediate fantasy. 
More generally, she misses the intensity of friendship that she 
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experienced in college and law school and "connections with other women 
who are my peers." 
As Janice begins to talk about her law school experience, she offers the 
now-predictable account of her first year: "It was horrible... Like 
everybody's first year in law school, it's horrendous." But she moves 
quickly from that to an account which is much less familiar. She 
experienced collaboration with fellow law students, utterly different 
from the cut-throat attitudes that Cindy described. Janice describes 
her study group as "enjoyable," and the friendships made in it as "nice" 
and "solid." Janice attributes much of her "different" experience of 
law school to having gone to Northeastern, which has a law school 
designed to be "different." Most of the students, unlike Janice, are 
not admitted directly after their undergraduate studies, courses are 
pass/fail, and there is no class ranking. Janice suggests that it is 
not "their touted theory of how they wanted to run the school" that 
creates the difference, since the faculty are "still very, very much 
into competition. But the student body was such that they wouldn't put 
up with it, essentially... It was a much better group to go to law 
school with because you tended to have people who were more 
interested... in learning, I guess just in learning as opposed to being 
very, very competitive." So Janice began to learn the basics of her 
profession in company with congenial fellows and as a member of a group 
which saw itself as assertive and influential. 
Janice married Bob, who was beginning graduate school at Harvard, 
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the summer before law school, and she describes her private life during 
the law school years attractively: 
We had enough time together. We were dirt-poor, so we didn't 
have any way to go out, so when we were home, we were 
together. And we had a nice little apartment actually in 
Winthrop, and in the summer we used to walk down to the beach, 
so it was pretty nice considering that we were starving 
students... we used to play tennis all the time and we used to 
go out for bike rides, we used to run together. That was a 
very good period. I mean, there were times when it was 
stressful, but it comes back as very carefree. 
This is strikingly different from the law student life styles of Donna 
and Eileen and Cindy, particularly the latter, with her one-hour-a-week 
relationship. There begin to appear so many ways in which Janice's 
experiences and approach to life are different from the others'. Janice 
chose to go to Northeastern; maintained an intimate relationship and 
developed friendships while in law school; is now in a smalltown 
practice rather than a more pressured situation; has children while 
practicing law. She is clearly a very different person from Cindy and 
Donna and Eileen, and her life is lived differently from theirs. 
Variety has a high value for Janice: she wants to "do it all." She is 
not, however, highly competitive and does not have to be the best at all 
she does. Janice's critique of a law school education is that "it can 
be a very narrowing experience": 
Because you learn to focus on issues, pick out certain things, 
because that's the kind of thing that will help you win your 
case, and you just pick out the one issue and hang your hat on 
that because that's the only thing you can hang it on. That's 
a skill that you need to develop. And some people develop 
that to an extreme and it carries over into the rest of their 
lives. 
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In their conversations with me, Eileen focuses much more than 
Janice on issues related to her law practice. When asked to tell about 
their day or their life, Eileen talks about her work and her law firm; 
Janice talks about "having young children, being thirty, and trying to 
put your life together." Being a lawyer appears to be a more critical 
part of Eileen's identity than it is for Janice. And Janice does not 
want a narrowly focused life, any more than she has sought a specialized 
practice. Let us look at the kind of practice Janice is in and her 
perspective on it. 
Janice is in partnership with a lawyer more experienced than she, 
and they have a flourishing, diversified, small-town practice. What 
does she enjoy most about it? 
The variety. Not having to do one thing all the time. That's 
the other thing about a big firm: it was clear that you would 
end up being a real specialist. In some senses, Dick and I 
will have to begin, have already begun to specialize in 
certain areas, but certainly not to the extent that you would 
in one of those big firms in Boston. You get your little 
niche and off you go for forty years. Boring. 
As a law student at Northeastern, Janice had been introduced to a 
variety of kinds of practice through her co-op jobs. She never had any 
interest in working in a large firm: "I saw what it did to people." 
She was aware that disavowing that world was a step down in her 
profession: "I think that some of my professors thought that that was, 
I don't know, was sort of a mark of somebody who didn't want to 
achieve." But Janice has little interest in status, and resolutely 
looked to practicing outside the city as most likely to offer her 
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pleasant work and a decent income. She firmly believes that when cost 
of living and hours worked are taken into account, her practice is as 
lucrative as a large firm partnership would be. When I first heard her 
mention this, my instinct was to call Eileen and see how much money she 
was making and what she anticipated making, to check out the validity of 
Janice's assumption. As Schuman notes, "The desire for order, for 
answers, for truth, is a strong and seemingly natural one."[4] The 
significance of Janice's claim is not in the comparative dollar figures, 
but in her perception that she does as well financially as big-city 
lawyers. Thus, the simplest incentive to competition - gross annual 
income - does not operate for Janice. It is particularly interesting to 
note that of the four, she is the only one to raise the subject of 
income. It appears that as a lawyer, she cannot lightly disregard the 
profession's rush for "big cash prizes." She seems satisfied with her 
lot, but needs to explain why she is not making large sums of money. 
The conditions of Janice's working life are pleasant. She works 
four or five days a week, as she determines, in a comfortable office. 
Her partner is intelligent and supportive. The practice pays for her 
child care, as a benefit outside her taxable income - a benefit unknown 
to most law firms. There is only one aspect of general practice which 
has little appeal to Janice - domestic relations. She describes 
herself as feeling "liberated" by reducing the number of divorce cases 
she handles to about six a year. This is the only time the central 
issue, so marked for Cindy and Eileen and Donna, appears in 
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conversations with Janice: 
The thing about doing domestic relations is that you're 
negotiating with people who have all sorts of different 
issues, very few of which are legal, but they all want a legal 
solution. They want custody or they want support, but it's 
all, there's all the garbage attached to it... When you're 
negotiating a contract, you have a feeling that you're in 
control... You feel like you're dealing with a real thing, as 
opposed to you don't know what you're dealing with, with 
domestic relations. 
Janice feels that in divorce cases her clients want "compassion, they 
want a social worker." This is not an area of comfort for Janice. She 
prefers to work with material that is susceptible to intellectual, 
financial or legal analysis, and to exercise the skills she has acquired 
to achieve a solution which is pleasing to her. Janice appears to view 
much of her work as a puzzle; she derives great satisfaction from 
figuring it out. Her favorite area of work is tax law: she has always 
had this interest, she listens to tax tapes as she drives to work; and 
she is about to begin a master's program in taxation at Boston 
University. 
Janice describes lawyering as "the one thing in my life that I've 
ever found challenging. I've never been challenged before I became a 
lawyer." She enjoys sorting out the issues in a case, convincing her 
client when necessary of the desirable course of action, and 
negotiating. While these are not activities confined to the practice of 
law, Janice feels her interests and abilities well matched with the 
requirements of law practice. Janice says, "I'm doing what I want." 
Eileen's words are, "I follow my natural talent. All four of the women 
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in this study have entered the field of law with considerable 
consciousness; none of them has drifted into it. While all of them note 
the pains of law school, they also variously express high levels of 
enthusiasm, interest and satisfaction in particular aspects of legal 
work. In attempting to discover the meaning of women's becoming lawyers 
at this time, the most central factor may be their expressed sense of 
satisfaction, their fulfillment of personal need or interest. Janice 
reflects on "What it is to be a feminist and what that means. What it 
is to be a woman lawyer": 
I no longer feel like I need to change the world through my 
life. I'm going to be a lawyer, I want to be a lawyer, and no 
one's going to stop me from doing that... I don't need to deal 
with it (sexism) head on all the time. Because I'm secure 
enough in myself that I don't have a problem with people who 
want to yell at me because they're threatened that I'm a woman 
and other women do other things... I mean, that's his problem, 
not mine. So I've gotten to the point where I don't feel like 
I have to battle all those issues. When I was younger, I felt 
like I did. I don't know if it's age or confidence, but I 
don't feel like I need to engage in those battles. Just being 
what I am is important enough, and that's all that's important 
to me. Doing what I want. As long as they don't stop me from 
doing what I want, then I'm happy. 
This is a moving testament to the opportunities for self-fulfillment 
that are extended by the removal of discriminatory barriers in education 
and by the opening of professional opportunities. There is no doubt in 
Janice's mind that she is a more contented person as a lawyer than she 
would have been as an elementary school teacher. This is a great deal, 
that the rules of American society have shifted to enable Janice to 
experience this. At some point, she - and the other three - have felt 
some expectation that they should "battle all those issues" in some 
direct fashion. Janice consciously rejects this task, perceiving it as 
a burden.[5] 
Comparative Analysis of Interview Material 
So, as women move into the world of law, it appears unlikely that 
they will, by the fact of being women, effect substantial change in its 
practice. In spite of cultural and developmental processes which foster 
a stronger sense of nurturance and care in women than in men, the women 
in this study show little evidence of it. By temperament and 
experience, they are drawn to the practice of law because it variously 
offers opportunities for working with linear modes of thought; the 
acquisition and display of intellectual and political skills; and the 
sense of power and competence that derives from working hard and 
successfully at something one is good at. The women in this study are 
drawn to be lawyers because they have the kinds of abilities and 
interests that suggest to them that law as it is practiced would suit 
them. There are many different forms of law practice, and this makes 
possible Eileen's match with a large firm and Janice's match with a 
small practice. Because of Eileen's and Janice's different choices, 
their public and private lives are very different. But in both cases, 
they are doing the kind of work they want to do. There is a congruence 
between their professional desires and aptitudes on the one hand, and 
the other. A friend of Cindy's expressed a simple their practice on 
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version of this when she said of her: "She's cut out to be a lawyer. 
She doesn't deal with the gray area at all. I'll be telling a story, 
and she interrogates me." Conversations with the four women interviewed 
suggest that the significance for women's sense of professional 
satisfaction in being admitted to the law profession is far greater than 
for the practice of law in its inclusion of women practitioners in large 
numbers. 
It is remarkable that all four women speak glowingly of their 
interest in law and lawyering. It is possible that the interview 
process, explicitly focused on these women because they are law students 
or lawyers, elicits comments that stress the positive. People may tend 
to express enthusiasm about their work when they know it is the subject 
of a study. But these women, acknowledging the unpleasantness of much 
of law school, and three of the four of them giving up almost 
everything other than the study or practice of law, speak in convincing 
terms of their interest in their work. This is perhaps a first- 
generation-of-women-lawyers phenomenon: they have not drifted into law 
the way they might have become teachers by default twenty years ago. 
Their choice is more conscious - in spite of the emerging pressure on 
undergraduate women to go unquestioningly to law or business school ~ 
and they are aware of the rewards of this choice. 
And how has the private world fared? As single women in law 
school, Cindy and Donna devote very little time to personal 
relationships. Although Eileen is now married, she and her husband 
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spend few hours together. But their relationship appears to be mutually 
satisfactory and supportive. Janice and her husband have a relationship 
of marked equality in the way that they approach working and parenting, 
and they spend most evenings and weekends with each other and their 
children. Only Janice's situation approaches a balance between work and 
intimate relationships. There has been considerable discussion in the 
last few years of the stresses on women of "trying to do it all," trying 
to be wives, mothers and professionals, trying to acquire the skills of 
men in the working world while being expected to perform traditionally 
womanly duties. The stories of these women confirm that "trying to do 
it all" is stressful. They also reveal another possibility: that some 
women are not, as they become professionals, trying to "do it all." 
Instead, they have moved almost entirely out of the private world into 
the world of public work. Not only is there little time in their lives 
for relationships of love or friendship; they make no reference in 
conversation to a book, a movie, a trip, or playing tennis. 
Each of the four women is becoming a lawyer in her own way; and 
each is finding a way to live a life largely inaccessible to women 
twenty years ago. At this early stage, the indicators are that women's 
access to the world of law will not materially affect it; but that their 
varying degrees of departure from the private realm will change some 
aspects of that. At its most bleak, this departure suggests a 
diminution in potential for intimacy. At its most promising, it heralds 
a new kind of family life. Janice's life is one in which she and her 
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husband each pursue 
and raise children. 
interesting work and together maintain a household 
And it works. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Women are leaving home to find a possible death in good 
causes.... the daughters of women who had gone mad from staying at 
home were going mad by being too much in the world. 
Francine du Plessix Gray 
World Without End 
Janet Rifkin: Her Story and Theory 
In the early stages of my inquiry into women becoming law students 
and lawyers, I interviewed Janet Rifkin. She is a lawyer, a professor 
of legal studies, a wife, a mother, a feminist, and a critical thinker 
about the law. For several years she has been engaged with the question 
of the impact of law school education, and has posed the question within 
the framework of a particular critique of the American system of law. 
In "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy," she argues that law has 
maintained the patriarchal social order, even as its forms have 
changed.[1] Although she acknowledges that litigation may offer a route 
to the improvement of women's lot in some spheres, she maintains that, 
"As long as the male-dominant power paradigm of law remains 
unchallenged, the basic social hierarchy will not change."[2] 
Janet's critical position has evolved over a period of years and 
incorporates views she has developed by retrospective reassessment of 
her own and others' law school experience and law practice. Janet 
talked to me in 1980 about her own story and the sense she has made and 
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continues to make of it. Her reflections demonstrate that "to think 
what we are doing has considerable power. Many of Janet* s experiences 
have been similar to those of Cindy, Donna, Eileen and Janice. The 
insistence with which she has pursued the meaning of these experiences 
creates a new understanding and way of being a woman lawyer. 
Janet's account of law school has some of the hallmarks of those 
heard in earlier chapters. The first year of law school? It was "a 
form of torture...very painful...my first set of exams was, I think, the 
most traumatic experience I've ever gone through." Having been a good 
undergraduate student, her confidence was assaulted in the first year of 
law school. The story unfolds in a familiar way as things got better in 
her second and third year. But then came the next horror, the New York 
bar exam: "It was the most intense thing. I have never studied so 
hard, I have never suffered so much. I mean, it was just absolutely 
outrageous." Even so, Janet believes that the whole process was 
preferable for her to graduate school and a dissertation. Qualifying as 
a lawyer was painful, but other possibilities seemed equally painful or 
"second-rate." Her father was influential in presenting career choices 
to her as limited: "Legitimate professional activity...was to be a 
doctor or a lawyer. And I just wasn't inclined to be a doctor. Janet 
was a part of the very earliest group of women in the second wave of law 
school admissions. In historical and public terms, she was breaking 
ground. The private experience, however, was that of the Amherst 
College male undergraduate of her era: a narrow choice, limited to 
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traditionally male professional options. 
After law school, Janet encountered the world of law practice as 
one of sexist combat, reminiscent of life in Eileen's law firm. She 
practiced in New York as a legal aid lawyer. She analyses vividly the 
courtroom drama as she perceived it: 
...What began to get to me was that every day I would come into 
court and I'd scream and yell with male judges, on behalf of my 
client, which was a completely losing battle. I mean, 
psychologically for me, I was trying to argue and convince them of 
the righteousness of my point of view and, with a couple of 
exceptions - I'd win once in a while - you lose, you'd always lose. 
Janet was able to play her part in the world of adversarial 
argumentation, but she registered that combat, with its inevitable 
losses, was debilitating for her. Her assessment of how a woman remains 
in a high-pressure law practice is that "you have to suppress a side of 
yourself in order to function and prove that you are completely equal 
and you are like a man." For Janet, that became "a really unbearable 
pressure." But, she notes, "there are those women who function 
perfectly well and they just don't see it like that at all." 
Recognizing that life in the adversarial world was debilitating and 
limiting for her, she became a professor of legal studies and, in that 
position, developed a successful mediation project and served as a 
university ombudsman. Her resistance to being a lawyer in the 
traditional sense has been the source of much of her energy in finding 
alternatives to the adversarial method and in developing a critique of 
the legal system. Having achieved substantial success in these areas, 
she is now willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the adversarial 
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method, and even to consider a role for herself in it. Since "people 
have a lot of legitimate anger," the law offers "an absolutely essential 
vehicle for at least confronting the system or people with some anger." 
So Janet's critique and professional life evolve in a manner which 
demonstrates "pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will." She 
proclaims the inability of legal changes to alter "the fundamental power 
structure," to address "the patriarchal social order"; in fact, "law is 
an impediment to social change." Becoming a lawyer, far from empowering 
one to effect social change, "at the very least it clogs your vision; 
you can't stop thinking like a lawyer." Yet she has continued teaching 
and thinking and writing and formulating her view of the relationships 
among women, the law and social change. In her work and in her thoughts 
for her future, it is clear that a belief in the possibility of a 
dignified, significant or active role for women in the legal framework 
is not quite extinguished. 
Janet's reflections differ from those of the other four women in 
that she has a developed theory of the role of law within which to place 
her story. Her theoretical perspective provides a view, but also an 
influence on how she is a lawyer. In answer to the question, Does it 
make a difference that women go to law school?" Janet provides an 
affirmative model. In her case, the inclusion of a woman in the process 
of law education and practice has afforded us a critique of the law in 
relation to women in America: a critique that goes beyond the specific 
laws that limit women, to the function of the legal system in 
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maintaining a sexual hierarchy. It is clear from Janet's story that 
women s entry into the legal profession cannot have a single meaning. 
As Schuman notes, "Events do not speak for themselves, and meaning is 
not a natural occurrence. "[3] As I draw conclusions from this study, it 
is important to remember this. The second wave of law school admissions 
does not speak for itself, nor should we expect, even as we pursue what 
it means, that there should be one over-arching meaning. 
The Women Interviewed 
In proposing some of the meanings inherent in women becoming 
lawyers, I began with the meaning for each of the lives of the women in 
this study. This will contribute to the emerging description of what is 
happening in this second wave of women lawyers. From this, I shall draw 
general conclusions about some of the meanings of women becoming lawyers 
and suggest possibilities for further exploraton and research. 
De Tocqueville's observation of nineteenth century lawyers, that 
they are "governed by their private interests," is applicable to Cindy. 
In her conversations with me, she has little use for the notion of law 
as a mechanism for impartial arbitration. She is an undisguised 
instrumentalist: "The law is just a device you use to get the outcome 
you want. My goal? Just use the proper strategy that will get me the 
outcome I want." While her interests and hoped-for outcomes are 
influenced by her feminism, her strategies are those that have 
traditionally been used by men for their interests. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that she finds it "useful" to attend law school, 
and extremely practical." Cindy is a woman who places little emphasis 
on her personal relationships; she can live virtually without them for 
long periods of time. The manner in which she has gone about achieving 
her goal of becoming a lawyer demonstrates her ability to be single- 
minded, planned, effectively focused on her goal. She is a doer, not a 
reflecter. She has well-defined views on oppression and discrimination, 
particularly of women, and she wants to do something, make some changes. 
It appears that she will put much of her energy into this, hoping as a 
lawyer to play a part in "alleviating some oppressive practices."[4] In 
becoming a lawyer, she will fulfill her family's aspirations for her to 
achieve professional status and her own desire to be active and 
effective on behalf of women's rights. Relationships with friends and 
lovers are occupying less and less space in her life, but she expresses 
little dismay at this. The world of law offers Cindy an opportunity for 
status and accomplishment, for a public life consonant with her 
political beliefs; and there is no indication that a minimal private 
world will be inadequate to her needs as she understands them. 
For Donna, law school and practice offer an arena for her 
achievement focus. She is highly competitive: "I've always competed on 
a scale, against what I considered to be a scale, of absolute 
perfection." Although, at the end of law school, she is getting tired 
of "this threshold after threshold," she has already demonstrated an 
enormous drive to succeed, to cover a great distance from the 
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powerlessness of her childhood to a position of prestige in a major law 
firm. Donna is less concerned than Cindy with what she can do with the 
law; instead, what the law can do for her is to offer an approximately 
appropriate means to achieve, to be in control, and to avoid 
intellectual and psychological disarray. All of this is sufficiently 
important for her that she inevitably defers pleasure and intimate 
relationships in her pursuit of these goals. 
Eileen resembles Donna in her competitiveness and her drive to be 
in control of events. In many ways, Eileen is Donna a few years down 
the road. Although her undergraduate friends suggested that an academic 
professional life was first-rate and that law practice was not, she 
resisted that lure to do well in their terms. The law offers her a far 
greater opportunity to direct her enormous energy towards a kind of 
success that includes winning. Eileen began life with a sense of loss 
and imminent losing. Now, she is willing to exchange almost all 
possible experiences for a sense of winning, of autonomy, independence, 
and control. Eileen discovers that there are things that she cannot 
control. In her first year in practice, "I worked so hard, I ended up 
in the hospital because I got no sleep." She tests the limits, and 
discovers the simple physiological fact that too much work and too 
little sleep make her ill. It requires a drive close to obsession to 
bring her to this point; and the profession of law provides a seductive 
opportunity for the full play of such an obsession. Eileen has very 
little time to spend with her husband, and it remains to be seen whether 
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she will have children. In the meantime, she works hard, often "until 
midnight on a fascinating deal." The norms of behavior in a large law 
firm countenance and encourage the amount of work that Eileen 
undertakes. 
Janice is less competitive than Donna or Eileen, less single-minded 
about the law than any of the other three. While the other three have 
selected law as the basket they are putting all their eggs in, Janice 
enjoys diversity and hopes for balance in her life. Law has offered her 
the opportunity to work in a profession for which she has considerable 
aptitude. Her interest in diversity makes general practice a perfect 
match for her, and her desire for a life that includes substantial 
family time makes a low-pressure practice more suitable than a city law 
firm. Janice is "doing it all": law practice, husband, children, 
graduate study, trying to find time for friends. She feels confident 
that she is a competent lawyer, more competent than many of the lawyers 
in the area. But she does not stress winning, being the best, or 
achieving a particular professional goal. The principal goal in her 
life that she cites is "making connections," with friends and with other 
women who are her peers. She misses the "intense experience" of 
friendship of her college and law school days and mourns the 
disappearance of that as her children have come to occupy so much of her 
time. So, for Janice, the law affords the opportunity to be "doing what 
I want." And the kind of law she practices and the way she practices it 
enable her to "do it all." 
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General Conclusions 
As we move from considering the meaning of law school education and 
practice in each of the lives of these four women, to proposing some 
general meanings inherent in the second wave of law school admissions, 
it is important to note that this does not represent a step in a 
hierarchy of values. A general meaning does not mean more than an 
individual meaning. The phenomenological approach to this inquiry has 
been one which accords importance to the stories and perspectives of 
each of the women interviewed. In this concluding chapter, my 
perspective becomes explicit, but the stories of Cindy, Donna, Eileen 
and Janice point towards some general conclusions and questions to 
pursue. Their stories are given meaning of wider implication; they are 
not lost in these conclusions. 
All four women interviewed want to be lawyers. Their conceptions 
of lawyering differ and their practices and expectations of practice 
vary, but each woman is clear that she wants to be a lawyer and is glad 
to be a lawyer. I do not propose that they have made informed choices, 
following any kind of serious review of alternatives, or that other 
professions might not have afforded them satisfaction. Eileen offers a 
psychological history which suggests a compelling reason for becoming a 
lawyer; the others sought a profession, and law seemed likely. But they 
believe that they have made a choice of profession, in a way that Janice 
would not have believed had she become an elementary school teacher. 
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Each of these women recounts her experience of the pains and horrors of 
law school, but none of them mentions thinking of quitting. And none of 
them mentions "big cash prizes," even lightly, as a reason to become a 
lawyer. Folkloric wisdom holds that law school is painful, but worth it 
because a lawyer can make a lot of money. Yes, these women say, law 
school was unpleasant, but I survived it in order to practice law, which 
is enjoyable and challenging. As law school becomes a more common 
option for a young woman, this attitude may lessen. Women may more 
readily fall into law school as Janice fell into elementary education. 
But at this stage in the second wave of law school admissions, women are 
finding a measure of fulfillment in their professional lives in the law. 
It is one of the fundamental meanings of women having access to a law 
education that it has afforded an opportunity for professional 
satisfaction, for fulfillment which was previously not available to 
women. 
This is a great benefit, the sense that one is, as Eileen says, 
"following my natural talent." Or in Gloria Steinem's words, "finding 
productive, honored work as a natural part of ourselves and as one of 
life's basic pleasures."[5] Too often women have argued for their 
liberation in some sphere on the grounds that it would be for the good 
of others. It is important to stress the simple advantages of enlarged 
opportunity and of professional satisfaction for women. As a woman 
enters the law, of course new problems and dilemmas arise. There is 
always a trade-off; but now, the woman has greater trading power. 
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It is clear from the stories of the four women that the experience 
of working in a small-town general practice is very different from being 
an associate in a large urban law firm. Eileen has found a place where 
her drive and ambition can mesh with the demands of a major law firm. 
And Donna will follow in her footsteps, deferring pleasure, working 
extremely hard. A large law firm requires the kind of drive and 
competitiveness that comes naturally to Eileen. Cindy is a single- 
minded and persistent student, and she is willing to put aside a private 
life. It looks as though she will continue into practice her habit of 
working intensely. But it is doubtful that the kind of practice she 
anticipates will require it. Eileen's law firm repeats the conditions 
for competition that prevail in law school: more work than is 
manageable, peers to compete with, and the vulnerability to judgment by 
one's seniors. Janice has deliberately opted for a small-town practice, 
which enables her to maintain some balance between her professional life 
and her intimate relationships. The differences between high-pressure 
practice and low-pressure practice are immense and cut across a number 
of possible generalizations about the profession of law and its impact. 
While Janice and Eileen have self-selected into firms that are 
compatible with their ambitions and which allow them to live their lives 
according to their fundamental dispositions, it is important to note the 
status that attaches to their choices. Eileen will earn more money than 
Janice; Eileen went to a prestigious law school, while Janice did not; 
it is clear that Eileen could practice in a small town if she chose, 
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while it is unclear that Janice would be taken on by a law firm such as 
Eileen s. Janice says, 'I never had any interest in working in a large 
firm. I never had any interest in doing it, ever. I saw what it did to 
people." But since success in the law profession is so often defined as 
joining a major law firm, Janice feels bound to explain her "failure," 
as Eileen has no need to discuss why she is not in a small practice. Of 
her lack of interest in a large firm, Janice notes, "I think that some 
of my professors thought that that was, I don't know, was sort of a mark 
of somebody who didn't want to achieve." Indeed, she doesn't have the 
drive for professional achievement that Eileen has. Her gain is a 
reasonably balanced life, a quiet enjoyment of her work, time with her 
husband and her children, an absence of the kind of striving which 
requires the deferment of pleasure. Eileen's gains are in work that she 
finds exciting and the prestige of professional success. 
The issues of satisfaction and of the differences in practice 
relate to the quality of life for women in the law. The meaning of 
their presence in the law also inevitably involves questions about their 
impact on others, about whether their presence has made a difference to 
the practice of law, to institutions, to the way business is conducted, 
to the quality of public life. The answer to all of this, it appears, 
is that they have made little difference. It is commonly assumed today 
that it is a "good thing" for women to have equal access to the 
professions. This is an assumption in the articles which appear from 
time to time in the New York Times and in Alumni and Alumnae magazines, 
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reporting that talented women have appeared in large numbers in law 
firms and in courts of law. Their skill in "juggling responsibilities" 
is applauded, lingering sexism is noted, and a bright future is 
anticipated. But there is no exploration of what makes women becoming 
lawyers a good thing - or for whom. The evidence of this study is that 
the world of law is powerfully organized to maintain the status quo, 
within the profession and in its dealings with the world. It is 
powerful enough to withstand the apparently major change of a large 
influx of women; it can incorporate women rather than being altered by 
them. The history of law education in this country reveals that ethnic 
groups and women were excluded as long as possible. When they could no 
longer be excluded, they were admitted on unchanging terms, which offer 
no acknowledgement of the special contributions that might be made by 
these groups. Diversity is not a value for the law profession, and 
where the law schools have had to yield to women, the demands for 
submission and competitiveness on the part of students have largely 
outweighed any influence that women might have had on the way in which 
students are prepared for the practice of law. In summary, the law is 
about maintenance, not change, and law schools are uniform and 
unchanging in their manner of training lawyers. This predicts to a 
large extent the kind of students, whether male or female, that the law 
schools attract. 
Carol Gilligan's studies exploring identity development and the 
nature of female and male approaches to moral conflict and decision¬ 
making describe and legitimize women's emphasis on "relationships and 
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interdependence as opposed to men's focus on a "morality of rights and 
noninterference."[6] Gilligan reframes women's emphasis on attachment, 
nurturance and relationship as strengths in their moral development, 
rather than, as they have previously been viewed, as handicaps to their 
attaining maturity. The characteristics of women that Gilligan charts 
are not apparent in the lives of Cindy, Donna or Eileen. An emphasis on 
relating and connectedness leads to the search for inclusive solutions 
to problems; the law offers an exclusive, win or lose, rights-based 
approach. As a profession, it appeals to those who are at ease with 
this mode of conflict resolution. I propose, therefore, that one reason 
that women are not making any significant impact on the way law is 
practiced is that those women who become lawyers - at least in the most 
powerful and prestigious areas - are apparently already "like men" in 
their orientation towards problem-solving. 
If women entering the law are not making a substantial difference 
to it, what is their impact in the private world? Here the evidence, 
and the way women talk about their private lives, suggest that changes 
are underway. In Eileen's and Janice's marriages, one sees two 
different models, each of which represents a departure from tradition. 
Traditionally, marriage has been the most consequential act in a woman's 
life. The obligations she incurs by marriage, and then by motherhood, 
have limited the professional possibilities open to her. Men have not 
been similarly limited by marriage or fatherhood. Family life has been 
held to be primary for women, secondary for men. This is not the case 
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in Eileen s marriage. She and her husband have equally demanding 
careers. They both spend extremely long hours at their respective law 
firms, and have an understanding that there is little time available for 
creating a home or spending time with each other or with friends. As 
Eileen looks ahead, she believes that "my career has more potential than 
David's does." Unless she has a child — and how that will be managed is 
unclear - there is no let-up in sight on the professional front. 
Eileen's career is the focus for almost all her energy. So marriage 
becomes a relationship of equality for Eileen and David, but one that 
does not engage much of their time. For a husband who is an aspiring 
associate in a major law firm, this minimal engagement is not new. But 
that the wife's role should duplicate the husband's is a recent 
phenomenon. Since most middle-class American marriages until now have 
been based on a fundamental division and differentiation of roles - in 
which the husband is to be worldly and practical and the wife nurturing 
and domestic - a wife's renunciation of her traditional role for one 
identical to her husband's will inevitably foretell a major shift in the 
experience and function of marriage. 
Janice's marriage is also one of equality, in which each partner 
has a major career focus and also shares in domestic and family 
decisions and tasks. In this marriage, Janice has not abandoned the 
traditionally female role; Bob has joined her in assuming it. In 
consequence, by being shared, it is a new role. Again, this is a 
different experience of marriage from the traditional one. Bob and 
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Janice have rejected a division of roles in favor of each trying to "do 
it all," but together. 
For women to go to law school and become lawyers is, one assumes, 
to extend their options. Undoubtedly, this is true on the professional 
front. In exercising such an option, however, women are altering 
fundamental assumptions about the family. It becomes difficult to 
maintain the woman as the emotional center, the force for connectedness 
in the family, if she is as deeply engaged in the world of work as her 
husband. Certainly, there are families in which women will literally 
try to do it all by becoming lawyers, and attempting to be wife and 
mother in the traditional sense. Neither Eileen nor Janice is doing 
this, and it suggests quiet but far-reaching changes. Janice's 
relationship with her husband is one of extensive sharing, and Eileen's 
tends towards the minimal, but both relationships are charactertized by 
mutuality. 
What will it be like for children growing up in these new families, 
with these mothers? It is impossible to predict the kinds of parents 
that Eileen and David or Donna and her future husband will prove to be. 
Certainly, they will not be able to do it either in the traditional way 
or as Janice does it if they continue to work at their present level. 
Janice and Bob's approach to parenting suggests a new model, an 
extending of options for family organization and experience. Janice s 
children do not have a mother who is primarily at home (the traditional 
model) nor one who is almost entirely engaged with work (the male 
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model). Her children are growing up in a family in which inclusiveness 
and connectedness are inherently probable in the family structure, which 
is one of sharing and balance. No longer is it the exclusive 
responsibility of the wife and mother to foster those relationships 
which will support the interweaving of family members. 
It appears that a woman can become a successful lawyer and be a 
good parent. Janice has what has been described as "the winning 
combination of the two ingredients absolutely necessary to dissolve the 
career-mothering double bind: a thoroughly supportive husband and a 
sympathetic employer."[7] In fact, her husband is more than 
"supportive," a notion which would leave Janice with the "psychic 
burden"[8] of responsibility; he assumes equal responsibility for the 
care of the children. Her employer is "sympathetic" in practical ways, 
allowing her a four- or five-day week as she chooses and providing a 
child care benefit. But recognizing that her employer is sympathetic 
offers an inadequate analysis. Janice is in a position which is not at 
the highest level of professional demand. If she were, she would find 
the whole organization of the law profession and the demands of a high- 
pressure law practice standing in opposition to her desire to combine a 
satisfying family and professional life. 
Philip Slater offers a bold account of the impact of public life on 
private relationships: 
...by and large, a successful public career is not compatible with 
leisurely and gratifying love-making. There are only so many hours 
in a day, after all, and strong involvement in a love relationship 
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even a marital one will ultimately impinge upon career 
activities ("he's neglecting his work for this affair"). Should 
the careerist choose love, he would cease to be a careerist.[9] 
There are notable exceptions to this theory, but in general Slater is 
right. Recognizing this present reality and making conscious choices 
may save some wear and tear on nerves and families. 
In noting the multiplicity of meanings in Americans' undertaking 
higher education, Schuman observes, "The bad news is this: Many of the 
'true meanings' of college seem to be hurtful to people."[10] And 
later, "This, it appears, is what college is getting people ready for: 
jobs that pay well, carry respect, and, possibly, make people sick."[11] 
This, it also appears, is what law school is getting many people ready 
for, only more so. So, before despair becomes a plausible response, it 
is helpful to cast a glance into the private world women are leaving and 
to try to capture the public/private dilemma. 
The law is a world of simplicity, offering an approach to life 
which is exclusive. Women are leaving a private world of complexity and 
inclusiveness for this; they are following men in escaping. While a 
debased public world does not offer peers or the opportunity for 
excellence in the Arendtian sense, it nonetheless offers collegial 
companionship as an alternative to the woman's isolation in the nuclear 
family. And there is a frightening aspect of women's private world - 
violence. As women become lawyers, they may find public power an 
elusive notion in a bureaucratised society; but they can acquire power 
tools to use for the protection of women. And, once in the public 
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world, they are less vulnerable to control by domestic violence. If 
women stay in the private world, their development is limited, their 
opportunity for fulfillment curtailed. They will, in consequence, have 
less to offer their children. Women at home enable fathers to offer 
only marginal parenting. And the division of interests between men and 
women militates against commonality and intimacy. Yet, if women go into 
the public world in a serious way, they may find limited real support 
for their move, so that there is new and perhaps greater stress on 
family relationships. And as women become professionals at a high 
level, they will tend to "become men," to operate competitively and 
exclusively, rather than in a caring and inclusive way. 
Women are moving into the professions in large numbers, and there 
is no sign that the trend will reverse. Becoming a lawyer is an option 
which many women will choose to exercise. In doing so, they ensure an 
escape from the feminine mystique; but they risk succumbing to a 
masculine mystique. For law education and practice to cease to be 
"hurtful to people," a new definition of success is required. Success 
would include achievement through hard and honored work, but not so much 
indulgence in competition that it can kill ~ the individual, health, 
relationships, and the family. Ironically, by entering the field of 
law, women have increased the competition for places in law schools and 
law firms. While there remains considerable sexist opposition to these 
women, there is also much unthinking support for their "going for it." 
Gilligan's studies on development have called into question all previous 
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studies and theories of adolescent and adult development, and they point 
the way to "a changed understanding of human development and a more 
generative view of human life."[12] Gilligan's work is clearly only the 
beginning of this new understanding, which may prove more powerful in 
leading towards a changed quality of life for men and women than much of 
the legislation that has been introduced by women's efforts. If women 
understand their developmental processes, they need not adopt male 
behavior automatically as they become lawyers. If women's emphases on 
attachment and care are supported and validated in the school and 
college years, at the same time that they are encouraged to achieve in 
the public world, women will have a moral foundation on which to build a 
life that includes love and work. 
Implications for Further Research 
This study represents an effort to deepen our understanding of the 
implications of women becoming lawyers, of a major movement of women 
into the public sphere. Future studies in this area should look beyond 
easy assumptions about the desirability of such a move and beyond "equal 
access." 
In Gilligan's research, "the contrasts between male and female 
voices are presented...to highlight a distinction between two modes of 
thought..."[13] A study similar to hers in methodology undertaken in 
law schools and within the law profession would be valuable in providing 
insight into the apparent discrepancy between her conclusions and those 
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of this study. Is it only that women whose modes of thought are most 
like men's select to become lawyers? Or is there a process whereby 
women's modes of thought are transformed by the powerful culture of law 
education and practice? Gilligan notes that the "different voice" is 
"characterized not by gender but by theme." However, "Its association 
with women's voice is an empirical observation, and it is primarily 
through women's voices that I trace its development."[14] Why is it 
absent in the voices of the women interviewed in this study? 
A second area for further research is in other professions. 
Studies similar to this one should be undertaken, at a minimum, in the 
fields of medicine and business. A careful comparative analysis of 
women talking about their lives as lawyers, doctors and businesswomen 
would create a broader foundation for hypothesis about the impact of 
women in the professions. 
Finally, much remains to be known about the newly developing 
families of these professional women. Some of these women will remain 
childless; some will share the responsibility with their husbands for 
raising their children; many will attend workshops with such titles as 
"Multiple Roles: An (im)Possible Balance,"[15] worrying about how to 
manage all their responsibilities. Much more needs to be known about 
the nature and experience of the alternative models available to women 
in combining public and private lives. In a dissertation on women 
psychologists, Patricia Mikols notes the influential role of supportive 
spouses in their career development.[16] What characterizes the 
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supportive man? What is the impact of this new role on his life? And 
over the next twenty years at least, it will be important to chart the 
comparative growth and development of children in the newly emerging 
family structures. 
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